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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South EIoward Street, Suite 41 6
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-71 00
Fax: (509) 455-71 11
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF T E SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
CaseNo.:
Plaintiff,

c v 08 -01 7

9
zF ,::>

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
MICHAEL E. MGNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & MCNICHOLS,
PA., an ldaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES I-V, unknown individuals;
Defendants.

Category: A. 1.
Fee: $88.00
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Reed J. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, BISSELL &
KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all applicable facts alleged below are incorporated by
reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each such cause of action):

I. PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is an elderly person as defined in I.C. $ 48-608.
2.

Defendant Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. ("Clements Brown") is

an Idaho professional corporation in the business of practicing law. Clements Brown is

COMPLAINT - 1

vicariously liable for the acts of (he individual Defendants.
3.

Defendant Michael E. McNichols is an individual residing in the state of

Idaho and is an agomey practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Clements
Brown.

4.

Jane Does I-V are h

o

w individuals who are and/or were at-lorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants.

11. WMSDICTION, VENUE AND CLAIMS

5.

The Defendants transacted business through the practice of law in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as defendants in Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

The Defendants committed tortious acts andlor assisted in the

commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The Defendants' tortious acts
andlor assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

6.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court.

7.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action. Plaintiff

Reed J. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc., the only
shareholder of AIA Insurance, Inc. by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, and
the largest creditor of AIA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000
and AIA Services Corporation is insolvent).

AIA Services Corporation and AIA

Insurance, Inc.'s value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000, plus
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed J. Taylor. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor is
entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defeidants for certain damages.
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1111. FACTS
8.

At all material times, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was owed over $6,000,000

by AIA Services Corporation &ough a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Plaintiff
Reed J. Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AIA Services Corporation. At all
material times, the Defendants had full knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's debt
and contractual obligations owed to Reed S. Taylor.

9.

AIA Services Corporation was in default of the $6,000,000 promissory

note when it failed to pay the note when it matured on August 1, 2005. Although
unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on August 1, 2005, demand
for payment was properly served upon AIA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor on December 12, 2006. AIA Services Corporation was insolvent in 2001, and bas
continued to be insolvent fIom said date.
10.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AIA Services

Corporation, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and all of the commissions and related receivables of
AIA Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation. Pursuant to the Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1, 1996, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor had the
contractual right upon default of AIA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AIA
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of AIA Insurance, Inc. Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor's right to vote the stock of AIA Insurance was also perfected through AIA
Services Corporation's irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed J. Taylor that was
coupled with an interest as required by 1.C $ 30-1-722.
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11.

On February 22, 2007, Reed J. Taylor voted the stock of AIA Insurance,

h c . and a%empted to take control of it pursuant to his conlsactual rights as provided
under the law, the contract documents, and I.C.

5 30-1-722.

However, the interested

directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (including K. John Taylor) by and through the
Defendants intentionally assisted in breaching the terns of the Arnended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement and reksed to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's valid vote
of the stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. and refused to surrender control as required. The
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining andor maintaining a restraining order and
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, when the Defendants knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and
funds of AIA Insurance, Inc. were being rnisappropriated andor not safeguarded.
12.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and
others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches
of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208
("Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al."), and therein Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
obtained an order of partial surnmary judgment for AIA Services Corporation's default of
the $6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial surnmary judgment andor his prior vote
of the stock, Reed J. Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance, Inc.
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J.
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Taylor's rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AIA Services
Corgoration, AIA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J, Taylor.

13.

In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AIA Services

Corporation, et aE., and assumed the direct legal representation of three distinct clients,
AIA Services Corporation, a corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., a corporation, and John
Taylor, an individual, and indirect legal representation of other interested parties
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman). At all material times R.
J o h Taylor was an interested CEO and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AIA Services Corporation. The
civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and ~efendants' duty of care, the Defendants
undertook to represent the three named clients, each having irreconcilable conflicts of
interest with the others.

14.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the

Defendants in early 2007, that it was a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct and duty of care to represent AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
and R. John Taylor because of various conflicts of interest. On March 28, 2007, the
Defendants finally recognized the violation and withdrew from representing AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. Although the Defendants should have
withdrawn from representing R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation and AIA
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Insurance, h c . in Tqylor v. AIA Sewices Corporation, et al., the Defendants cornmified a
fixther violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care by
terminating the representation of the corporations and continuing to represent R. J o b
Taylor, which was a breach of their duty of loyalty to the corporations. Defendants'
actions constitute a violation of the "hot potato" doctrine.
15.

The Defendants inappropriately entered into andor pa~icipatedin a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
Crop USA Insurance, Inc., R. John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in
Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and
diverging interests in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Defendants'
duty of care, and to the detriment AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and
Reed J. Taylor. In Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, ei al., a Joint Defense Agreement
was not permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding
and abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed
consent from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense
Agreement was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a
joint defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement.
The Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate andor hide acts of fraud,
fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and
other claims, while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of
fees and costs in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care.
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16.

The Defendmts assisted AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,

Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and others in taking action that was
not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, andor
done so without requiring AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. andor Crop

USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to retain separate independent counsel that were retained by
separate independent uninterested parties.
17.

As attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, an entity, the Defendants

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the assets and
businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services Corporation was insolvent, to its
creditors including Reed J. Taylor. As attorney for AIA Services Corporation, and in
light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor,
the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume representation of the
interests of R. John Taylor, individually andor through a Joint Defense Agreement, or
with any other interested parties.

18.

As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc., the corporation, the Defendants

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the
corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and
assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in
control of the corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance, Inc.

and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporate client not to a s s m e representation
of the interests of R. John Taylor, individually andor though any Joint Defense
Agreement, andor of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Ine.).
19.

As aaorneys for R. John Taylor, individually and through any Joint

Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct and their duty of care. As attorneys for R. John Taylor by and through taking
directions andor accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against R, John Taylor

by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their corporation clients
not to assume representation of any party other than that of the interests of AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.

The Defendants failed to noti@ or obtain

appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate parties or disinterested
shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the
Bylaws and Articles of Formation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed J.
Taylor. The Defendants inappropriately participated in the Joint Defense Agreement.
20.

As former attorneys' for AIA Services Corporation andor AIA Insurance,

Inc., the Defendants owed duties of loyalty to the corporations and could not represent R.
John Taylor in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al., represent the interests of other
interested parties because the Defendants' loyalty belongs also with AIA Services
Corporation andor AIA Insurance, Inc. Furthermore, the Defendants could in no way
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represent the interests of Grop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. or pa&icipate in any joint
defense of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, andlor Michael Cashman) as AIA Services
Coveration andor AIA hsurance, Inc. should have been asse&ing claims against Crop

USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other, and other interested parties.
21.

Defendants represented, and continues to represent, R. John Taylor

(individually and though any Joint Defense Agreement) and with full knowledge that R.
John Taylor is an interested party and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the course of
litigation involving the Defendants' former clients, AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc., to the detriment of Defendants' former clients, AIA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance, Inc.

22.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants

have coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP, the law firm that has
represented AIA Services and AIA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation,
and Hawley Troxell, the law firm that assumed the representation of AIA Service
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. from the Defendants (and later the inappropriate
representation of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.). During the course of the civil
action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others have further engaged in
inappropriate andlor wrongful transactions involving themselves, AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Grop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which
transactions have occurred with Defendants knowledge andlor assistance, and to the
detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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as creditor and stclck pledgee.

23.

Deendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor for an arnounl to be proven at trial

because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance andlor aided and abetted R.
John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and other interested parties in acts of fraud, fkaudulent conveyances,
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties.

The acts of fraud,

fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties
include, but are not limited to: I) While purporting to represent AIA insurance, Inc. and
AIA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted andor aided and abetted R. John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's
contractual rights to control and operate AIA Insurance, Inc., which has proximately
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or
aided and abetted R. John Taylor and other interested parties to engage in tortious
transactions involving R. J o b Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.,
andor Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which such transactions have been to the
detriment of AIA Services Corporation, AIA ~nsurance,Inc., and Reed J. Taylor, and
proximately caused damages to Reed J. Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3)
While representing R. John Taylor, individually and through a Joint Defense Agreement,
the Defendants have had full knowledge that their client is an interested party and
director of AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation
involving the Defendants' former clients, AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance,
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lnc,, and Dekndants have assisted andlor aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others
(including, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and bas coordinated and part-icipated with
the Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in R. John Taylor's engaging in tortious
transactions involving himself, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA
Services Cofporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed

J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee.
24.

In connection with the Defendants' inappropriate representation andor

joint defense of R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties, the Defendants accepted
payments of atlomeys fees and costs believed to exceed $100,000 in violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and as participating andor
assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.

25.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed J. Taylor v. AIA Services

Corporation, et af., Reed J . Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith,
Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the Defendants on dumerous occasions that their conduct
violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, was inappropriate,
and constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties
(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), among other potential
legal claims against them. In early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their
inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed J. Taylor.
Mr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite
Mr. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed J.
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Taylor. The Defendants disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be constmed as
intentional improper acts to assist R. J o h Taylor and other interested parties to the
detriment of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor and others.

26.

The Defendants wronghlly assisted R. John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, inc. with the fbnds, assets, employees,
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from AIA Services
Corporation andor AIA Insurance, Inc., and by assisting R. John Taylor and other
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in preventing claims
from being asserted and prosecuted against thern. The Defendants wrongfully assisted
and/or failed to prevent interested parties (including R. John Taylor) in transferring the
long-term employees of AIA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., while
at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation that the
corporations were being operated properly andor failing to advise the Court of the
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants were aware of andor
assisted in the inappropriate payment of salaries, benifits, compensation, and director
fees of $20,000 per year when AIA Services Corporation was insolvent.
27.

Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made personally and through his

attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and
funds of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and recover funds and assets
fiom R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other interested and
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their duty of care, and
the law. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.
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Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or
protected because of the wronghl acts of R. John Taylor and other interested parties, the
Defendants refizsed to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts to
the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.

28.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submiEed to the court in

Taylor v. AIA Sen~icesCorporation, et a t , the Defendants made arguments that did not
benefit AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., or Reed J. Taylor,
inappropriately made other argments preventing valid claims from being asserted
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take action against responsible parties
(including R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie Taylor, James
Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others).

In the instance of

Michael Cashman, the Defendants successEully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AIA

Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual
when the Defendants should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others.
29.

Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.

Bond) that disinterested directors andor parties must direct the litigation on behalf of the
corporations, the Defendants refused and permitted andor assisted R. John Taylor and
other interested parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and
Reed J. Taylor. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick
C. Bond) that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance, Inc.'s improper guarantee of a
$15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., the Defendants refused
to act, failed to inform or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the
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existence of such inappropriate loan guarantees.

30.

The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all agorneys"
fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AIA 'Sewices Corporation, el al. and other related
and w e l a t e d legal representations. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his
allomey Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and their
duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so.
3 1.

Through the acts of the Defendants, the value of AIA Insurance, Inc. and

the assets of AIA Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in
value, the corporations' value and assets have been impaired, andlor the assets and funds
have been transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Ine. Through the acts of the
Defendants, ownership of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. has remained vested in
interested parties (including R. John Taylor), while the major creditor Reed 5. Taylor and
minority shareholders have been left with nothing. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands
(through his attorney Roderick C. Bond) that action should also be taken for the interests
of the innocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendants have rehsed to take
action and inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including R. John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).

32.

Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, et al., which
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional
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Conduct and Defendantsquty of care.

The Defendants also refused to make any

provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AIA Sewices Corporation as
requested by Reed J. Taylor.
33.

The Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of..?I

John Taylor

and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed J. Taylor and Donna J.
Taylor, Reed J. Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstmding Preferred A Shares
of AIA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, Donna J. Taylor is required to be a
member of the board of directors of AIA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, the
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed

J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor from being members of the board of directors of AIA
Services Corporation, which has further far reaching ramifications and results in
additional damages against the Defendants.
34.

With h l l knowledge of AIA Services Corporation's obligations to ensure

that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of its board until they were paid in
full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings
and take inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by interested directors
without Reed J. Taylor or Donna J. Taylor being present, which results in all such
meetings and decisions being null and void, and the Defendants being liable for the
associated damages.
35.

The Defendants assisted and/or failed to prevent

and/or notify

disinterested parties that AIA Services Corporation had inappropriately pledged its sole
remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of the Defendants' services in violation of the
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Rules of Professional Conduct and the law.
36.

'fhe Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court

in Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et al. to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. In
several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court. to take action that was not in the
best interests of the corporations or Reed J. Taylor, to the detrirnent of the corporations
and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when
the Defendants knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their
assets safeguarded j.
37.

The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R. John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and borne by AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or AIA Services Corporation for the benefit of
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor and other interested parties.
38.

The Defendants had full knowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive

Officer's Agreement.

Even though 8. John Taylor has breached the terms of his

employment contract with AIA Services Corporation by competing against AIA Services
Corporation through Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AIA Insurance, Inc., and other
inappropriate actions, the Defendants intentionally refused to act in the best interests of
AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders, and/or Reed J. Taylor.
39.

The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to defraud AIA Services
Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed
by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation

COMPLAINT - 16

AIA Insurance, Inc., assistance in transferring
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shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to collect
the over $300,000 owed by R. John Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested
parties or other appropriate parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
40.

In April 2007, the Defendants pemieed and/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
with h11 knowledge that Reed J. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally
denied their right to be on the board of ATA Services Corporation and participating in
such meetings (Donna Taylor bas subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J.
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants perrnitted and/or assisted R.
John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance. Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AIA
Services Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims against, that
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. The Defendants inappropriately
perrnitted and/or assisted two interested parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to
approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys'
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.
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31.

Despite demands to the contrary, the Defendants continued to take

instructions andor directives From the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AIA
Senrices Coqoration andlor AIA Insurance, Inc. knowing that the boards are not properly
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant
claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and the law.

IV. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS

42.

Thr: Defendants have damaged Reed J. Taylor by aiding and abetting

andlor assisting others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.)
in the commission of tortious acts.

43.

The Defendants committed tortious acts in concert with others (including

R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant to a common
design or civil conspiracy with others (including R: John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc.). The Defendants' conduct also constitutes the assistance of interested
parties (including R. John Taylor) with the tortious interference of AIA Services
Corporation and Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the
Defendants had intimate knowledge.
44.

The Defendants knew that the conduct of others (including R. John Taylor

and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial
assistance and/or encouragement to others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties.

45.

The Defendants gave substantial assistance to others (including R. John

Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in committing and/or accomplishing
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turtious conduct andior acts, and the Defcndantsbonduct, separately considered,
constilutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations andlor Reed J. Taylor.
46.

The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others

(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or constikrles the
conduct of a contributing tort.feasors, and such conduct has damaged Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor in an m o u n t to be proven at trial or on surnmary judgment.
V. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS

4'7.

Reed J. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in

all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.
48.

All of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. were pledged to Reed J. Taylor as

collateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by AIA Services Corporation. By way of
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed J. Taylor is entitled to
possession and control of all of the assets of AIA Insurance, Inc.
49.

The Defendants were fully aware of Reed J. Taylor's rights to property in

which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral.
50.

The Defendants have received substantial payments believed to exceed

$100,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which were payments the
Defendants had no lawful right to possess or retain and were received in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
52.

The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AIA Services Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
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Agency, Inc.) and the significant misappropriation ,of the corporations' assets, but
provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment from
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc, In connection with the payment of
al-torneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. ALA Services Corporatior?,et

a]., the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed J. Taylor or other
disinterested parties to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.
53.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes the willful interference with property

and money belonging to AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed 5.
Taylor and/or which such property and money should be under the possession andlor
control of Reed J. Taylor, as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession of such property and
money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refused to return such
property and money.
54.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has

damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on summary judgment.

VI. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS
55.

The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in

acts, conduct, and representations that were false, misleading, deceptive and/or a
violation of I.C. $ 48-601, et seq. The Defendants' acts, omission, representations and
conduct constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or practices in trade pertaining to the
practice of law pursuant to I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
56.

The Defendants' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25% of Reed J.

Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other harm as set forth under T.C. Ij 48-608(2)(a).
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As such, PlaintiE Reed J, Taylor is entitled damages, which such amount is also subject
to treble damages pursuant to I.C.

5 48-608.

VLI. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS
57.

AIA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its

insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed J. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least,
AIA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pledged to
Reed J. Taylor and he voted the shares in February 2007 naming himself the sole director
and officer of AIA Insurance, Inc.
58.

The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries performing

similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor.

The Defendants knew that their

appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AIA Services
Corporation and/or AIA Insurance, Ine. to take action to prevent and/or rectify the
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by AIA Set-vices Corporation andlor AIA Insurance,
Inc. to Reed J. Taylor when such breaches were crimes and/or fraud and/or the
Defendants assisted and/or are assisting in the breaches. Reed J. Taylor was not able to
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to
AIA Services Corporation andlor AIA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly
impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect sums owed by others
and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.).
59.

The Defendants owed AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.

andlor Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including but not limited to, reasonable,
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation
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in keeping with the standad o f care in the legal profession and as owed to the
corporations (refened to herein and above as "duty of care"). The Defendants breached
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the
corporations and Reed J. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor.

60.

The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services

Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and/or Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, including, without
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty.
61.

The Defendants' acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduct has damaged Reed J. Taylor in an
amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve

(12) on all claims and damages so triable.

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor prays for the following relief:
I.

For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for $6,000,000

in damages ($2,000,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000 in treble damages), the exact
amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary judgment, plus an award of
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
2.

For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $4,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. § 48608(2j;

3.

For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all

afiorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AIA Services Corporation andlor AIA
Insurance, Inc.;
4.

For judment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional

damages as provided under T.C. 5 48-608;
5.

5

For such other relief as may be available to Reed J. Taylor pursuant to 1.C.

48-601, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary

injunction to restrain the Defendants from underlaking further representation;

6.

For an award of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs

incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limitation, I.C. tj 48608, I.C. 5 12-120 andlor I.C. jj 12-121; and
7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this

L
8;"day of August, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KI

"h,Y PLLC

By:
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

COMPLAINT - 23

dofin d, Janis [ISB No. 3599]
HEPWORTW, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. B m o c k Street, Ste 200
P O, Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582
Telepfione: (208) 343-75 I0
Fax No. (208) 342-2927

At-torneys For Defendants Michael E. McNichols
and Clements, Brown & McNichals, P.A.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTNCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, n\J A m FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYL,OR, an individual;
Plaintiff,
vs

)
)
)

Case No. CV 08-01763

}

MOTION TO DISMISS

1

MICHAEL E. McNICNOLS, an individual;
GLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professiond corporation;
IANE DOES I-V, unlcnown individuals;

)
)

1
1

++***
COMES NOW The defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys of record, I-fepworlh, tezanliz & .ranis, and puXsuatltto Rule '12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, hereby move this I-fonorableCourt for an Order dismissing Plaiiltiffs Complaint
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
This Motion is based upon the pleadings on file with the Court in this action together
with the Memorandum of Law in Support of this Motion filed conteniposaneously herewith.

MOTION PO DISMISS - I.

DATED this

29&day of September, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undexsigned, a resident attonley of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W
Bamock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise Idaho 83701, and one of the attol-neys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this *ay
of September, 2008, he caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by tile method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissel1 & Kirby PLI,C
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201

MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

[ ] U,S. Mail
[ j Wand Delivered
[ ] Overnigl~tMail
[ XI Telecopy (Fax)
[ XI E-mail

John J. Janis [ISB No, 35991
Hepwotth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd.
537 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No (208) 343-7510
Facsimile No. (208) 342-2927

I

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

)

1

Plaintiff,
vs .
MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS,
P.A., an ldaho professional corporation;
JANE DOES I-V, unknown individuais;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 08-01763
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
COMPLAINT

)

Defendant Michael E. McNichols and Defendant Clements, Brown & McNichols,
P.A. (hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Hepworth, Lezamiz
and Janis, Chtd., hereby submit the following memorandum in support of their motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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I. INTRODUCTION
PlaintiFf's Complaint alleges four causes of action against Defendants. First, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants have aided and abeged their clients in the commission of tortious
conduct. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants converted Plaintiffs property by
accepiring attorneys fees from their clients for legal work perfarmed on behalf of their
clients. Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have committed legal malpractice.
For the reasons set forth below, each of Plaintiff's causes of action fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed
in its entirety.

11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The instant motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)
Consequently, the following factual background is taken solely from the facts set forth in
Plaintiff's Complaint.

By referencing the facts alleged by Plaintiff in his Complaint,

Defendants do not accept, or admit, the alleged facts in the Complaint as true or accurate.
Furthermore, Defendants affirmatively contend that Plaintiff has intentionally omitted
important and necessary facts from the body of his Complaint. Nonetheless, Defendants
acknowledge that, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must base its opinion
solely on the factual allegations contained in the Complaint.
As set forth in his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was originally owed an amount
in excess of $6,000,000 by AIA Services Corporation (alleged to currently be in excess of
$8,500,0000), (Complaint 77 8-10.) Plaintiff further claims that the obligation to pay him
Page -2-

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS ~ ~ ~ U l h ~ ~ p ~ , a Scitings\Twnporary
n i s t ~ - ilnlernel Flles\Conlenl IES~GWF60Hi\MolloDiuniss.t~'Iem[t~
qd\)

the $6,000,000 was secured by stock in AIA Insurance, tnc. Id_ Plaintiff alleges that AIA
Sentices defaulted on the $6,008,000 owed to him. Id_ Plaintiff further claims that upon
default of the $6,000,000, Plaintiff had: ( 1 ) the right to "vote the stock;" and (2) to take
operational control of AIA Insurance.

!&

On or about February 22, 2007, Plaintiff attempted to "vote the stock of AIA
lnsurance and obtain control of the corporation. (Complaint 1 II.) The directors of AIA
lnsurance (including John Taylor) contested that Plaintiff had the right to take over control
of the corporation.

Id, Accordingly, the directors refused to aHow Plaintiff to obtain control

of AiA lnsurance

Id.

As a result ofthe alleged $6,000,000 default, Plaintiff filed an action to obtain control
of AIA Insurance. (Complaint

1 12.)

This action is entitled Tavlor v. AIA Services

Cornoration, et al., Case No. CV-07-00208, in the District Court of the State of Idaho, Nez
Perce County (hereinafter "the Underlying Litigation"). In the Underlying Litigation, Plaintiff
sued AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA lnsurance Agency, Inc., as
well as the directors individually, including John Taylor, for a variety of alleged tortious
conduct.

Id. One of the primary purposes of the Underlying Litigation is to determine,

among other things, the legal rights of Plaintiff regarding his authority, or lack thereof, to
vote the AIA lnsurance stock and obtain ultimate control of AIA Insurance.
As set forth in the Complaint, after Plaintiff filed the Underlying Litigation,
Defendants filed an appearance as litigation counsel for AIA Services, AIA lnsurance
(collectively referred to hereinafter as "the AIA companies"), and John Taylor. (Complaint

1 13.)

Shortly after entering an appearance on behalf of the tvvo corporations and John
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Taylor, Defendants withdrew as counsel of record for the AIA companies, but continued
to act as litigation counsel for John Taylor. (Complaint 9 14.) Defendants have continued
to act as litigation counsel for John Taylor in the Underlying Litigation for over a year and
a half,

Id. With respect to the alleged facts set forth in the Complaint,

Plaintiff has not

alleged that Defendants have acted in any capacity other than as litigation counsel for John
Taylor and the AIA companies..
Plaintiff now attempts to sue Defendants for actions consisting of nothing more than
acting as attorneys for John Taylor and the AIA companies in the Underlying Litigation. As
a result, this case presents the issue of whether one party to a lawsuit may sue the
opposing party's attorneys for actions taken by the attorneys during the course of litigation.
Based upon the overwhelming number of legal decisions on the issue, the answer to this
question is a resounding "no." As set forth below, Plaintiff has failed to state any ciaim
upon which this Court may grant him relief, requiring dismissal of Plaintiff's entire
Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants' motion has been brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the summary dismissal of any cause of
action contained in a Complaint which fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The Rule provides:
Every defense, in iaw or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses shall be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. . . .
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MEMORANDUM IN SlJPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DlSMISS G6;aJUIRUlhw&sifjanls!~ocal Sell,ngs\Temporary lnlernei Files\Conlenl IES\GVVFWWltMolloDisrri~s.Memo(l~
wpd\)

I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.

, 122 Idaho 535,536,835 P.2d

1346, 1347 (Ct. App.. 1992).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court should look only at the pleadings, and
all inferences should be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Owslev v. ldaho
Industrial Comm'n, 14 1 Idaho 129,133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion
that is filed without suppofiing affidavits, such as the present motion, is addressed solely
to the sufficiency of the complaint. Orthman v. ldaho Power Co., 126 ldaho 960,962,895
P.2d 561, 563 (1995). In the present case, the question then becomes whether Plaintiff
has, in the body of his Complaint, alleged sufficient facts in support of his claims which, if
true, would entitle him to relief. Owsley, 141 ldaho at 133, 106 P.3d at 459. See also,
Rincover v. State, 128 ldaho 653 ldaho 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996).

IV. LAW AND ARGUMENT
Plaintiff has alleged four causes of action against Defendants: (1) Aiding and
abetting tortious conduct; (2); Conversion; (3)Violations of the ldaho Consumer Protection
Act ; and (4) Legal malpractice. As set forth below, Plaintiff has failed in each instance to
state a claim against Defendants upon which this Court can grant relief. Rather, Plaintiff's
allegations appear to be nothing. more than dissatisfaction with a legal system that
permitted the defendants in the Underlying Litigation to hire their choice of lawyers to
defend themselves against Pfaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth below, each of
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PlaintiEs claims should be dismissed for the failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.

A.

Defendants Are Immune from All of PfaintiR's Causes of Action
Pursuant to the Litisation Privifeae.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants assumed the legal representation of
three distinct clients in the underlying Litigation. AIA Sewices Corporation, AIA Insurance,
Inc., and John Taylor. Plaintiff further alleges that the factual basis for all of Plaintiff's
claims occurred while Defendants were acting as legal coi~nselfor one or more of the
above clients in the Underlying Litigation. Therefore, any evaluation of whether Plaintiff has
adequately stated a claim against Defendants for actions that occurred in the
representation of their clients, must necessarily begin with the resolution of the question
whether Defendants are immune from suit based on the litigation privilege.
The overwhelming number of courts that have addressed the issue of the litigation
privilege have held that no cause of action may lie against an attorney for actions taken by
that attorney during the course of the attorney's representation of a client.

See Maness

v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 7 F.3d 704,709 (8'hCir. 1993) (holding that an attorney who acts
within the scope of the attorney-client relationship will not be liable to third persons for
actions arising out of his professional relationship unless the attorney exceeds the scope
of his employment or acts for personal gain), Schottv. Glover, 440 N.E-2d 376,380 (ill. Ct.
App. 1982) (Public policy requires that an attorney, when acting in his professional
capacity, be free to advise his client without fear of personal liability to third persons if the
advice later proves to be incorrect.)

'
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It is uniformly accepted that an attorney does not owe any duty of care to a third
party, including an opposing party in litigation, the breach of which duty would subject the
aMarney to liability*

a,
e,a.,

,599 F.2d 376,379 (1 Oth Cir 1979);James

v, Chase Manhattan Bank, 173 F.Supp.2d 544,550 (N.D. Miss. 2001); Taco Bell Corr). V.
Cracken, 939 F-Supp, 528, 532 (N.D. Texas 1996);Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376,

1381 (N.D. Iowa 1978);

,543 A.2d 733,735 (1988); McKenna Lonq &

, 598 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Ct. App' Ga. 2004); Brodv v. Ruby, 267
N-W.2d 902,906-7 (lowa 1978);Eustis v. David Aqencv, lnc., 4"1 N.W .2d 295,298 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987); Rhode v. Adams, 957 P.2d 1 124, 1127-28 (Mont. 1998);Garcia v. Rodev,

Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, PA, 750 P.2d 118, 122 (N.M. 1988);Aetna Electroplatinq
Co. v. Jenkins, 484 A.2d 134, 136-7 (Pa. Super.. 1984); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56,
7 1-72 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)-

It is nearly universally accepted that the creation of a duty upon an attorney in favor
of an opposing party would create a conflict of interest which would seriously hamper the
attorney's eEectiveness as counsel for his own client. Not only would the interests of the
opposing party interfere with the client's interests, the attorney's concern with being sued
by some third party for actions taken in his or her representation of his or her client would
detrimentally interfere with the attorney-client relationship. See Clark v. Druckman, 624
S.E 26 864, 869 (W. Va. 2005). Stated another way, the imposition of a duty in favor of
an opposing party would work to the detriment an attorney's client and would adversely
impact the attorney's duty of zealous advocacy for his or her own client. Id, Furthermore,
it would create an impossible and unjustified conflict of interest in evetv case.
Page -7-
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It is important to note that the litigation privilege extends beyond mere aaorney-client
"communications " It also provides immunity from civil damages for claims arising from
"conduct" occurring during a civil action. As the Florida Supreme Court stated:
[Albsolute immunity must be afforded to anv act occuning during the course
of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a defamatory
statement or other tortious behavior such as the alleged misconduct at issue,
so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding. The rationale behind
the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is equally applicableto other
misconduct occurring during fhe course of a judicial proceeding. Just as
particioants in litiqation must be free to enaaae in unhindered
communication, so too must those participants be free to use their best
judament in orosecutins or defendinu a lawsuit without fear of havins to
defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.
Levin. Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., v. United States Fire Ins.
Co 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.1994) (emphasis added)

f

Plaintiff may argue that the litigation privilege does not apply to bar liability of an
attorney in

circumstances. For example, the privilege may not apply in certain situations

where facts are alleged that the attorney engaged in fraud or malicious conduct.
Revnolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1069 (Ore. 2006). However, in order to overcome
the litigation privilege, a plaintiff must set forth facts that the attorneys acted outside the
. Goodsill Anderson
scope of the attorney-client relationship. See Kahala Roval C o r ~v.
Quinn & Stifel, 151 P.3d 732,748-753 (HI 2007).
That is not the case in the present matter. Plaintiff's Complaint clearly alleges that
the actions taken by Defendanfs in the present matter were taken pursuant to their
representation of the AIA companies and John Taylorwhile in the course of the Underlying
Litigation. In the instant matter, therefore, the litigation privilege applies to Defendants
actions. Plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. When the
Page -8-

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISM SS E;WRLAlha;;Teafianis\tow~Sellingstiernporary Internet FilostConlenl IES\GW60H1\MolloMsmI~s5~dem~[1~
vtpd
,.
i '

&g$p~*
p+z:
$B@<$
e
%
w;h
n-

litigation privilege applies, as in the instant case, the proper course of action is for the Court
to dismiss the claim.. The Court should dismiss the instant action in its entirety.

B,
Abetting.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants have aided and abefted allegedly tortious acts
commiMed by John Taylor and the AIA companies. Plaintiffs ciaim for aiding and abetting
fails for several reasons. First, since the alleged actions of Defendants occurred in the
course of legal representation of their clients, Defendants are protected by the litigation
privilege. Second, Plaintiff did not, and cannot, adequately plead the elements of aiding
and abetting. Third, Plaintiff has no standing to bring a direct aiding and abetting cause
of action against the AIA companies and R, John Taylor. Fourth, Plaintiff did not, and
cannot, adequately plead the elements of conspiracy. Fifth, Plaintiff did not, and cannot,
adequately plead the elements of intentional interference with a contract.

I.

Defendants Are Protected by the Litiuation Privileqe Specifically
Aqainsf Claims for Aidinq and Abetting.

As set forth in Section IV.A., supra, the litigation privilege clearly applies to Plaintiff's
claims against Defendants in this action. Notwithstanding the application of the litigation
privilege to Plaintiffs Complaint in general, a few courts have had the opportunity to
address the litigation privilege in the s~ecificcontext of claims against an attorney for
aiding and abetting his client. These Courts have uniformly held that, in cases such as this
one, the litigation privilege attaches, resulting in a failure by the defendant to state a claim
t
upon which relief can be granted. A prime example is the recent Texas case of A l ~ e rv.
Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005). The Alpert case presents
Page -9-
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In addressing the issue, the

court recognized that an a ~ o r n e yhas a duty to

zealausly represent his or her clients within the bounds of the law.

at 405. In fulfilling

this duty, an attorney has the right to interpose defenses and pursue legal rights that he
deems necessary and proper, without being subject to liability or damages.

The A l ~ e r t

court presciently noted, that if an altorney can be held liable to an opposing party for
statements made, or actions taken, in the course of representing his or her client, such
anorney would be forced constantly to balance his or her own potential exposure against
his client's best interests.
As a result, the court reasoned that an attorney is "qualifiedly immune" from civil
liability, with respect to non-clients, for actions taken in connection with representing a
client in litigation.

Id. This qualified immunity applies even if conduct is wrongful in the

context of the underlying lawsuit. &j

Thus, an altorney's conduct, even if without merit,

is not independently actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's duties
in representing his or her client.

In finding that a claim for aiding abetting had not been

stated, the Alpert court declared:
Here, the acts that [the plaintiff] alleges in his petltion to support his claim of
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty occurred during [the defendant
law firm's] representation of Riley. Unlike the defendant in Toles, [the
defendant law firm] specially excepted to [the plaintiffs] pleadings. Despite
opportunities to replead, [the plaintiff] does not allege that [the defendant law
firm] committed any acts or misrepresentations, independent of its
representation of Riley, upon which he justifiably relied. Absent any
allegation that [the defendant law firm] committed an independent tortious
act or misrepresentation, we decline [the plaintiff's] invitation to expand
Texas law to allow a non-client to bring a cause of action for "aiding and
abetting" a breach of fiduciary duty, based upon the rendition of legal advice
to an alleged tortfeasor client. The trial court thus did not err in dismissing
this claim.
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Id. at 407
The holding of the Texas Court of Appeals in

is not unique. In Reynolds v.

Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062 (Ore, 2006) the Oregon Supreme Court addressed substantially
the same issue. The Revnolds court also arrived at the conclusion that the litigation
privilege extends to an attorney accused of aiding and abetting a client. In Revnolds, the
plaintiff had entered into an agreement regarding the purchase of certain properties with
her business partner, Schrock.

Id.at 1063-64. The relationship between the plaintiff and

Schrock soured and the plaintiff sued Schrock.
attorney to represent her in the litigation.

Id.

Schrock retained the defendant

td. The defendant attorney represented Schrock

with respect to the litigation. The defendant attorney also provided legal advice to Schrock
regarding actions following settlement of the litigation, including the disposal of the property
that was the subject of the underiying litigation.

Id. The plaintiff then sued Schrock for,

among other things, allegedly breaching a fiduciary duty by disposing of the property,

Id.

Schrock also included a claim against the defendant attorney for aiding and abetting
Schrock's alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Id_
The Revnolds court squarely addressed the question of whether, and under what
circumstances, a third party may assert a claim of aiding and abetting against an attorney.
Id. at 1065. The Reynolds court began its analysis by recognizing that a third party's claim
against an attorney puts the attorney at odds with the client, and thus compromises the
attorney-client relationship.

Id.at 1068.

The court continued its analysis by recognizing

that attorneys cannot adequately serve their clients when they are faced with the specter
of having to protect themselves from potential tort claims by third parties.
Page -12-
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court ultimately held that the litigation privilege protects attorneysfrom

The

claims for aiding and abeeing, stating:

- ..

a tawver acting on behalf of a client, and within the scope of the

assistinq the client in conduct that breaches the client's fiduciarv dutv to a
third party. Accordingly, for a third party to hold a lawyer liable for
substantially assisting in a client's breach of fiduciary duty, the third party
must prove that the lawyer acted outside the scope of the lawyer-client
relationship.
Id. at
-

1069 (emphasis added). See also, Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756 (N.M. 2007)

(holding that an attorney who represented an insurer in a claim arbitration could not be held
liable for aiding and abetting the insurer's allegedly wrongful conduct).
Likewise, in the present matter, Defendants are protected by the litigation privilege
for actions undertaken while acting as counsel for the AIA companies and R. John Taylor.
Plaintiff has clearly failed to plead a claim for aiding and abetting upon which relief can be
granted. The Court should grant Defendants' motion and dismiss Plaintiffs claim for aiding
and abetting

2.

Plaintiff Did Not Adeuuatelv Plead the Elements of Aidina and

Abetting.
Even if the Court decides that the litigation privilege does not apply in this instance,
Plaintiffs cause of action must still be dismissed since Plaintiff did not adequately plead
the actual elements of a claim for aiding and abetting against Defendants. To the best of
Defendants' knowledge, no Idaho case specifically sets forth the elements required forciviJ
aiding and abetting. Nonetheless, ldaho Courts have recognized that there are certain
circt~mstancesin which a party may be held liable as a contributing tortfeasor for harm
resulting from the tortious conduct of another
Page -13-
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P.2d ? 16 (Ct. App. "182). In arriving at this conclusion, ldaho appellate courts have cited
with approval to the Restatement (Second) of Torts $87fi(b). See also, Price v. Aztec, 108
ldaho 674, 678,701 P.2d 294,298 (1985).
Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he

(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself.
Id.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges first that Defendants have aided and abetted "others"
in the commission of tortious acts. Plaintiff fails to identify who the "others" are that
Defendants have allegedly aided and abetted. For purposes of this motion, Defendants
assume that the "others" referred to in the Complaint are John Taylor and the AIA
companies. With respect to both John Taylor and the AIA companies, Plaintiffs attempt
to plead a cause of action for aiding and abetting fails because Plaintiff has failed to plead
facts which, if true, would constitute a tortious act. As set forth above, the very definition
of aiding and abetting requires tortious conduct. Defendants cannot be accused of aiding
and abetting tortious conduct, where no tortious conduct has been properly alleged. The
basis far Plaintiffs complaints are clearly grounded in breach of contract. Mislabeling
claims for breach of contract as tortious conduct does not convert them into torts.
Even if the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint sufficiently alleges the commission
of a tortious act, the Complaint is still deficient because it fails to allege which of the
Page -14-
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Defendants allegedly aided and abetl.ed any particular act, what knowledge any of them
had of any particular act, what "substantial assistance" was purportedly lent, or how the
Plaintiffs alleged damages were caused by such acts. As set forth above, a person may
only be held liable for aiding and abetting where such person has given "substantial
assistance" to another person who has, in fact, comrnieed a tortious act.
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF TORTS5 876(b). If the wrongdoer has J
K
-J actually committed
a tortious act, then there can be no cause of action for aiding and abetting. The failure of
Plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to constitute a claim for aiding and abetting is fatal to
PlaintiWs Complaint being reviewed for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
claim for aiding and abetting shoufd be dismissed.

3.

Plaintiff Was No Standina a s a Creditor of AIA Services to Brinq
a Direct Cause of Action Aqainst the Directors of the
Corporation.

Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a direct cause of action against the
directors of the AIA companies.

Plaintiff's aiding and abetting allegations against

Defendants are premised on a four-step argument that is seriously, and fatally, flawed.
Plaintiff's four-step argument is as follows: First, Plaintiff alleges that the directors of an
insolvent corporation owe a fiduciary duty to creditors of the corporation.. Second, Plaintiff
alleges both that he is a creditor of AIA Services, and that AIA Services is insolvent, Third,
Plaintiff further reasons that, because AIA Services is insolvent, John Taylor, as a director

of AIA Services, owes Plaintiff a fiduciary duty. Fourth, Plaintiff claims that Defendants
have aided and abetted John Taylor in breaching his duties to Plaintiff through the
diversion of corporate funds for purposes other than paying Plaintiff, thereby precluding
Page -15-
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AIA Senrices from making payments to him. As set forth below, these allegations do not
state a claim against Defendants upon which relief can be granted
ldaho law provides that "directors of corporations stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation, hence, to the stockholders. . . ." Weatherhead v. Griffin, 123 ldaho 697,702,
85W.2d 993, 998 (1992). Hannv v. Sunnvside Ditch Co., 82 ldaho 271, 276, 353 P.2d
406,409 (1960); Coeur d'Alene Lead Co. v. Kinqsburv, 59 ldaho 627, 630, 85 P.2d 691,
692 (1938), A few courts across the nation have determined that when a corporation
becomes insolvent, the directors may also owe a fiduciary duty to the creditors of the
corporation.

a,
u,
VFB, LLC V. Campbell Soup Go., 482 F.3d 624,635 (3'

Cir. 2007);

In Re Boniila, 2007 VVL 4556913 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Cal. 2007). However, this does not mean
that either shareholders or creditors have a direct cause of action against the directors.
Rather, any cause of action maintained by a creditor against a corporation's director
be derivative.
The most recent case addressing this issue is North American Catholic Educational
Proqrammina Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). In Gheewalla, the
Delaware Supreme court held that creditors of an insolvent corporation, or a corporation
operating in the "zone of insolvency," is not permitted to bring a direct action for breach of
fiduciary duty action against a corporation's directors.
In Gheewalla, creditors of an insolvent, or nearly insolvent, corporation sought to
bring a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duties against the directors of the corporation.
Asin the present case, the defendant directors moved fo dismiss the claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for the failure to state a claim upon which relief
Page -16-
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could be granted. The trial court. entered judgment under Rule 12(b)(B) and dismissed the
complaint, finding that the creditors ofan insolvent corporation cannot bring a direct action
against the corporations directors. In so finding, the Delaware Supreme Court noted the
following:
Recognizing that directors of an insolvent corporation owe direct fiduciary
duties to creditors, would create uncertainty for directors who have a
fiduciary duty to exercise their business judgment in the best interest of the
insolvent corporation. To recognize a new riqht for creditors to brinu direct
fiduciary claims aaainst those directors would create a conflict betweenthose
directors' dutv to maximize the value of the insolven"icarporation for the
benefit of all those havina an interest in it, and the newly recoanized direct
fiducian, dutv to individual creditors. Directors of insolvent corporations must
retain the freedom to engage in vigorous, good faith negotiations with
individual creditors for the benefit of the corporation. Accordingly, we hold
that individual creditors of an insolvent corporation have no right to
assert direct claims for breach of fiduciarv dutv aaainst corporate
directors. Creditors may nonetheless protect their interest by bringing
derivative claims on behalf of the insolvent corporation or any other direct
nonfiduciary claim, as discussed earlier in this opinion, that may be available
for individual creditors.
Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
The fact that a corporation has become insolvent does not turn a derivative claim
into a direct creditor claim.

Plaintiff's Complaint clearly states that Plaintiffs claims are

direct, not derivative. (Complaint 7 ) Plaintiff's attempt to assert a direct claim against
John Taylor and the AIA companies in the present case is ill-founded and not legally
tenable. Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks the proper standing to bring an action against the
directors of the AIA companies. If Plaintiff has no standing to sue the directors directly, he
certainly has no standing to extend his claims one step further and sue the directors'
counsel directly.
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4.

To the Extent That Plaintiff Intends to Plead a Cause of Action for

Which Relief Can Be Granted.
In paragraph 43 of Plaintiff's Complaint, under the heading of "aiding and abetting,"
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in tortious acts pursuant to a civil conspiracy,
It is unclear in the Complaint whether Plaintiff is actually alleging a cause of action for civil
conspiracy, separate from the claim for aiding and abetting, or merely inserting superf)uous
words in the Complaint in a classic "kitchen sink" maneuver. Nonetheless, to the extent
Plaintiff is anempting to state a claim for civil conspiracy, he has again failed to state a
proper cause of action, since ldaho does not allow an independent cause of action for civil
conspiracy. The ldaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that:
A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only if there is an
agreement between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to
accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner. Civil conspiracy is
not, bv itself, a claim for relief. The essence of a cause of action for civil
conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as the objective of the conspiracy,
not the conspiracy itself.
Mannos v. Moss, 143 ldaho 927, 935-36, f 55 P.3d 1166, 1174-73 (200'7). See also,
McPheters v. Maile, 138 ldaho 391, 395,64 P.3d 317,321 (2002) (Civil conspiracy is not,
by itself, a claim for relief. The essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil
wrong committed as the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself.) Accordingly,
any claim for civil conspiracy must fail as a matter of law. McPheters, 138 ldaho at 395,
64 P.3d at 321.
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5.

with Contract.
In paragraph 43 of the Complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendants conduct
constitutes 'Yortious interference" of AIA Services' and Plaintifs contractual rights. Again,
PlaintiFfs Complaint does not specifically allege intentional interference with contract.
However, the above statement could be construed as &

to plead interference with

contract. Again, ldaho law clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff has not pled a claim upon
which relief can be granted
The elements of the tort of intentional interference with contract were set forth in the
watershed case of Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 ldaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d
1102, 1114 (1974). The Barlow court identified the elements of such a claim as follows:

(a) the existence of a contract, (6) knowledge of the contract on the part of
the defendant, (c) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract,
and (d) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach.
Id.
v
tortiouslv interfere with its own
Of premier importance, is the fact that a ~ a r t cannot
contract.

See Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of ldaho, Inc., 123 ldaho 650,654,

851 P.2d 946, 950 (2993) (holding that "a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own
contract"). Furthermore, the actions of an agent acting within the scope and course of his
authority are imputed to the principal. Id. Therefore, an atforney, acting as the agent of his
or her client, cannot tortiously interfere with a contract to which his or her client is a party.
For example, in Ostrander, aformer employee of Farm Bureau, Ostrander, alleged that her
supervisor had interfered with her employment contract with Farm Bureau by making an
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inaccurate evaluation of her performance, which ultimately led to termination of her
employment. The could held:
As an agent of Farm Bureau, [the supervisor] had the authority to evaluate
Ostrander and terminate her contract. Since [the superuisor's] actions with
respect to Ostrander were within the scope of his authority as an agent of
Farm Bureau, there was no third party to the contract. Accordingiy,
Ostrander has not stated a claim for tortious interference with contract.
Id. at 950,851 P.2d at 654.
-

See also, BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Enqineers, Inc., 145

ldaho 719, 184 P.3d 844 (2008) (holding that claim cannot lie against an agent of a patty
who was acting within the scope of his authority); Cantweli v. Citv of Boise, 2008 VYL
2757046 (Idaho 2008); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade C o r ~ . ,141 ldaho 233, 108 P.3d 380
(2005); Gunter v. Murohv's Lounqe, LLC, 141 ldaho 16, 105 P.3d 676 (2005); Thomas v.
Medical Center Physicians. P.A., 138 ldaho 200,61 P.3d 557 (2002); Leon v. Boise State
Universitv, 125 ldaho 365, 870 P.2 1324 (1994)
It goes without saying that the relationship between an attorney and his or her client
is that of a principal and agent.

Obviousty, an attorney cannot be held liable for

interference with a contract for giving advice to his or her client within the scope of the
attorney's representation of the client. In the instant action, Defendants' clients were
parties to the contract that Plaintiff claims Defendants interfered with,
Defendants' clients cannot tortiously interfere with their own contract.

Obviously,
Any alleged

interference would simply be a breach of contract. By extension, Defendants, as agents
of their clients, also cannot legally interfere with the subject contract. Therefore, Plaintiff's
complaint fails to plead a cause of action for intentional interference with contract.
PlaintiFfs claim for aiding and abetting should be dismissed for failing to state a claim.
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6.
Plaintiffs second cause of action is for alleged conversion. According to the
Complaint, Defendants are guilty of conversion by simply accepting payment from their
clients for attorney's fees incurred in the Underlying Litigation. Plaintiffs have not identified
the amount of money that was allegedly conveded. Plainties have also failed to identify
the party to whom the money belongs. Rather, they have simply averred that the money
belongs to "AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., andlor Reed J. Taylor."
Plaintiffs have also failed to identify the time frame in which the money was allegedly
converted, whether before or after Defendants ceased their representation of AIA Services.
Taken as a whole, Plaintiff's allegations are both factually and legally deficient to the point
that Plaintiff has simply failed to state a ctaim for conversion upon which relief can be
granted
In Idaho, conversion has essentially two elements. (1) a distinct act of dominion
wrongfully asserted, (2) over another's personal property in denial of, or inconsistent with,
the rights therein. See Peasly Transfer & Storase Go. v. Smith, 132 ldaho 732, 743, 979
P.2d 605, 616 (1999), Torix v. Allred, 100 ldaho 905,910, 606 P.2d 1334, 1339 (1980).
The second element of conversion actually contains two components, both of which must
be satisfied. It requires that Plaintiff demonstrate not only that he owns, or has a
possessory interest in the subject property, but also that the property in question qualifies
as "personal property." In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate each and
every element of a conversion claim.
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First, Plaintiff has not pled facts which demonstrate that Defendants have
asserted dominion over the money claimed.

Second, Plaintiff has not pled facts

demonstrating that he owns, or has a possessory interest in, the money claimed. Third,
Plaintiff has not pled facts demonstrating that the money claimed by him is personal
property. Plaintiff's conversion claim, therefore, fails as a matter of law and should be
dismissed.

I.

Defendants Have Not Wronafullv Asserted Dominion Over the
Prct~ertv,

Plaintiff has failed to plead facts that fulfill the very first requirement of a conversion
claim wrongful dominion by Defendants. A claim for conversion fails if Plaintiff cannot
establish that the defendant wrongfully exerted dominion over the subject personal
property. Peaslv Transfer & Storaqe Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743, 979 P.2d 605
(1999).

In this case, Defendants are not alleged to have taken any property directly from
Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendants have received substantial payments
believed to exceed $100,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs." (Complaint rj

50) In other words, the Complaint alleges that Defendants were merely compensated for
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the defending of their clients in the Underlying
Litigation. As set forth below, Plaintiff's reasoning in this regard is without merit.
Plaintiff claims, as part of the Underlying Litigation, that he is entitled obtain control
of AlA Insurance. Plaintiff further claims that the directors of the AIA companies have
engaged in wrongful conduct, The directors of the A1A companies contest Plaintiff's
claims. As a result, whether Plaintiff is entitled to obtain control of AIA Insurance, and
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2.
"[A] plaintiff in a conversion action must establish that he had title to the property or
had the right to possess the property at the time of the conversion." SeeWestern ldaho
, 106 ldaho 260,263,678 P.2d 52,55

(1984); National Produce Distributors v. Miles & Meyer, lnc., 75 ldaho 460, 274 P.2d 831

( 1954). Obviously, no action for conversion of money may be brought if the plaintiff does
not have ownership, possession or control of the subject property,
In the present case, Plaintiff does not allege that he is either the owner of the
money, nor that he has the right to possess the subject money. Rather, Plaintiff alleges
that he has a claim as a creditor of AIA Services. (Complaint, rjf147-49). The question of
whether Plaintiff's claim as a creditor is valid has not yet been established and is currently
at issue in the Underlying Litigation. lJntil Plaintiffs creditor claim is fully and finally
adjudicated in the Underlying Litigation, and his alleged rights are affirmatively established,
Plaintiff has no right to, or possessory interest in, the subject property. Plaintiff therefore
cannot establish a necessary element of his cause of action for conversion, and his claim
should be dismissed.

3. Plaintiff's AIIesed Conversion Does Not Involve Personal Propertv.
As set forth above, the third requirement for a conversion cause of action, is that the
converted property must be "personal property." See Peaslv, 132 ldaho at 743,979 P.2d
at 616 (holding that conversion is defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted
over another's personal propertv in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein")
(emphasis added). In the present matier, Plaintiff's conversion claim against Defendants
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alleges the conversion of money paid for legal services.

does not qualify as

"personal property"' that is capable of being conve~ed.
The ldaho Supreme Court has clearly stated: "Normally conversion for
misappropriation of money does not lie unless it can be described or identified as a soecific

, 96 Idaho 270,272,526 P 2d

chattel."

I 1Q6,I 2 08 (1974) (emphasis added). The facts of the

case are instructive

in the present matter. In Warm S~rinas,the plaintiff contracted with a construction
company, Butler Brothers, to construct a condominium for the plaintiff. @at 27 1,526 P.2d
at 1107. At about the same time, the defendant also contracted with Butler Brothers to
construct a condominium for the defendant.

During the course of construction, the

plaintiff made money payments in the amount of $60,000 to Butler Brothers to be used for
paying expenses associated with building the plaintiWs condominium.

Id. Instead, Butler

Brothers used the money to pay expenses associated with the building of the defendants
condominium. @ The plaintiff then sued the defendant for conversion of its $60,000.
The ldaho Supreme Court quickly disposed of the issue by acknowledging that conversion
of a sum of money is impossible "unless it can be described or identified as a specific

chattef." Id.at 272, 526 P.2d at 1108.
Courts in jurisdictions other than Idaho have also ruled that "if the alleged converted
money is incapable of being described or identified in the same manner as a specific
chattel, it is not the proper subject of a conversion action." Hiqh View Fund, L.P. v. Wall,
27 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also, Ehrlich v. Wowe, 848 F. Supp..482,
494 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("An action for conversion of money is insufficient as a matter of law
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unless it is alleged that the money converted was in specific tangible funds of which
claimant was the owner and entitled to immediate possession"); Landskroner v.

lands krone^, 797 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio App 8 Dist., 2003); SouthTntst Bank v. Donley, 925
So.2d 934,940 (Ala. 2005).
Simply put, Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for conversion of the money
paid by the defendants in the Underlying Litigation for legal fees and costs. Thus, even if
Plaintiff were a shareholder of AIA Services or AIA Insurance, which he currently is not;
and even if he has standing to maintain a direct cause of action against Defendants, which
he does not; and even if he has a possessory right in the claimed money, which he does
not; and even if Defendants wrongfully asserted dominion over the money, which thev did
not; Plaintiff would still not be able to maintain a cause of action for the conversion of
money, since no such cause of action exists in Idaho. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim should

be dismissed.
C.

Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Cause of Action for Violation of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiffs third cause of action against Defendants is for an alleged violation of the
ldaho Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter "the Act"), There are at least three reasons
why Plaintiff has not stated a vaiid claim under the Act against Defendants. First, as set
forth in Section IV.A., supra, the litigation privilege provides immunity to Defendants for
actions taken white acting as legal counsel for John Taylor and the AIA companies. Since
the actions alleged in Plaintiffs consumer protection claim allegedly occurred while
Defendants were acting as counsel for John Taylor and the AIA companies, Plaintiff has
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failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Second, Plaintiff has not alleged
any acts or practices engaged in by Defendants which qualify as unfair or deceptive as
specifically defined in the Act. Third, Plaintif does not have a contractual relationship with
Defendants, which is one of the primary requirements to maintain a private cause of action
under the Act. Accordingly, PlaintiFfs third cause of action must be dismissed as a matter
of law.
A brief oventiew of the Act itself may be helpful. The Act, which is embodied in
ldaho Code 5s 48-601 through 48-619, prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce within the state of
Idaho. The legislatively stated purpose of the Act is as foilows:
The purpose of this act is to protect both consumers and businesses against
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in
the conduct of trade or commerce, and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection.
ldaho Code

48-601

Of primary importance is the fact that the Act does not permit private individuals to
create or define actions that they think are unfair or deceptive acts. Rather, the Act sets
forth specific prohibited actions that are statutorily deemed to be unfair or deceptive.

See

ldaho Code (j§ 48-603 through 48-603E. In the present matter, Plaintiff has failed to
identify which of the unfair or deceptive practices, as set forth in the Act, Defendants have
allegedly engaged in. Furthermore, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to identify

anv alleged acts

engaged in by Defendants that would constitute unfair or deceptive practices enumerated
under the Act. Rather, Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendants have violated the Act, A
plain reading of the practices prohibited by the Act, compared with alleged actions of
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Defendants as set forth in the Complaint, reveals that Ptaintlff has utterly failed to state a
claim under the Act altogether,
Secondly, in order to bring a private cause of action under the Act, the individual
bringing the claim must have a contractual relationship with the defendant. The portion of
the act that provides for private causes of action is ldaho Code

5 48-608.

Section 48-

608(1) states the following:
Any person who purchases or leases qoods or services and therebv suffers
, real or personal, as a result of
the use or employment by another person of a method, act or practice
declared unlawful by this chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto
as voidable or, in the alternative, may brinq an action to recover damages or
one thousand dollars ($1,000), which ever is greater . .
ldaho Code ij 48-608(1) (emphasis added).
The plain language of the statute requires a contractual relationship between any
potential piaintiff and the person or entity accused of violating the Act. The language is
clear: the "person who purchases or leases the goods or services. . . may bring an action."
Id. If there is one thing that Plaintiff's Complaint makes clear, it is that Plaintiff has never
purchased leqal services, or any other qood or service, from Defendants. Plaintiff cannot
avail himself of the Act if he cannot even satisfy the first requirement of the Act.
Idaho case law interpreting the Act, confirms that private causes of action brought
under the Act are limited to circumstances involving a clear and distinct contractual
relationship between the parties.

Haskin v. Glass, 202 ldaho 785,640 P.2d 1186 (Ct.

App. 1982). The Haskin case directly addressed this point. The Haskin case involved the
failed purchase of real property.. In Maskin, the buyer and seller of real property had
entered into sales negotiations.
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occurred due to a controversy about a lot line. Od, The buyers subsequently purchased
another property at a higher selling price and sued the sellers for the digerence in price.
Id, The buyers' cause of action was based upon the ldaho Consumer Protection Act.
The buyers claimed that the sellers had engaged in deceptive acts regarding the lot
line dispute.

!& The sellers defended the claim on the grounds that the Act required a

contract to be consummated between the parties, and that no contract had been formed
with respect to the potential purchase of the original property.

Id.at 787-88. The trial court

agreed that no valid claim could be asserted under the Act where no contract had ever
existed between the parties.

& Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the claim. Id_

On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of the claim,
and specifically held that a claim under the Act must be based upon an actual contract
between the parties.
We find no authority for applying the ICPA to a merely contemplated
transaction, where there was no contract. We hold, as we believe the trial
court intended, that a claim under the ICPA must be based w o n a
contract,
Haskin, 102 ldaho at 788,640 P.2d at 1189 (emphasis added).
Not only is there is no contract in the present case between Plaintiff and Defendants
upon which Plaintiffs claim under the Act can be based, but Plaintiff has not alleged that
any transaction was even "contemplated" between the himself and Defendants. In sum,
Plaintiff has not alleged facts which would bring Defendants' alleged conduct within the
unfair or deceptive practices specifjcaIly enumerated in the Act, nor has Plaintiff
demonstrated that he had a contractual relationship with Defendants as required under the
Act. The failure of Defendant to satisfy the most basic elements of the Idaho Consumer
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Protection Act, requires dismissal of the claim for the failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

D.

Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Cause of Action for Leqal Malpractice,

Plaintiff's fourth cause of action against Defendants is for legal malpractice.
Plaintifs claim fails for at least three reasons. First, Plaintiff has no standing to bring an
action against Defendants for legal malpractice. Second, there exists no attorney-client
relationship betvveen Plaintiff and Defendants. Third, since there is no attorney-client
relationship beween Plaintiff and Defendants, the litigation privilege provides immunity to
Defendants from any claim brought by Plaintiff against Defendants for actions taken while
acting as attorneys for John Taylor and the AIA companies as set forth in Section VI A.,

supra. Accordingly, Plaintiff's fourth cause of action must be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Before a court can gain jurisdiction over any matter, the Plaintiff must be able to
demonstrate that he has standing to bring the action In the present matter, Plaintiff lacks
the standing to sue Defendants who are, or were, the attorneys for John Taylor and the
AIA companies. It is important to note that Plaintiff affirmatively states in his complaint that
he is not bringing a shareholder derivative action. Rather, Plaintiff seeks to plead a direct
cause of action against Defendants. Plaintiff reasons that because he is an alleged
creditor of one or more of the corporations, he is entitled to bring suit directfv against the
corporation's attorneys.
"It is a fundamental tenet of ~ m e r i c a jurisprudence
n
that a person wishing to invoke
a court's jurisdiction must have standing." Van Valkenkenbursh v. Citizens ofTerrn Limits,
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135 ldaho 121, 124, 15 P,3d 1 129, 1 132 (2000). Furthermore, "[sltanding focuses on the
party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Id. See
, 137 Idaho 102, 106, 44 P.3d 1 157, 1 159 (2002);
, 128 ldaho 371, 913 P.2d 1141 (1996). In

short, before a court can address the issues presented by a plaintiff, it must first determine
that the plaintiff has standing. With respect to Plaintiff's claim of legal malpractice, it is
abundantly clear that Plaintiff does not have proper standing to bring the claim.
The ldaho Supreme Court enumerated the elements required to obtain standing in
ldaho courts as follows:
To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litisant must
"alteqe or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed iniurv." This requires a
showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."
Young, 137 Idaho at 106,44 P.3d at 2 159 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In order to fulfill the standing requirement, a plaintiff must allege in his or her
complaint a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his
or her invocation of the court's jurisdiction.

& Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 ldaho

371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999). The "personal stake" requirement demands that the plaintiff
allege a distinct palpable injury to himself.

rd.at 377, 973 P.2d at 146..

In the instant case,

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a personal stake in any theoretical controversy between
John Taylor or the AIA companies and Defendants. As a result, Plaintiff lacks standing
to assert any direct claim for professional negligence against the Defendants in this case.
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Furthermore, even it the court determines that Plaintiff has standing, PlaintiR has
not demonstrated that he has the requisite anorney-client relationship belvveen himself and
Defendants. The ldaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an aeorney-client
relationship is necessary before a claim of legal malpractice can be properly alleged. The
Supreme Court has stated:
To establish a claim for attorney malpracticelprofessional negligence,
the plaintiff must show: ( I ) the (;reation of an attorney-client reiationshi~;
(2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the
duty of the standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform
the duty was a proximate cause of the damages suffered by the client.
McColm-Traska v. Baker, 139 ldaho 948,951,88 P.3d 767,770 (2004). See also, Becker
v. Callahan, 140 ldaho 522, 526, 96 p.3d 623, 627 (2004); Jordan v. Beeks, 135 ldaho
586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912 (2001); Sun Vallev Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson &
Tucker, 133 ldaho 1, 981 P.2d 236 (1999); Blouqh v. Wellman, 132 ldaho 424,974 P.2d

Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege that Defendants represented the Plaintiff in
connection with any of the events alleged therein. The ldaho Supreme Court has
determined that ordinarily, an individual who has not entered into the attorney-client
relationship cannot bring a cause of action for legal malpractice against the attorney. In
Harriqfeld v. Hancock, 140 ldaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), the ldaho Supreme Court
directly confronted the issue of whether an attorney-client relationship is necessary to
maintain a cause of action for legal malpractice. In the Harrigfeld case, heirs of a decedent
brought a legal malpractice action against the attorney who had drafted the decedent's will
and three codicils..
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Each of the codicils expressly revoked the prior codicils. td_ The heirs contended
the codicils were intended by the testatrix to be cumulative, and that by revoking the prior
codicils the attorney had committed malpractice.

Id.at 136,90 P.3d at 886. An action for

legal malpractice was brought in federal district court.

Id.

The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the attorney finding that the heirs had failed to state a valid
cause of action since they did not have an attorney-client relationship.

Id.The matter was

appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit certified the question to the ldaho
Supreme Court,

Id.

The question ultimately addressed by the ldaho Supreme Court was as follows:
Is a direct attorney-client relationship required to exist between the plaintiff
and the attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice action when the plaintiff
alleges to be an intended beneficiary of testamentary instruments drafted by
the attorney-defendant for a third-party testator?
Id. at 136, 90 P.3d at 886.
-

The Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging that

"As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence onlyto his or her client and

not to someone with whom the attornev d o e s not have an aftarnev-client
relationshla." Id.at 137, 90 P.3d at 887 (emphasis added). The court then addressed
the question of whether this rule shoilld apply to the intended beneficiary of a testamentary
instrument. In doing so, the court utilized a balance-of-the-harms test, which involved the
weighing of several factors.

Id.at 138, 90 P.3d at 888.

After considering several factors, the court arrived at a very narrow holding that an
attorney preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named in the
instruments to effectuate the testator's intent. Id_ However, the court was extremely
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careful to note that this "exlension of the aMorneyls duty is
added). In fact, the testamentary exception is the

." Id. (emphasis

instance in which the requirement

of privity in a legal malpractice action has been abrogated under ldaho law. The Harriqfeld
court even warned against potential claimants, such as Plaintiff in the instant case, trying
to expand the exception, by holding:

A direct attorneyclient relations hi^ is reauired to exist between the
plaintiff and the attorne~defendantin a leaal mal~racticeaction except in
Id, at 139, 90 p.3d 884 (emphasis added).
Following the Harrisfeld decision, the ldaho Supreme Court had the opportunity to
extend the narrow exception promulgated by Harriafeld, but declined to do so. See Tavlor
v. Maile, 142 ldaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). It is interestinq to note that one of the

plaintiffs in the Tavlor c a s e is Reed Tavlor, the Plaintiff in the ~ r e s e ncase.
t
A review
of the Taylor case, in conjunction with the instant case, reveals that this is not the first time
that Plaintiff Reed Taylor has sued the attorneys of his business adversaries for legal
malpractice, despite his failure to establish an attorney-client relationship with the
defendant attorneys.
In the Tavlor case, the defendant was the attorney for a trust.

Id.at 255, 127 p.3d

at 158. The trust was seeking to sell some real estate and had received an offer from a
third party to purchase the property. Id, The defendant attorney advised the trust to reject
the offer. Id, Later, the defendant attorney purchased the same property from the trust for
approximately the same price as the original offer. Id_ Reed Taylor was one of the residual
- .d!
beneficiaries of the trust.
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defendant for, among other things, legal malpractice, alleging the defendant had
purchased the property for less than fair market value.

fcl, The defendant filed a motion

to dismiss Reed Taylor's complaint for the failure to state a claim for legal malpractice
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Id-

The trial court recognized that if an attorney-client

relationship had existed, the relationship was between the defendant attorney and the
trust, not between ihe defendant attorney and the residual beneficiaries. Id.at 256-57,127

Relying upon the reasoning set forth in Harrideld, the trial court dismissed the entire
complaint.

td. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling with

respect to the claim for legal malpractice. In aRirming the dismissal, under Rule f2(bf(6),
of the claim of malpractice against the attorney the court stated:
The third count of the complaint asserts a professional malpractice
claim against [the the trust's attorney] and this count is precluded by the
general rule espoused in ffarrigfeld that an attornev-client relationship
with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for hoidinq the attorney liable for

g l i q e n c e in the performance of leqal services.
Id. at 259, 127 P.3d at 156.
In the present matter, Plaintiff does not allege an attorney-client relationship with
Defendants. Plaintiff does not have, nor has ever had, an attorney-client relationship with
Defendants. Through his efforts in the Tavlor v. Maile case, Plaintiff had personal
knowledge that the absence of an attorney-client relationship was fatal to his legal
malpractice claim against Defendants in the present case. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff filed
the present cause of action.. Because Plaintiff has not alleged an attorney-client
relationship with Defendants, his claim for legal malpractice must be dismissed.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(Fj).

DATED this

day of September, 2008.
HE

MIZ & JANIS, CHTD.

By:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
John J. Janis, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the
day of September, 2008, he served a true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing document upon the following:

2 7e

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 99201
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John J. Janis [ISB No. 35991
EPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W B m o c k Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582
Telepl~one:(208) 343-75 10
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
AMorneys for Defendants Michael E. McNichols
and Clements, Brown & MeNichols, P.A.

l[N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T I E

$TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ P E K E

1

REED .J, TAULOR, an individual;

)

1
1

PlaintiE,
vs.

)
)

MICHAEL E, McNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICW OLS ,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation;
JANE, DOES I-V, unknown individuals;

)

Case No. CV 08-01763

ANSWER TO COmLAENT AND
REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL

1
1
1
1
)

Defendants.

j

1

--

COMES NOW Defendants Michael E. McNichols and Clements, Brown &
McNicIiols, P.A,, by and through their counsel of record, .John J. Janis, of the film, Hepworth,
Lezamiz & Janis, a ~ ind Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint for Damages ('Complaint"), hereby admits,
denies and alleges as follows:
FTRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state acause of action upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
These answering Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs
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Complaint not expressly or specifically admiged herein.

T W m DEFENSE
PlaintiB lacks standing to asserl the causes of action alleged in his Complaint.

Responding to specific allegations contained in Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants
hereby respond as follows:

1. Responding to paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, tl1e answering Defendants
admit that PlaintifE is a resident of the City of Lewiston. The second sentence states a pure legal
conclusion which does not require a response.

2. Responding to paragraph 2, the Defendants admit the law firm is an Idaho
professional corporation that practices law, but denies any liability in this matter.
3. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs
Complaint.
4. The allegations contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.

5. Tn answer to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants admit they
practice law in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The remaining allegations of paragraph 5 are denied.
6. In answer to paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants agree that
,jurisdictionand venue of this case are appropriate in the Nez Perce County District Court, but deny
the Plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages in this matter.

7. The allegations contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.
8. The allegations contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.

9. The Defendants admit upon information and beliefthat AIA Services Corporation
was insolvent in 2001 and bas continued to be insolvent from that date forward. To the extent the
Plaintiffs Complaint is implying that such insolvency started only in 2001, such allegation is denied.
The remaining allegations of paragraplt are denied.
10. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the Plaintiffs
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL - 2

Complaint, the Defendmts would first admit and achowledge the existence of an "&ended

and

Restated Stock Pledge Agreement" that is dated July I , 1996, but in response to any specific
allegations regwding that docunent, the Defendants would respond that the document speaks for
itself. The remaining allegations appear to either state a pure legal conclusion or otherwise do not
state any allegations directed against these answering Defendants, and such allegations do therefore
not require a response, To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendmts deny such
allegatians.
1 1. The allegations contained in paragraph I I of Plaintiff's Complaint are denied.

12. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Plaintiffs
Complaint, the answering Defendants admit and acknowledge there is a pending civil action filed
in the Nez Perce County District Court, Civil Case No. 07-00208, and that on February 8,2008 the
District Court in that matter entered an Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Motion for Injunction. The Defendants would further respond that any specific
allegations relating to the Court's OpinionlOrder that said OpiniordOrder speaks for itself. The
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 12 are denied.
13. In xesponse to the allegations contained in paragrapl-t 13 of the Plaintiffs
Complaint, the Defendants acknowledge and admit they initially appeared as counsel of record for
the defendants in Nez Perce County Civil Case No. 07-00208, specifically the defendants AIA
Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and John Taylor, an individual. To the extent this
paragraph contains any allegations relating to what claims were made at any particular point by the
plaintiffs in the civil action filed in Nez Perce County as Civil Case No. 07-00208, the most current
Coinplaint on file at any particular point in that case otherwise speaks for itself. The remaining
allegations contained in paragraph 13 are denied.

14. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Plaintiff's
Complaint, the Defendants acknowledge and admit they received communications from attorney
Roderick Bond, but state and respond that such comn~unicationsspeak for themselves. The
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remaining allegations c o n ~ i n e din paragaph 14 are expressly denied.
15. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the Plaintiffs

Complaint, the Defendants and their respective counsel in Nez Perce Counv District Court Civil
Case No. 07-00208 entered in to a Joint Defense Agreement. The remaining allegations contained
in paragaph 15 are denied.

16. The alIegations contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintips Complaint are denied.
17.. In response to the allegations contained in parragraph 17 of Plaintips Complaint,
the Defendants acknowledge and admit as atlorneys they owe duties to their clients as provided by
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, but regarding any specifics relating to any such Rules of
Professional Conduct that such rules speak for themselves. The remaining allegations contained in
paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.
18. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs Complaint,
the Defendants again acknowledge as attorneys they owe duties to their clients as provided by the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and that regarding the specifics of any such Rufes of
Professional Conduct the rules speak for themselves. The remaining allegations contained in
paragraph 18 are denied.

19. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the Plaintiffs
Complaint, the Defendants again acknowledge and admit that as attorneys they owe duties to their
clients as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, but state that the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct speak for themselves. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 19
are denied.
20. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Complaint,
the Defendants acknowledge that for a relatively short time they represented the defendants AIA
Services Corporation andlor AIA Insurance, Inc. and John Taylor in Nez Perce County Civil Case
No. 07-00208, that a little more than a month after appearing for said defendants in that case, that
the Defendants in this action withdrew as counsel of record for the defendants AIA Services
ANSWER TO COMPL.AINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL - 4

Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. and at all times thereafrer served as counsel

0.f' record

the

defendant John Taylor in that action. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 20 are
denied.
21. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 21 of the Plaintiffs
Complaint, the Defendants acknowledge and admit only that they are representing John Taylor in
the Nez Perce Comv Civil Case referenced above, but otherwise deny the allegations contained in
paragraph 2 1.

22. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 22 of Plaintips Complaint,
the Defendants acknowledge and admit they have worked with the law fims Quarles & Brady LLP
and Hawley TroxeII in the joint defense of the civil action filed by plaintiff in Nez Perce Civil Case
No. 07-00208, but deny the remaining allegations contained therein.
23. The allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Con~plaintare denied.
24. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs Complaint,
the Defendants acknowledge and admit they have been paid attorneys fees and costs for legal
services performed for their representation of the defendant or defendants in NezPerce County Civil

Case No 07-00208, but deny the remaining allegations contained therein.

25 In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 25 ofPIaintiff s Complaint,
the Defendants acknowledge and admit having received communications from Roderick C. Bond,
but state and aver that any such communications speak for themselves. The remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 25 are denied.

26. The allegations contained in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied
27. The allegations contained in paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.
28. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's

Complaint,

the Defendants state that the records and pleadings on file in the civil action filed in Nez Perce
County as Case No. 07-00208 specifically including, but not limited to, the Court's record regarding
the plaintiffs intent to add Mr. Michael Cashman as a named defendant, all speak for themselves.
i

'
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in this action, the Defendants acknowledge the Stock Pledge Ageement as well as the h ~ e n d e and
d
Restated Stock PIedge Agreement, but specifically state and aver that such documents speak for
themselves. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 48 are denied.
49. The allegations contained in paragraph 49 of Plaintiff's Complaint are denied.
50. The allegations contained in paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.
5 1. The allegations contained in paragraph 5 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.
52. The allegations contained in paragrap11 52 of Plaintiff's Complaint are denied.
53. The allegations contained in paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.
54. The allegations contained in paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.

THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS
55. The allegations contained in paragraph 55 of Plaintiff's Complaint are denied.
56. The allegations contained in paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied
FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION
57. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 57 of Plaintiffs Complaint,
the Defendants state that this paragraph does not appear to state any allegations against these
answering Defendants that require a response by these answering Defendants. To the extent a
response is required, the allegations are denied.
58. The allegations contained in paragraph 58 of Plaintifrs Complaint are denied.
59. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 59 of Plaintiffs Complaint,
the Defendants acknowledge and admit they have certain duties and responsibilities to their clients
in keeping wit11 the standard of care ofthe legal profession. The Defendants deny, I~owever,that the
plaintiff Reed Taylor is now or ever has been a client of the Defendants. The remaining allegations
contained in paragraph 59 are denied.
60. The allegations contained in paragraph 60 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.

GI. The allegations contained in paragraph 61 of Plaintiffs Complaint are denied.
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FIRST AFFIMATPVE DEFENSE
Defendants are entitled to a litigation privilege which bars PlaintifFs claims in their
entirety.
S E C O W A F F W A T N E DEFENSE
Plaintiff has waived some or all of the claims andlor allegations against these
answering Defendants.
T H m A F F m A T l V E DEFENSE
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting some or all of the claims andlor allegations
against these answering Defendants,
FOURTH AFFIRMAWE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages sought in his complaint.

FlFTH A F F W T I V E DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud andlor conspiracy
as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including 1.RC.P. 9@)..
SIXTH MFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Certain of Plaintiffs claims are bmed by the statutes of limitation pursuant to Idaho
Code Sections 5-21 9(4) and 48-610.
SEVENTH AFFlRMATrVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants are based on an unenforceable and illegal
agreement and as such he has suffered no recoverable damages
RESERVATION
These answering Defendants reserve the right, after discovery, to amend this Answer
to add additional affirmative defenses supported by the facts andlor applicable law, and a failure to
include all such defenses in this Answer shquld not be deemed a waiver of any right to further
anlend this Answer.

c,
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These answering Defendants hereby request that they be awarded their attorney fees
and cos& incurred herein p m u m t to Idaho law, including Sections 12-120(3), 12-121,12-123, and
48-608 of the Idaho Code, and Rules 54 andlor 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

To the extent there are any triable issues of fact in this case, the answering Defendants
hereby dernmd a trial by a jury of twelve on all such issues, in accordance with Rule 38@) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

PRAYER

W E E F O E , these answering Defendants respectfully pray for judgment as
follows:
1. That the Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice, and that

Plaintiff take nothing thereby;

2. That these answering Defendants be awarded their attorney fees and costs incurred
in defense of this action, pursuant to Idaho law; and

3. For such other and m l l e r relief as the Court deems just and equitable
D A E D this

*day

ofOctober, 2008.
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & .JANIS
BY
for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE 01F'
SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident aBorney of the State of Idaho, with ofices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise Idaho 83701, and one of the altorneys far the
Defendants in this matter, cerlifies that on this
day of October, 2008, he caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16
Spokane, WA 99201

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ J Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ XI Telecopy (Fm)
[ XI E-mail
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-71 11
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV08-01763
Plaintiff,
v.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES I-V, unknown individuals;
Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor'("Reed Taylor"), by and through his attorneys, Campbell,
Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, hereby responds to Defendants' (collectively "Clements Brown")
Motion to Dismiss.

I. INTRODUCTION
Clements Brown attempts to portray this action as being simple and that, contrary
to the facts and evidence, the attorneys were merely "representing their clients."
However, Clements Brown's arguments fail. Reed Taylor's claims involve factual and
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legal claims that entitle him to damages at trial and that cannot be resolved though an
1,R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion.
Moreover, Reed Taylor's appropriate and wmanted direct claims against
Clements Brown defeat the Motion to Dismiss for such independent and personal claims
as conversion, fraud, conspiracy and aiding and abetting, all of which are independent: of
any derivative claims alleged directly against Clements Brown.

Moreover, and

nowithstanding Clements Brown's lack of authority to act on behalf of AIA Insurance
and AIA Services, it exceeded the scope of any purported legal representation while
purportedly representing the corporations. As such, Clements Brown is liable for the
claims and corresponding dmages requested in Reed Taylor's Complaint, which are
more than adequately pled under Idaho notice pleading standard.'
11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA
Insurance"), the only shareholder of AIA Insurance holding all of its shares, a secured
creditor, and the largest creditor of AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services"). See
Complaint, p. 2, fj 7. AIA Services is significantly insolvent and its assets are insufficient
to pay the over $8,500,000 owed to Reed Taylor. Id. Consequently, Reed Taylor is
bringing claims personal to him and claims derivatively held by him, all directly against
Clements Brown for certain damages, i.e, he is pursuing a1 1 claims directly a gainst
Clements Brown. See e.g., id.
///

i

Even if the Court fmds that Reed Taylor should not be permitted to bring certain claims directly against
Clements Brown, the issue is effectively moot as Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor will also bring the same
claims against Clements Brown derivatively on behalf of AIA Services and AIA Insurance to ensure every
possible claim is brought in a single action.
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Since 1996, Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of
the stock of AIA Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA
Insurance. See Complaint, p. 3 . 1 10. Wi.th full knowledge of the security interests held
by Reed Taylor, Clements Brown accepted payments from fknds subject to such security
interests. J'ee Complaint, pp, 19-20, fl47-54.
In violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Clements Brown undertook the
representation of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and R. John Taylor ("John Taylor"), each
having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other. See Complaint, p. 5, 1 13.
Clernents Brown's representation of John Taylor resulted in a breach of its fiduciary
duties owed to AIA Services and AIA Insurance. See Complaint, pp. 5-6, 1113-14; pp.
8 - 9 , s 20.
On February 22,2007, Reed Taylor voted the shares of AIA Insurance pursuant to
his contractual rights and as authorized under Idaho law. See Complaint, p. 4, 1 11. On
March 28, 2007, Clements Brown moved to withdraw as purported counsel for AIA
Insurance and AIA Services. See Complaint, pp. 5-6, 1 14. However, Clements Brown
continued to represent John Taylor, thereby breaching duties owed to its former
purported clients, AIA Services and AIA Insurance, to the detriment of Reed Taylor and
proximately causing damages to him. See Complaint, pp. 10- 11 , 1 2 3 .
Clements Brown owed duties to Reed Taylor as a creditor and pledgee of AIA
Insurance, who voted the shares of AIA Insurance.

See Complaint, pp. 7-8, 11 8 .

Clements Brown failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals
from appropriate parties in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Complaint, p. 8,

1 19.

See

Clements Brown was advised on numerous occasions that its
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conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and constituted the aiding and
abetting of others. See e.g., Complaint, p. 11-12, fi 25. Clements Brown's disregard of
w m i n g s can only be construed as intentional improper acts, all of which were to the
detriment of Reed Taylor. Id.
Clements Brown has assisted R. John Taylor and others in preventing Reed
Taylor from being a member of the board of directors of AIA Services. See Complaint,
p. 1 5 , s 34. Moreover, and with knowledge of Reed Taylor's right to be on the board of

AIA Services, Clements Brown participated and/or assisted in board meetings, with such
meetings and board decisions being null and void. See Complaint, p. 15, fi 34; p. 17, 7
40.

Clements Brown assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining funds,
assets, and property to defraud Reed Taylor. See Complaint, pp. 16-17, 7 39. Clements
Brown owed duties under the law to Reed Taylor to preserve and protect the assets and
businesses of AIA Services since it was insolvent. See Complaint, p. 7 , 7 17.
Clements Brown has assisted in the inappropriate acts of John Taylor and others
in stopping all payments to Reed and Donna Taylor. See Complaint, p. 15,

7

33.

Clements Brown took instructions and/or directives from unauthorized boards of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated in violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Complaint, p. 1 8 , 7 41.
Clements Brown inappropriately entered into andor participated in a Joint
Defense Agreement knowing that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, R. John
Taylor, and the other individual defendants had irreconcilable conflicts of interest and

.

that the agreement assisted others to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent
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conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciay duties and other claims.
See Complaint, p. 6, t/ 15.

Clements Bro~vnhas assisted mctior aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others
(including GropUSA) in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil
conspiracy, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties and inappropriate
transactions, thereby proximately causing damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock
pledgee. See Complaint, p. 10-11 , 1 23. Finally, Clements Brown assisted John Taylor
in obtaining a court order enjoining Reed Taylor when it knew that the corporations were
not being operated properly. See e.g., Complaint, p. 4, $/ 11; p. 1 6 , 1 3 6
111. LEG& AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

A. Clements Brown Cannot Meet Idaho's Stringent 12(b)(6) Standard.

1. The Complaint Properly Alleges Valid Causes Of Action.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court looks only at the
pleadings, and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City
of Ketchurn, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). "The issue is not whether the

plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims." Id. at 104. "Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a
complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm'n on
Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 21 5, 21 7, 506 P.2d 1 12 (1973). Idaho has adopted

a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857
(2000). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.. ." Id. (quoting Durstler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230,
697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985)). Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly
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bound to stating pa&icular theories in its pleadings."

Cook, 135 Idaho at 33. All

pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. I.R.C.P. 8(f).
Motions to dismiss under I.R.G.P. 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor because of

the waste of time in case of reversal, and because the primary objective of the law is to
obtain a determination of claims on the merits. Kachrli v. Marti~dale,82 Idaho 400,

404, 353 P.2d 782 (1960). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claims which would entitle hirn to relief. Id
Reed Taylor's claims are two-fold: (1) claims owned by him and which are
independent of any claims owned by or affecting AIA Senices or AIA Insurance; and (2)
claims owned by AIA Insurance and AIA Services that he is entitled to bring directly
against Clements Brown in lieu of bringing 'such claims derivatively on behalf of the
c ~ r ~ o r a t i o n sReed
. ~ Taylor has alleged valid causes of action and none of his claims
should be dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
In a nutshell, Reed Taylor claims that Clements Brown conspired and aided and
abetted in the commission of breaches of fiduciary duties, conspiracy, fraud, and tortious
interference. Reed Taylor claims that Clements Brown conspired with and aided and
abetted John Taylor and/or CropUSA in protecting John Taylor's interests to the
detriment of the interests of Clements Brown's other clients and former clients (AIA
Services and AIA Insurance), thereby damaging Reed Taylor. In addition, Clements
Brown directly interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rigHts in assuming to represent
AIA Insurance without authority as well as c~nspiringwith and aiding and abetting John
Reed Taylor will clarify the various claims and relief in his amended complaint that will be attached to
his Motion to Amend, all of which will be filed before the hearing on Clements Brown's Motion to
Dismiss.
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'Taylor in the interfering with Reed Taylor's contractual rights. In addition, Clements
B r o w is directly liable for the conversion of property in which Reed Taylor possessed a
valid iriterest for the payment of its fees and costs, as well as conspiring with and aiding
and abetting John Taylor and other parties to do the same. The claims are substantial and
numerous and have damaged Reed Taylor, AIA Insurmce and AIA Services, all of which
such damages Reed Taylor is entitled to pursue and collect.
Clements Brown has failed to meet the heavy burden required to obtain a
dismissal of claims pursuant to I.R.G.P. 12(b)(6), and its Motion to Dismiss should be
denied in full.3
2.

Regardless Of How Novel One Or More Of Reed Taylor's Causes Of
Action May Be Under Idaho Law, They Are Valid Causes Of Actions.

"The court should be especially reluctant to dismiss on the pleading where the
asserted theory of liability is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories
be explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader's supposition." Stewart
v. Arrington Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 53 1,446 P.2d 895 (1968), citing Shull v. Pilot Life

Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445,447 (5" Cir. 1963) (emphasis added).
Regardless of whether Idaho law has adopted the legal authority of any of the
claims being pursued by Reed Taylor, he should be permitted to plead and pursue all of
his valid and warranted claims. All of Reed Taylor's claims are sufficiently pled and all
supported by Idaho law or law in other jurisdictions.

Ill
Ill

Although Idaho law only requires notice pleading, the Court should permit Reed Taylor to file an
amended complaint to the extent that the Court may believe that the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead a
cause of action.
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3.

The Proper Test Of The Validity Of Reed Taylor's Complaint Is
Through A Motion For Summary Judgment After Discovery Has
Been Conducted.

'The motion to dismiss serves its most useful purpose where from the pleadings
and docwented proof available no controverted fact issue rem&ns and only questions of
law are to be decided." Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 53 1,446 P.2d 895
(1968) (citing Shull v. Pilot L$e Ins. G'o., 3 13 F.2d 445, 447 (5' Cir. 1963)). "The
validity of a complaint is more properly tested by the summary judgment procedure of
I.R.C.P. 56." Stewart, 92 Idaho at 53 1; Duffin v. Idaho Iwqprovement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho
1002, 1013,895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995).
To the extent that any of Reed Taylor's claims involve factual issues (which they
all do, to the extent Clements Brown wants the claims dismissed), such claims should be
resolved at trial or on summary judgment. All of Reed Taylor's claims survive an attack
based upon I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
4.

]If The Court Finds That Reed Taylor's Cornplaint Is Deficient In Any
Respect, Reed Taylor Should Be Permitted To File An Amended
Complaint.

If a court finds that a complaint fails to state a claim, then the court can permit the
party to file an amended complaint to cure any defects. Gardner v. Hollijeld, 96 Idaho
609, 61 1, 533 P.2d 730 (1975) (the Court dismissed plaintifPs complaint, but allowed
him 15 days leave to file an amended complaint). Thus, to the extent that the Court may
find that Reed Taylor's Complaint contains any defects, Reed Taylor should be permitted
to file an amended complaint curing such defects.

///I/
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The issue of standing focuses on the pady seeking relief and not on the issues the
party wishes to have adjudicated, which may be based upon threatened harm as well as
past injury. Schneia'er v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006). "An attorney
can be liable to a nondient, even an adversary in litigation, for fraud or deceit. Duty is
not at issue, because wrong is intentional conduct." 1 Legal Malpractice

5

6:7 (2008)

(internal cilations omitted) (emphasis added); see also e.g., Bunco Popular North

,.lmerica v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (I4.Y. 2005) (recognizing there could be a valid cause of
action for a conspiracy to defraud a creditor by helping a client transfer assets).
"[A] lawyer is subject to liability to a.. .nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in
similar circumstances." See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law.

5

This basis concept of lawyer liability is discussed in numerous Comments in

5 56:

56 (2008).

If activities of a nonlawyer in the same circumstances would render the
nontawyer civilly liable or afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the
same activities by a lawyer in the same circumstances generally render the
lawyer liable.. .

See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law.

5 56 (2008), Comment b.

When a lawyer advises or assists a client in acts that subject the client to
civil liability to others, those others may seek to hold the lawyer liable
along with or instead of the client. Whether a lawyer is liable depends on
the elements of liability under the law upon which the claim of liability is
predicated and may therefore turn on such facts as how the lawyer's acts
contributed to the plaintifPs harm, what the lawyer knew or believed as to
the relevant facts and law, the lawyer's intent, and how culpable the
client's conduct is under the law.

See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 56 (2008), Comment c. "A law firm

.

.

is subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by any wrongfkl act or
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omission of any principal or employee of the firm.. ." See Reswement (Third) of Law
Governing Law

fi 58 (2008) C'Wen fim principals are personally liable vicariously,

they are jointly and severally liable." See Co
Here, Reed Taylor's CornplaiM asserts valid causes of action against Clements
B r o w fbr conversion, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, todious interference,
malpractice for duties owed to Reed Taylor, and unfair and deceptive acts in trade (and
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy of the foregoing). As discussed in further detail
below, these claims are all independent of Reed Taylor's rights to bring derivative claims
directly against Clements Brown (i.e., Reed Taylor is not required to sue derivatively on
behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA Services, but may bring direct claims because of the
siwificmt factual and legal circumstances discussed in this Response). These collective
claims are all excluded from the m y assertion of litigation privilege because all of these
claims involve acts not protected by litigation privilege or acts for which the litigation
privilege may not be asserted (i.e., Clements Brown may not assert the litigation privilege
for claims owned by AIA Services and AIA Insurance that are brought directly by Reed
Taylor).
C. In Addition To Having Standing To Pursue His Personal Claims, Reed
Taylor Has stand in^ To Directlv Bring Certain Derivative Claims
A~ainstClements Brown.

1. Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Stoek Pledgee.
A stock pledgee has standing to bring direct claims against third parties. See e.g.,
Gustafson v. Gustafson, 47 Wn. App. 272, 278, 734 P.2d 949, 953 (Wn. App. 1987);
Empire Life Ins. Co. ofAmerica v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); Ritchie v.
McMullen, 79 F . 522 (6th Cir. 1897); see also 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations
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5 2032 (2008)

("A pledgee of corporate stock has an interest therein that entitles him or her to be heard

in court of equity concerning the preservation. and protection of the assets and property of
the corporation.").

"The pledgee may file suit in equity to preserve the stock and to

. . .The pledgee is

protect his or her interests,

also interested in the preservation of the corporate property and in preventing it from
passing out of the hands of the corporation.. ." See 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. Ij 5651
(2008) (emphasis added).
Were, Reed Taylor has standing to pursue claims directly against Clernents Brown
because he is the sole pledgee of all of the shares in AIA Insurance. Clements Brown's
actions are and were damaging AIA Insurance, impairing the value of AIA Insurance,
diverting AIA Insurance's assets, and inappropriately assisting and aiding and abetting
John Taylor and others in the commission of torts and to loot AIA Insurance. All of the
foregoing acts have resulted in money and assets being inappropriately diverted out of
AIA Insurance and claims not being pursued against Clements Brown, John Taylor and
others for the recovery of AIA Insurance's funds, assets and damages. As the sole
pledgee of all of AIA Insurance's shares, Reed Taylor has standing to pursue the claims
directly against Clements Brown.

2. In Addition To His Rights As A Pledgee, Reed Taylor Has Standing
Because He Stands In The Shoes Of AIA Insurance's Sole
Shareholder.
"The pledgee may file suit.. .to protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at
least, as the pledgor.. ." See 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. Ij 565 1 (2008) (emphasis added).
Generally, shareholders must pursue claims derivatively, i.e., on behalf of the
corporation.

However, a well-recognized exception to this general rule is that a
Y
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shareholder in a closely held corporation may file a direct action without bringing the
claims derivatively in the name of the corporation. See e.g , tSteelman v. Mallory, 110
Iddho 510, 512-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986) ("'Since.. .directors in this small closely held
corporation, had a fiduciary duty to Steelman, as minority shareholder, we c m o t agree
with appellants' contention that this case should have been dismissed because it is a
'direct action' rather than a shareholder's derivative suit.") (emphasis added); see also
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280
(Utah 1998) (a direct action may be brought when based upon a "contract to which
[plaintiffl is a party, or on a right belonging severally to Iplaintiffj, or on a fraud affecting
Cplaintifq directly...") (quoting 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations $ 59 11 (1970)); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W. 2d 793 (J3.D. 1991);
Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 412, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. App. 1980) overruled
on other grounds (". . .plaintiff had standing, both derivatively and directly, to sue on the
alleged contract and for an accounting."); Schumaker v. Schumaker, 469 N.W.2d 793,

Since a pledgee has the rights of a shareholder, the pledgee has the shareholder's
standing to pursue direct claims:
A shareholder may sue directly for harm to himself or herself that is
separate and distinct from that suffered by the corporation.

...Under some authority, the analysis for determining whether a
stockholder's action should be classified as direct or derivative turns on
the determination of who suffered the alleged harm, the corporation or the
suing stockholder individually, and who would receive the benefit of
recovery or other remedy. Most courts hold, however, that a shareholder
may have standing to bring an action arisihg from an injury to the
corporation if the injury is the result of the violation of duty owed directly
to the shareholder, or if the shareholder sustains an injury that is peculiar
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to him or her alone, and does not fall alike upon other stockholders, even
if the corporation was similarly harmed.
...W e n a shareholder's complaint states a cause of action that is both
direct and derivative, the shareholder may proceed with the direct action.
...Some jurisdictions, howver, permit a shacholder in a close
corporation to proceed directly rather than derivatively under some
circmstances. In such a jurisdiction, the decision whether to allow a
party to proceed with a direct suit in lieu of a derivative action is entrusted
to the court's discretion.

In detemining when a shareholder of a close corporation may proceed
with a direct action, rather than a derivative action, courts consider
whether a direct action will: (1) unfairly expose the corporation or the
defendants to a multiplicity of actions; (2) materially prejudice the
interests of the corporation's creditors; or (3) interfere with the fair
distribution of recovery among all interested persons.
See 18 G.J.S. Corporations § 485 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
The distinction between individual and derivative actions has been explained as
follows:
[I]t is generally held that a stockholder may maintain an action in his own
right for an injury directly affecting him, although the corporation also
may have a cause of action growing out of the same wrong, where it
appears that the injury to the stockholder resulted from the violation of
some special duty owed to the stockholder by the wrongdoer and having
its origin in circumstances independent of the plaintiffs status as a
shareholder.
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 233, 61 P.3d 585 (2002) quoting 19 Am. Jur. 2d
Corporations 5 2249 (1986). In other words:
An action brought by a shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of the
complaint is the injury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock
or property and not injury to the plaintiff's individual interest as a
shareholder.
McCann, 138 Idaho at 233 quoting 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations

5 2250 (1986); see also

Steelman v, Mallory, 110 Idaho 5 10, 5 12- 13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1 986). The definition of
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""gravamen" is "[tlhe substmtial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint."
Black? (Seventh Edition) Law Dictionary, p. 708 (1 999).
Here, Reed Taylor's claims are based upon the fact that the money and assets of
AIA Insurance are being tortiously misappropriated, converted and looted to his
detriment. We is the only shareholder of AIA Insurance as the pledgee of all of its
outstanding shares, he holds a security interest in all of the c o m i s s i o n s of AIA
Insurance, he is a creditor owed over $8,500,000, and he is the only bona-fide party
entitled to recover and possess all of the moneys recovered through his direct claims. In
short he is entitled to all of the assets and funds of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
Moreover, AIA Insurance is not bringing any claims against the responsible parties,
including Clements Brown. There is no better example of a case warranting direct
claims. These reasons, along with the others set forth in this Response, makes Reed
Taylor essentially the only person entitled to bring the claims against Clements Brown.
3.

Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Secured Creditor Of AIA Services,

When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has
standing to bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g.,
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, MA. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664
P.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1983); US. v. McCEeskey Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (Ga. 1969). The
rights of a secured creditor are extensive:
In some circumstances, however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition
of collateral may constitute conversion as to the secured party. In most
cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral, the
security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the
secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an
appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured
may claim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course,
may only have one satisfaction.. ..
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a
conversion of the collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one
who sells, as well as on the part of the one who purchases, or to whom
properly is transferred, or a third party who exercises dominion over the
collateral or its proceeds.. .
See 79 G.J.S. Secured Transactions

5

157 (2008) (intemal citations omitted) (emphasis

added).
Here, Reed Taylor holds a perfected security interests in AIA Services and AIA
Insurance's comissions and related receivables and all of the stock of AIA Insurance.
Reed Taylor also holds a security interest in the $1.2 Million Mortgage held by AIA
Services. In holding a security interest in all of AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor's security
interest and corresponding rights are p a m o u n t to all others, and his security interest in
all of the comissions of AIA Services is no less significant as they are the company's
sole source of revenue.
4.

Reed Taylor Has Standing To Pursue His Claims As The Creditor Of
AIA Services.

A creditor of an insolvent corporation has standing to bring direct claims. See
e.g., Board of fiustees of Teamsters v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 170 (3rd Cir.
2002); Asarco LLC v. Americas Min. Corp., 382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex 2007) (making claim
against directors for breach of fiduciary duty).
Here, Reed Taylor's position as a creditor owed over $8,500,000 and who has a
partial sumrnary judgment against AIA Services gives him standing to pursue direct
claims, and even more entitled to standing in light of the fact that he is also a secured
creditor and pledgee. Nevertheless, Clements Brown argues that Reed Taylor has no
standing, as a creditor, to pursue claims against Clements Brown or AIA Services'
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See Hortia American Catholic Educafiannl
directors for breach of fiduciary d ~ t i e s . ~

Programming FozanLfation, Inc, v. Cheezualta, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.Supr. 2007) (creditor
may not pursue direct claims for breaches of fiduciary duties when a corporation is in the

zone of insolvency); Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Croup, h c . 863 A.2d
772 (Del. Ch. 2004) (recognizing that a creditor is owed fiduciary duties when a
corporation is in the zone of insolvency).

However, Gheewalla and Production

Resources are not applicable to the facts and legal issues in this case.'
First, it should be noted that AJA Services is not in the zone of insolvency. AIA
Services is beyond insolvent and its assets are estimated to be over $6 Million less than
the over $9,000,000 owed to Reed Taylor. AIA Services does not even have sufficient
assets to pay Reed Taylor's attorneys' fees in Taylor v. AL4 Services, et al. Second, Reed
Taylor is a secured creditor, unlike the apparent general creditors in Gheewalla and

Production Resources. Third, Reed Taylor is entitled to be on the board of AIA Services,
and this contractual right has been thwarted with the assistance of Clements Brown.
Fourth, Neither Clements Brown, John Taylor or the other interested individuals have
pursued any claims on behalf of AIA Services because they all know the roads to claims
lead directly back to John Taylor: Clements Brown, C - ~ O ~ U Sand
A , the others. Fifth, the
past and present defense of AIA Services is obviously being conducted for no legitimate
basis other than to protect John Taylor and others in assisting in unlawfUlly transferring
millions of dollars of assets and other things of value from AIA Insurance.
4

However, even if accepted as true and found to be fully applicable to this case, Clements Brown's
argument does not apply to the rights Reed Taylor has as a pledgee (shareholder) of AIA Insurance and
secured creditor, the issues raised will be moot when Reed Taylor also files derivative claims against
Clements Brown. For this reason alone, Reed Taylor should be permitted to bring the claims directly to
conserve resources, particularly since he is the only person entitled to any funds recovered.
Clements Brown does not challenge Reed Taylor's standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims
directly against Clements Brown and the others as the pledgee/shareholder of AIA Insurance.
Nevertheless, Reed Taylor provides authority supporting such direct claims in this Response.
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5. Reed Taylor Has Standing As The Only Authorized Director And
Officer Of AIA Insurance.
A director or officer may bring claims against other parties in a quasi-derivative
action. Law of Corp. Offs. 5% Dirs.: Rts., Duties & Liabs. ij 9127 (2008) (citing New
York law); see also ,SfeeEman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 5 12-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986)
(recognizing a director's rights to bring a direct action in lieu of a derivative action
(although the director was also a shareholder)). Reed Taylor is the only authorized
officer and director of AIA Insurance, and, consequently, he has standing to pursue
claims directly as he is the only party entitled to the any recovered funds or damages.

6.

As Both The Director And Sole Shareholder Of M A Insurance, Reed
Taylor Has Standing To Make Direct Claims Against Clements
Brown.

Under Idaho law, a shareholder and director of a closely held corporation has
standing to bring direct claims. Steelman v. MaElory, 110 Idaho 5 10, 7 16 P.2d 1282
(1986); see also 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp.

5 '5651 (2008) ("The

pledgee may file suit in

equity to preserve the stock and to protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at least,
as the ~ l e d g o...
r The pledgee is also interested in the preservation of the corporate
property and in preventing it from passing out of the hands of the corporation.. .")
(emphasis added). Here, Reed Taylor is the only authorized officer and director of AIA
Insurance and its only shareholder as the pledgee of all its outstanding shares.
Consequently, he is entitled to bring direct claims against Clernents Brown for claims and
damages inflicted upon AIA Insurance.
7,

Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Third Party Beneficiary,

A party has standing to bring direci claims when be .or she is a third party
beneficiary:
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Thus, a shaseholder may have a personal cause of action against a third
person to recover d m a g e s for breach of' contract, even though a corporate
cause of action and the shareholder's cause of action result from the same
wongful acts, such as for mismanagement of the corporate business and
diversion of assets in breach of an express contract with the shareholder.. .
...The shareholder's individual claim based upon a contract between the
corporation and another may be brought as a third-party beneficiary
action, despite lack of privity between the plaintiff shareholder and the
defendant, provided the shareholder as an intended beneficiary of the
contract. ..

12B Fletcher Cyc. Gorp. fj 5921 (2008) (internal citations omitted) citing VogeZ v. Reed
Supply CO., 277 N.G. 119, 126, 177 S.E. 2d 273, 278 (N.G. 1970) (third-party
beneficiaries not in privy of contract may bring an action in their own name to "enforce a
contract made for their benefit...") (other citations omitted). There are other instances in
which a third-party has standing to pursue claims against an attorney:

.. .[Aln at.torney may owe a duty to a party who is not his or her client, but
who is a third-party beneficiary to an agreement between the attorney and
his or her client. Accordingly, third party liability of an attorney arising
from representation of a client may be found to exist where the attorney is
responsible for damage caused by his or her negligence to a person
intended to be benefited by his or her performance irrespective of any lack
of privity. Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary
for a duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific
h a m which occurred.. .
...Thus, although a legal malpractice claim may accrue only to the
attorney's client, an attorney may be liable for damages to a third party
because of events arising out of his or her representation of a client if the
attorney's acts are fraudulent or tortious and result in injury to that third
person.
An attorney for a trustee is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the thirdparty beneficiaries of the trust when the attorney has placed his or her selfinterest about that of the trustee.
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law 5 234 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
Here, AIA Services promised Reed Taylor to not .impair
the value of AIA
Insurance and to vest the voting rights to its shares in AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor upon
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a default, with the -full knowledge of Clements Brown. A1A Services is insolvent and
Reed Taylor is the only beneficiary entitled to its remaining assets. As such, Reed Taylor
is a third-pwy beneficiary of any services purpodedly provided by Clements Brown,
who in turn was required to represent the best interests of AIA Insurance and AIA
Services-but

failed to do so. Finally, Clements Brown also owed special duties to Reed

Taylor by way of him being the pledgee of AIA Insurance's shares and the sole officer
and director of the company. When it knew that Reed Taylor has voted the shares of AIA
Insurance, Glements Brown knew that it owed special duties to protect the corporation's
interests and assets.

The cumulative effect of all of the above establishes that Clements

B r o m owed Reed Taylor d ~ t i e s . ~

8. Assuming Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing Under Any One Of
The Above Reasons, He Should Have Standing As A Result Of All Of
The Above Collective Reasons.
The gravamen of Reed Taylor's Complaint is that Clernents Brown has been
aiding and abetting John Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and
depriving him of money and property to which he is righthlly entitled. Clements
Brown's actions have occurred knowing tb at duties are owed to Reed Taylor, as a
pledgee, director, officer, creditor and secured party.

There is no other bona-fide

shareholder or creditor entitled to the remaining assets, hnds, and claims owned by AIA
Services and AIA Insurance. The little remaining assets are being unlawfully utilized to
cover up the acts of John Taylor, Clements Brown, CropUSA and other individuals.
Moreover, Reed Taylor is a creditor owed over $9,000,000, he has a security interest in
Even if none of the single factual issues creates a third-party beneficiary entitlement for Reed Taylor, a
special exception should apply based upon Reed Taylor being a secured creditor of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance, a creditor owed over $8,500,000 by an insolvent AIA Services incapable of ever satisfying the
debt, the pledgee of AIA Insurance, the sole officer and director of AIA Insurance, and the only
shareholder of AIA Insurance by way of being the pledgee of all of its outstanding shares.
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the commissions of A1A Services and AIA Insurance, he is the only authorized
representative of AIA Insurance, be is required to be on the board of AIA Services, he
has priority over all of the assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurmce, he has a security
interest in all of the AIA Insurance's shares, and AIA Services is insolvent.

9.

The Gases Relied Upon By Clements Brown Have No Application To
The Facts And Claims Alleged By Reed Taylor.

Clements Brown expends significant effort in mistakenly relying upon Taylor v.
Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005) for the misplaced argument that Reed Taylor
lacks standing to pursue malpractice claims. See Clements Brown's Motion, pp. 34-35.
Reed Taylor's malpractice claims are two- fold: (1) for damages from claims and duties
owed to Reed Taylor as described in this Response and the Complaint; and (2) for
damages from claims and duties owed to AIA Services and AIA Insurance, which Reed
Taylor is directly bringing against Clements Brown. Taylor v. Maile has no application
to the facts and claims alleged by Reed Taylor.

D, Clements Brown's Acts, Omissions, And Torts Are Outside Of Any
Scope Of Purported Legal Representation Because It Was Never
Authorized To Undertake The Purported Representations.
"A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents." RPC 1.13(a).
When a managing officer has been validly removed, he has no authority to
institute legal proceedings in the name of the corporation.

American Center for

Education, Inc. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal.Rptr. 736, (1978) (citing Templeman v. Grant, 75
Colo. 519, 534-35, 227 P. 555 (Colo. 1924) ("It is also true that neither the plaintiff
Templeman nor the former directors.. .had any right or authority to assume to be officers
of the ...corporation, or to institute legal proceedings in the court ...in the name of the
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corporation.'"); U S v. WOK 352 F.Supp.2d 1195 (W.D. Okla. 2004) (the court is not
bound to defer to the parties' representations as to their authority to hire counsel);

Safewaj~ IHS. Cn. v. ,Spinak, 641 N.E.2d 834 (I11.App. 1994) (holding that the
unau~orizedfiling of a lawsuit constituted a cause of action and subjected the attorneys
to exemplary d a a g e s j . No person has the right to appear as another's aeomey without
the other's authority. Am.Jur.2d AMomeys at Law

5

159 (1997); Cofmex, I~zc.v. Harris,

R E 248799 1 (Wn. App. 2008j. .An attorney who enters an unauthorized appearance for

a party is liable to the party for any damage sustained. 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law

5

219 (1997). Absent authority to retain an attorney, no attorney-client relationship can be
established. In re Gonservaforship ofNelson, 587 N.W.2d 649 (Minn.App. 1999).
Here, all of Clements Brown's acts exceeded the scope of any purported
representation because they were never authorized to represent AIA Insurance, never
properly authorized to represent AIA Services, and because of the irreconcilable and
unwaivable conflicts of interest they intentionally manufactured in simultaneously
purportedly representing AIA Insurance, AIA Services, John Taylor, and others.
1.

Clements Brown Never Had Authority To Represent AIA Insurance,
And, Therefore, Clements Brown Had No Scope Of Representation,

Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AIA Insurance. Under
the legal authority cited above, Clements Brown is not authorized to represent AIA
Insurance, and is, therefore, liable to Reed for the same reasons and to the same extent as
any other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims.
On December 12, 2006, AIA Services received a notice of default from Reed
Taylor. See Complaint, p. 3 , 7 9. On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of
AIA Insurance. See Complaint, p. 4, f/ 11, p. 7, 7 18. Reed Taylor should be in control
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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of AIA Insurance, and would be but for the tortious acts of Clements Brown and others,
along with the acts of Clernents Brown to unlaw-fuliy cnjoin Recd Taylor.
Complaint, pp. 4-5,

ql/ 12-13.

See

Notwithstanding Clements Brown's unauthorized

representation, it took instmctions andlor directives from the unauthorized board of AIA
Insurance, namely John Taylor. See Complaint, p. 18, T/ 41.
John Taylor purports to control AIA Insurance and Clernents Brown purports to
have represented AIA Insurance, however, neither was authorized to do so. Reed Taylor
is the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance and the only person entitled
and authorized to control it. Significantly, AIA Insurance, by way of Reed Taylor being
the only authorized director or officer of the company, may not have John Taylor or
~
Clernents Brown's representation of AIA
others retain and direct c o ~ n s e l . Therefore,
Insurance is not authorized and is not protected under the law. Consequently, the acts of
Clements Brown on behalf of AIA Insurance are as individuals and not as attorneys
within the scope of an attorney-client relationship. They have no protections under the
law.
Clements Brown has directly interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights to
control AIA Insurance, his right to be a member of the board of AIA Services, his rights
to commissions and the $1.2 Million Mortgage collateral to which he is entitled to
possess, and his rights to realize upon his collateral by and through its unauthorized
representation of John Taylor.
Clements Brown is also directly aiding and abetting John Taylor and other
interested individuals in breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, conspiracy, fraud and
tortious interference. Significant damages to Reed Taylor are being caused by these
7

See Sections C-1 and C-2 above, which are incorporated by reference into this section.
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actions, including impairing the value of A I h Insurance, the company that he is
contractually entided to control. In sum, the commission revenues of AIA Insurance and
$1.2 Million Modgage in which Reed Taylor has a direct security interest or a security
interest by way of the property being proceeds of collateral securing his debt are being
directly conveded to unlawlfully benefit John Taylor, Clements Brown, and others.
Because Clements B r o w had no authoriv to represent AIA Insurance, its
asserlions that it merely rendered advice within the scope of an attorney-client
relationship relative to AIA Insurance canriot be used as basis to assert that Reed Taylor's
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At a minimum, the
issues of whether Clernents Brown had authority to represent AIA Insurance and whether
Clements Brown has a legal privilege predicated upon an attorney-client relationship
present factual issues which (it is respectfully submitted) cannot be decided by the Court
on an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion, which is addressed solely to the sufficiency of Reed
Taylor's Complaint.
2.

Clements Brown Had NO Authority To Represent AIA Services
Because It Was Never Retained By The Duly Authorized
Representative Of AIA Services.

Under the legal authority cited above, Clements Brown is not authorized to
represent AIA Services and is, therefore, liable in the same manner and to the same
extent as any other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims. Reed Taylor and Donna
Taylor are required to be members of the board of AIA Services. See Complaint, p. 1 5 , l

34. Moreover, Clements Brown has unlawfully taken instructions and/or directives from
the unauthorized board of AIA Services and without obtaining the necessary approvals.
See Complaint, p. 18,1141.
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3.

Because Of The Irreconcilable And Unwaivable ConMcts Of Interest,
Gternenis Brown's Purported Representation Exceeded The Seope Of
Representation,

A consent to dual representation required by W G 1.7 mandates that "the consent
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organizdtion other than the individual who
is to be represented, or by the shareholders." RPC 1.13(g). Any conflict of interest in
representing a majority shareholder and corporation in litigation brought by a minority
shareholder was not waived, where only the majority shareholder approved the conflict
waiver. Williams v. Stanford, 977 So.2d 722, 730 (Fla. 2008). "[Slome conflicts are
nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such an
agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent.

When

representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to
each client." RPC 1.7, Comment 14.
Reed Taylor would have been required to give any consent to represent AIA
Insurance. Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, and/or disinterested innocent shareholders
would have similarly been required to provide consent for AIA Services. By undertaking
to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests and by receiving and accepting
directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted with their clients' conflicting
interests, Clements Brown inevitably implicated itself in the claims for damages made by
Reed Taylor.
The basic allegations in Reed Taylor's Complaint encompass the following facts:
It is claimed (and the court has found) that AIA Services is indebted to Keed Taylor for
over $8,500,000 by contract. The relationship between Reed Taylor and AIA Services is
not merely creditor and debtor. AIA Services is insolvent and therefore owes fiduciary
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duties to its creditors under Idaho law (which means that AIA Services should be
operated exclusively for the benefit of creditors). Furthemore, Reed Taylor is a secured
creditor (which is one of the most pedinent facts of this case relative to the liabilities for
interference with Reed Taylor's contractual relationship and for conversion).

Reed

Taylor has a security interest in all of the stock of AIA Insurance and all of the
c o m i s s i o n revenue and related proceeds of AIA Insurance and AIA Services. Reed
Taylor has the right to control AIA Insurance and has in fact voted the shares of AIA
Insurance as he is contractually entitled to do. Furthermore, the Court has granted partial
summary judgment to plaintiff finding AIA Services in default. Reed Taylor has the
right to control AIA Insurance and should be controlling AIA Insurance, but has been
denied his contractual rights by the actions of John Taylor and the three corporations
represented by Clements Brown, with the assistance of Clements Brown.
Clements Brown currently represents John Taylor. An interested director, John
Taylor, who is a director common to AIA Services and CropUSA andpurports to be a
director of AIA Insurance, controls and makes the decisions for all the corporations with
respect to litigation involving plaintiff and the corporations. John Taylor himself is a
defendant in the litigation and is the object of claims of breach of fiduciary duties owed
to the two corporations and to Reed Taylor, directly. Clements Brown received and
accepted litigation instructions from John Taylor and has joined in most every motion or
response submitted by Hawley Troxell (another example of exceeding the scope of
representation and aiding and abetting in the c o m i s s i o n of torts). Each of Clements
Brown's past corporate clients had distinct and diverging interests based upon claims
being litigated, diverging interests so strong that numerous torts such as fraud, fraudulent
b

:

*
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conveyance, conspiracy and conversion are implicated.

John Taylor's interests are

distinct and diverge from the interests of the corporations based upon claims being
litigated. These distinct and diverging interests essentially result from: 1) the claim that
AIA Services is indebted to Reed Taylor by contract; 2) the claim that Reed Taylor is
contracbally entitled to control AIA Insurance and has conbactual rights to full
possession of the revenue comissions; 3) the claim that CropUSA is liable to AIA
Services and AIA Insurance because of fraudulent conveyances, fraud and other torts;
and 4) the claims that John Taylor is liable to AIA Services, AIA Insurance and
CropUSA for breaches of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent conveyance, excessive
compensation and other torts. It is also claimed that John Taylor is liable to Reed Taylor
because of breaches of fiduciary duties owed directly to him.
The allegations against Clements Brown are for conspiracy and/or aiding and
abetting in the breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy;
for interference with Reed Taylor's contractual relationships; and for conversion, and are
underscored by the following facts:
AIA Services, an insolvent corporation, should be operated exclusively for the
benefit of creditors, specifically Reed Taylor. The interests of AIA Services are to
maximize the recovery of assets for its creditors and pursue claims against others who
may be liable the corporation. AIA Services should have separate counsel receiving and
accepting instructions from independent directors.

An attorney representing AIA

Services should not be taking directions from an interested director like John Taylor
against whom claims are being made. It was in the best interests of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance to pursue claims against John Taylor. It was in the best interests of AIA

'b
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Services and AIA Insurance to pursue claims against others, including CropUSA, which
it is alleged is liable to AIA Services. It was in the best interests of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance to pursue claims against John Taylor.
En addition, the interests of John Taylor were and are naturally adverse to the
interests of AIA Sewices and AIA Insurance. It is inconceivable to expect J o b Taylor to
rnmage his personal assets for the benefit of AIA Services and its creditors, Reed Taylor.
It is impossible Ibr attorneys, in this case Clements Brown, to purportedly represent the
interests of AIA Services exclusively for the benefit the corporation and its creditors
while at the same time representing the interests of John Taylor and taking directions for
both clients from an interested director like John Taylor. The conflicts of interest were

irreconcilable and unwuivabte and constitute Clements Brown's breaches of fiduciary
duties owed to the corporations.
In a situation such as described above, Clements Brown cannot avoid representing
one client to the disadvantage of another client, i.e., the interests of one rnust necessarily

predominate over the other. Clements Brown then must impermissibly divide its loyalty
owed to a present client or former clients and act outside the scope of an attorney-client
relationship, and then shift its duty of loyalty back to itself to prevent claims from being
asserted against it while maintaining a steady stream of ill-gotten income from assets
securing Reed Taylor's debt to further the impossible and unlawfhl purported
representations.
4.

Even If Clements Brown Was Authorized To Represent AIA Services
And AIA Insurance, Its Acts Were Outside Of The Scope Of
Representation Because They Were Not In The Best Interests Of The
Organizations.

"[Aln attorney may not hid&behind a client's instructions in order to perpetrate a
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fraud against a third party." The Fioridu Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1992).
W C 1.13(b) expressly states that a lawyer is required to proceed in the bests interests of

the corporatiorr:
If a l a w e r for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act
or refkses to act in a m a e r related to the representation that is a violation
of a legal obligation to the o r g ~ z a t i o n ,or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and this is likely to result
in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the orgmization.. .

W C 1.13(b) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. Ij
96 (2008) (virtually identical language to RPC 1.13(b)).
Here, the only interests Clements Brown served were those of itself, John Taylor
and other interested parties. With the assistance of Clements Brown, John Taylor and the
other parties who should be on the receiving end of claims by AIA Services and AIA
Insurance, but instead are ensuring that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor are no longer
being paid any amounts due them. Meanwhile, the h d s continue to flow out of the
corporations to CropUSA, John Taylor, Clements Brown and other interested and
responsible parties.
This argument also applies to Clements Brown's representation of John Taylor
after it withdrew from representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance. It is impossible for
the best interests of AIA Services and AIA Insurance to benefit from Clements Brown
dropping them as purported clients so that it can continue representing the key wrongdoer
and tortfeasor, John Taylor.

5. Any .Purported Agreement For Clements Brown To Provide Legal
Services Is Void And Unenforceable.

Contracts that violate ethical n ~ l e sviolate public policy and are unenforceable.
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Evans & Luptiik, PLC v. Lizza, 251 Mich.App. 187, 650 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Mich. 2002).
Once representation has commenced, a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if ""-the representation will result in violation of the rules of prokssional conduct
or the law." W C 1.16(a)(a). A lawyer may not engage in a representation that serves his
or her self interests and limits the representation of one or more clients. W C 1.7(a)(2);
see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 403 (C.A.D.C. 1996) (simultaneously

representing multiple parties in violation of the rules of ethics constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty).
AS a result of any one or more of the ethical violations set forth above, Clements
Brown was never authorized to represent any of the entities and any purported waiver
obtain to permit it to continue representing John Taylor was also never authorized. Thus,
Clements Brown cannot utilize the immunity defense for any of their acts andlor
omissions and resulting torts.

6.

Clements Brown Unlawfully Dropped AIA Services And AIA
Insurance To Represent John Taylor.

An attorney may not represent interests adverse to former clients.

RPC 1.9.

With respect to RPC 1.9, courts have adopted the "Hot Potato Doctrine" which states:
Generally, a lawyer may not drop one client so that he may continue to represent a
more favored one. The weight of authority holds,. . .that once the lawyers find
themselves representing clients with adverse interests, they generally may not
drop one client in order to represent the other, preferred client. In other words, 2
lawyer may not drop a current client like a "hot potato" in order to turn the client
into a former client as a means of curing the simultaneous representation of
adverse interests. As one commentator explained, courts have agreed that, where
a lawyer has terminated representation of a client for the purpose of keeping a
more important client happy. counsel will be treated as if he is still the client's
present attorney for purposes of determining whether disqualification is
warranted.

Flying J. Inc. v. TA Operating Cory., WL, 648545 *4 (D. Utah 2008) (internal citations

*
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omined) (emphasis added); see also GATm'Airlog Co. v Evergreen Inter 1' Airlines, Inc., 8
F.Supp.Zd 1182 (N.D. Cal. 1998); El Cismino Resources, Ltd. v. Huntiulgton Nat. Bank,
WL 2710807 (W.D. Mich. 2007).

In addition to breaching its fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services and AIA
Insurance by dropping them as puqorted clients to permit it to continue representing

John Taylor, Clernents Brown could not have received the necessary waivers or consents
from AIA Insurance or AIA Services to cease purportedly representing them and to
exclusively represent John Taylor. Moreover, under the same authority in this Response,
Clements Brown did not obtain the required waivers or consent from authorized or
disinterested representatives of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

E. Assuming Clernents Brown Was Authorized To Represent AIA Services
And AIA Insurance, It Is Liable For All Claims Arising Out Of Actions
Exceedinfr The Scope Of Its Purported Representation.
Attorneys are liable for acts and torts committed outside the scope of their
representation because the law does not provide absolute immunity. See Alpert v. Crain,
Caton & James P.C., 178 S.W. 3d 398 (Tex. 2005) (attorney liable for fraud committed
outside the scope of representation); Kimmel v. Goland, 793 P.2d 524, 530 (Cal. 1990)
(attorneys may be liable for aiding and abetting violation of privacy act or other illegal or
tortious conduct).
Clements Brown correctly notes that attorneys normally have the luxury of
asserting litigation privilege.

See Clements Brown's Motion, pp. 9-12.

The only

problem with Clements Brown's argument is that 'this is'not the normal case. Implicit in
its analysis is the erroneous contention that the facts alleged by Reed Taylor are: 1)
limited to the advice rendered by Clements Brown to a client; and 2) conceded to be
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pedomed withirz the scope of the attorney-client relationship. These bare conclusions
ignore the facts alleged in Reed Taylor's Complaint and all of the required inferences.
Reed Taylor's Complaint is plainly not limited to factual allegations pedaining to
Clernents Brown merely giving legal advice to a client, but alleges acts c o m i t t e d by
Clements Brown that are clearly outside the proper scope of an attorney-client
relationship.
Clements Brown understmdably desires to "uncomplicate" this case by citation to
case authorities involving cases with less complex and inapplicable facts (i.e. cases where
the sued attorney represents only one client and is not burdened by a conflict of interest
because the attorney has undertaken to represent more than one client or when an
attorney has not actually committed a tort). This case, however, is compounded because
Clements Brown undertook to purportedly represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance,
each with distinct and diverging interests, while taking instructions from John Taylor (a
person not authorized to act on behalf of AIA Services and AIA Insurance).
Furthermore, Clernents Brown incorrectly received and accepted litigation instructions
from interested (as opposed to independent) persons who participated in the conspiracy to
defraud the corporations. Moreover, the interested directors themselves should be the
subject of pending claims of breach of fiduciary duties to the AIA Services and AIA
Insurance, but the valid claims were not pursued because of the self interests of John
Taylor, Clements Brown and the other responsible individuals.
Clements Brown, while disregarding constant warnings from Reed Taylor's
counsel, knowingly stepped into a situation complicated by irreconcilable conflicts of
interest and fraught with individuals committing torts. As will be discussed below, an
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aaorney with a conflict of interest goes outside the scope of an attorney-client
relationship with respect to one client when the attorney acts for the benefit of another
client and/or person to the detriment of the first client (assuming the attorney has
authorily to act-). Likewise, the attorney provides more than mere legal advice when the
aeorney so acts.
There are issues of fact pertaining to whether Clements Brown had any authorized
at-t-omey-clientrelationship with AIA Insurance or AIA Services. At a m i n i m u , there
are issues of fdct pertaining to the scope of Clernents Brown's purported representation
and the extent to which they exceeded any purported scope of representation. Moreover,
Clernents Brown has not, and cannot, provide any authority holding that a law firm's
scope of representation of one client or more clients (AIA Insurance and/or AIA
Services) includes defending another client John Taylor from claims that should be
asserted by the other clients to recover millions of dollars that were fraudulently
transfened from the corporations. Clements Brown's acts and subsequent torts exceed
any permissible scope of representation.

F. Clements Brown Owed Reed Taylor Special Duties As A Secured
Creditor, Stock Pledgee, And Creditor Of The Insolvent AIA Services.
Under Idaho law, when a corporation becomes insolvent, its assets are held in
trust for the benefit of the corporation's creditors. See e.g., Smith v. Great Basin Grain

Go., 98 Idaho 266, 651 P.2d 1299 (1977). Attorneys may not engage in legal
representations that affect the attorney's responsibilities to third parties. RPC 1.7(a)(2).
Wben a corporation is insolvent, attorneys also have special obligations to creditors:
[W]e hold that if an attorney represents both a dissolved or insolvent
corporation and a director or officer of that firm, and if the attorney
controls corporate assets, then the attorney must protect the financial
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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rights of creditors to these assets, where he or she h o w s or should h o w
that the director or officer intends to interfere with creditor" claims
through an improper distribution of these assets.

WiElner's Fuel Distributors, Inc. v. %reen, 882 P.2d 399, 406 (Alaska 1994) (like the
attorney in this action, Clements Brown was at one time in possession of the $1.2 Million
Mortgage and funds derived from AIA Services andior AIA Insurance). The lack of an
attorney-client relationship does not preclude a finding of a fiduciary duty, which is an
issue of fact for the jury. Ira re D. C. Equipmeal; Inc. v. Peshtigo Nafional Bank, 1 12 B.R.
855, 135'7 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that an issue of fact as to whether corporate
debtor's counsel owed fiduciary duty to debtor's sole shareholder precluded summary
judgment).
Here, Reed Taylor holds a valid and perfected security interest in all of AIA
Insurance and AIA Services' commissions and related receivables. Reed Taylor has a
valid security interest in the shares of A1A Insurance. Reed Taylor is a creditor owed
over $8,500,000 by the insolvent AIA Services, thereby making him the beneficiary of
the funds and assets held in trust by AIA Services and its subsidiary AIA Insurance.
Moreover, he is the pledgee of all of the shares in AIA Insurance who voted the shares
and is the only authorized director and officer of AIA Insurance. Clements Brown is
representing John Taylor with full knowledge of the facts and claims that directly harm
its former clients AIA Services and AIA Insurance. There can be no better example of a
situation in which corporate assets should be protected or better set of facts to support a
lawyer's duties owed to a non-client. Thus, Reed Taylor's claims are all valid and
warranted under the special factual circumstances of this case as he is the beneficiary and
secured creditor of the remaining assets and funds of the insolvent AIA Services.

.:
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G.
Action.

Reed Taylor's Complaint specifically states "all applicable facts alleged below are
incorporated by reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each cause of
action." See Complaint, p. 1. Thus, every fact alleged in Reed Taylor's Complaint
applies as necessary to support each cause of action. As discussed in detail below, the
facts and causes of action are all more than sufficiently pled.
H. Reed Ta3vlorBas Sufficiently Pled That Clernents Brown Has Aided And
Abetted In Various Torts.

1. Contrary To Clements Brown's Argument, Idaho Has Numerous
Aiding And Abetting Cases And Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled
The Cause Of Action And It Is Not Barred By Any Privilege.
Idaho has a plethora of cases on aiding and abetting. The following listed Idaho
cases (in reverse chronological order) have clearly established the principles of law
governing conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims. In Todd v. Sullivan Const. LLC.,
191 P.3d 196, 203 (2008) (Idaho Report cite unavailable) (emphasis added), the Idaho
Supreme Court addressed aiding and abetting:
As we stated in Hetgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 682, 34 P.2d 957, 963 (1934):
The law seems to be well settled that, where several people
actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, not
only the actual actor or assailant is liable but all others who aid,
abet, counsel or encourage the wrongdoer by words, gestures,
looks or signs are equally liable with him to the injured person.
In Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 342, 986 P.2d 996 (1999). the
Idaho Supreme Court reiterated:
A person is subject to liability if he or she does a tortious act in concert
with the other or pursuant to a common design with him. See Restatement
(Second) oGTorts 5 876(a) (1977).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has even addressed the rninimal jury instructions necessary to
find that a defendant aided and abetted:

. . . the jury was instructed that:
If you find that a defendant who did not personally perform a
w o n g k l act nonetheless did pursue a common plan or design to
cornmit that act with the actor by cornanding, instigating,
advising, aiding, abetting or encouraging the actor by words,
gestures, looks or otherwise; then the conduct of the actor
physically c o m i e i n g the wrongdoing was also the conduct of that
defendant. If either is liable then both are equally liable.
Highland Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 348. En Price v. Aztec Llc%, Inc., 108 Idaho 674, 67778, 701 P.2d 294 (Idaho App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeal addressed aiding and
abetting:
Secondly, it is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a
contributing tort-feasor, joint tort-feasor or cotrespasser for harm resulting
to a third person from the tortious conduct of another. Smith v. Thompson,
103 Idaho 909, 655 P.2d 116 (Ct.App.1982). See, e.g., Lorang v. Hays, 69
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd., 39
Idaho 354, 227 P. 1055 (1924). Further, it has been held "all persons who
command, instigate, encourage, advise, countenance, co-operate in, aid or
abet the commission of a trespass by another, are cotrespassers with the
person committing the trespass ...." Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd., 39
Idaho at 358,227 P. at 1056.
W e n the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and indivisible harm,
each contributing tort-feasor is liable to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves; i.e., they are
jointly and severally liable. Smith v. Thompson, supra. See generally
RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS 5 875, 876 (1977); and cases
collected at 74 AM.JUR.2d Torts 5 66 (1 974). Each tort-feasor is liable for
the whole damage at the option of the injured party. Spencer v. Spencer,
91 Idaho 880, 434 P.2d 98 (1967). The rule of joint and several liability
also prevails where tort-feasors act in concert in the execution of the
common purpose. The tort liability of persons acting in concert is
expressed in RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS 5 876 (1979):
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he ...
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(b) knows that the other's conduct constimtes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself,. ...

In the Reslalement's c o m e n t s on clause b it is said that if the
encouragement or assistmce referred to is a subsmtial factor in causing
the resulting tort, then the one giving it is himself a tort-feasor and is
responsible for the consequences of the other's act.

In Smith v. Thompson, 103 Id&o 909, 91 1, 655 P.2d 116 (Idaho App. 1982)., the Idaho
Court of Appeals noted:
It is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a contributing
tortfeasor, joint tortfeasor, or "cotrespasser," for h m resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another. See, e.g., Lorang v. Hays, 69
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho In. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho
354, 227 P. 1055 (1924). "All persons who command, instigate,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a trespass by another are cotrespassers with the person committing the
trespass." Bailey v. Idaho In. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho at 358, 227 P. at 1056.
Furthermore, when the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and
indivisible harm, each contributing tortfeasor is liable to the same extent
and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves; i.e., they are jointly and severally liable. See Lorang v. Hays,
supra; Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Ltd., supra; see generally Restatement
(Second) of Torts $5 875, 876 (1977); and cases collected at 74 Am.Jur.2d
Torts 5 66 (1974).
As noted in all of the Idaho cases cited above, Reed Taylor has sufficiently pled
aiding and abetting causes of action against Clements Brown. For example, Reed Taylor
specifically alleges the following in his Complaint:
Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor for an amount to be proven at trial
because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided
and abetted R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance,
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties in acts of
fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches
of fiduciary duties.

See Complaint, p. 10-11, t/ 23 (emphasis added). In Reed Taylor's Complaint, he also
exhaustively pleads various forms of the cause of action of aiding and abetting, along
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with numerous facts. See Complaint, pp. 18-19,1/742-46; see also e.g., Complaint, p. 4-

5, fj 12; pp. 6-7,117 15-16; p. 10-11,B 23; p. 12,7 26.
All of the above facts are incorporated by reference into Reed Taylor's causes of
action for aiding and abetting. See Complaint, pp. 1 and 18-19. Not only does Reed
Taylor succinctly and specifically plead aiding and abetting, but he pleads the various
causes of action with numerous fact pagerns and claims.
2.

Clernents Brown Is Liable For Aiding And Abetting In The
Commision Of Numerous Torts And Such Claims Are Not Barred By
The Litigation Privilege.

Like normal tortfeasors, attorneys may be liable to others under various legal
theories, including aiding and abetting, conspiracy and other torts. Hearst v. Hearst, 50
A.D. 3d 959 (N.U. 2008) (factual issues precluded summary judgment on conversion and
aiding and abetting of fraud claim against lawyer); In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 26691 50

(D. Colo. 2007); Traub v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382 (Ga. App. 2003); Adena, Inc. v.
Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 35 1 (E.D.Pa. 200 1); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2000); In re Atlantic Financial Management, Inc. Securities Litigation v. Paine
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, et al., 658 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1986) (valid cause of
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud based upon conflicts of interest).
A highly illustrative and demonstrative case is

liz

re MS5.5, Inc., 2007 WL

2669150 (D. Colo. 2007). In that case, the federal district court reversed the bankruptcy
court's order granting a motion to dismiss. A bankruptcy trustee for the estate of a
corporate debtor sued a law firm for tortious conduct involving certain financial
transactions between the debtor and corporate insiders, including one Howard Leach and
"entities under his control," all referred to' in the facts of the case as "Leach." The facts
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reveal a series of various transactions which axe quite complex but ultimately involve
Leach obtaining prmary liens on debtor's assets when debtor was insolvent. The court
notes that "of critical impedance" to the trustee's claims is the fact that the law firm
(refexed to in the case as ""C;DC") acted as counsel for both debtor and Leach during the
transactions which the court characterizes as "dual representation" altendant with
conflicts of interest and divided loyalties behveen the debtor and Leach. The district
court stated:
The bankruptcy court summarized the basis for Trustee's claims against GDC as
f-bllows:
[GDC], while owing professional duties to [Debtor] acted to
protect the interests of another client, Leach, contrary to the
interests of Pebtor]. According to [Tmstee], [GDC] undertook to
structure the Bridge Loans so that Leach, Blue Chip, and Akarnai
would receive security interests andlor payments from [Debtor]
that were either fraudulent or preferential.

Jn re MS5.5, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 * 3. The district court reviewed the allegations of
the trustee's complaint relative to claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting in the
breach of fiduciary duties8 and held that the complaint stated claims. The court stated:

. . . I find Trustee sufficiently alleged the following claims on behalf of the
corporation's creditors: (1) GDC engaged in a civil conspiracy with Leach,
Blue Chip, Akamai, and members of Debtor's management to commit
fraudulent transfers that breached fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors;
and (2) GDC aided and abetted Debtor's officers and directors in
breaching their fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors. Thus, I find the
bankruptcy judge's determination that Trustee's allegation only supported
"claims of the debtor against a third party" was in error. [Footnote No.31
[Footnote No. 31. Strangely, another portion of the bankruptcy judge's
opinion supports my finding here. The judge noted: "[Tlhe basis for all of
[Trustee's] claims is that [Debtor] committed wrongful acts, i.e., violation
of fiduciary duties it had to its creditors and shareholders or securities
8

The district court noted that "Colorado state law dictates that when a corporation becomes insolvent, the
corporation's creditors are owed a common law duty by the directors and officers of the corporation." 2007
WL 2669150 at * 14.
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firaud, and that [Debtor] was either caused to commit such violations or
was assisted in comitting such violations by [GDC]."

The district court quotes the allegations of the trustee's complaint at length which
allegations are pertinent and instructive for compaing to the allegations of the plainties
complaint in this case. The district court's opinion s m a r i z e s the claims and then
provides quotations from the trustee's complaint:
Claim three alleges that "[GDC] engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit
fraudulent transfers in breach of its fiduciary duty by agreements with
Leach, the Leach Trust, Blue Chip, Blue Chip's counsel, Akamai,
members of [Debtor's] management including Roger Moody and Robert
Ogden, and other Bridge lenders." . . . Claim four alleges that GDC aided
and abetted Debtor's officers and directors in breaching their fiduciary
duties by participating in or approving fraudulent transfers.
[Tlhe following allegations [are] contained in [the] amended complaint:

7

135 At all times after December 5, 2000, Blue Chip, Leach and
[Debtor's] management were known by [GDC] to have fiduciary
duties to unsecured creditors of [Debtor] which prohibited selfdealing and preferences for insiders and required them to preserve
the assets in trust for such creditors.
7 137 Self-dealing insiders of [Debtor] including Blue Chip,
Leach, [and] Ogden were unable to ratify or waive [GDC's]
conflict which was undisclosed to other shareholders and general
creditors.

7 143 GDC's fiduciary duties tb [Debtor] encompassed duties
which [Debtor] and its management owed to general creditors at all
times after December 1, 2000 to avoid self-dealing and insider
preferences.
7

155 The civil conspiracy in which [CDC] participated was
attended by circumstances of fraud of willful and reckless
disregard of the rights of [Debtor], unsecured creditors and smaller
shareholders.

fl

157 The officers and directors of [Debtor] breached their own
fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors '&d/or smaller shareholders
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in [Debtor] by participating in or approriing [CDC's breach of
fiduciary duties].

fl 160 GDC's conduct in aiding and abetting those breaches were
attended by circmstances of fraud or willful and reckless
disregard of the rights of the debtor, unsecured creditors, the
Trustee and smaller shareholders.

In this case, for the same reasons as in In re ,WS55, k c . , Reed Taylor's factual
allegations against Clernents Brown state claims upon which relief can be granted.
Clernents Brown, by undertaking to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests,
and by receiving and accepting directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted
with their other clients' conflicting interests, inevitably implicated themselves in the
claims for damages made by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor properly states claims against
Clements Brown for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor in breaching
fiduciary duties by acting to protect John Taylor to the detriment of the interests of
Clements Brown's former clients, AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and to the detriment
of Reed Taylor.

Reed Taylor's claims against Clements Brown with respect to

interference with his contractual relationships and conversion have the same foundation
because John Taylor is not a party to the contracts in question.
Another instructive case is Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa.
2001).

In that case, a closely-held corporation and two shareholders sued a former

majority shareholder ("Malecki') and his law firm ("Cohn") alleging among other claims
breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting in the breach of fiduciary duty. The law
I

firm moved to dismiss which motion was denied by the court. The facts indicate that
Malecki, as corporate director and officer, diverted corporate h n d s to another business
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''\vIsich he owned and operated for his own personal pecuniary gain."

In addition,

Malecki used covorate "facilities and personnel to further" his other btlsiness. The law

fim had undenlaken to provide representation to both Malecki, personally, and the
corporation and the facts of the case detail a n m b e r of personal and corporate
trmsactions for which the law firm provided representation. The court stated the law
fims>osition on the applicable law as follows: "[Tlhe Cohn Defendants contend that . .

. an attorney is not liable for aiding and abetting a corporate officer's breach of fiduciary
duty merely by the provision of advice to the corporation absent direct and knowing
participation in the breach itself; . . ." Adena, Inc., 162 F. Supp.2d at 356. The court
addressed Ihe issue, stated the law, and held as follows:
To establish a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a
plaintiff must show: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty owed to another; (2)
knowledge of the breach by the aider or abettor; and (3) substantial
assistance or encouragement by the aider or abettor in effecting that
breach. (Citations omitted). The court in Schuylkill Skyport Inn [v. Rich,
1996 WL 502280 (E.D.Pa.19961 did not require the direct and knowing
participation that the Defendants contend is required. Rather, the court
allowed the claim to proceed based upon a showing of "substantial
assistance or encouragement." Moreovkr, even if such a heightened
involvement were required, the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the Cohn
Defendants were indeed knowing and active participants in Malecki's
breach. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty against the Cohn Defendants.

Adena, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d at 357-358.
It would certainly appear fi-om the preceding that Pennsylvania law is consistent
with the law of Idaho as set forth in the cases cited above and follows the Second
Restatement of Torts

5 876 (which is followed by Idaho and is cited several times).

It is

to be emphasized that at the crux of the cause of action against the Cohn Defendants in

Adena, Inc. v. Cohn was the dual representation of clients and the divided loyalties that

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 41

$12

inrvibbly occur. The Cohn DeGndmts subjected themselves to claims of liability for
conspiracy and aiding and abeeing of various torts by undertaking to represent more thdn
one client and then substmtially assisting the client in breaching fiduciary duties owed to

the oher client.
Another illustrative case of divided loyalties, conflicts of interest and claims of
aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty is Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d

133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). That case arose out of a partnership of four brothers. The
estate of one of the fraternal partners (Salvatore) filed suit against the partnership
attorney. The partnership attorney had also undertaken to represent one of the three other
brothers (Edward), individually, when Edward purchased the partnership share of another
brother (Anthony). This transaction was alleged to have disadvantaged the partnership
(which could have acquired Anthony's share for the partnership as a whole) to the
advantage of Edward, individually.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's

dismissal of the plaintiPs complaint. Citing the Second Restatement of Torts

5 876, the

court specifically addressed a cause of action against an attorney for aiding and abetting
the breach of a fiduciary duty in a conflict of interest context:
Indeed the defendant may also be liable for aiding and abetting Edward's
breach of his fiduciary duty to Salvatore. As his partner, Edward owed
Salvatore a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty," (citations omitted),
the more so because of the familial relationship. (Citations omitted).
'[Lliability arises when a person [actively] participates in a fiduciary's
breach of duty ... such that he ... could not reasonably be held to have
acted in good faith.' (Citation omitted). Compare firker v. Hill, 44
Mass.App.Ct. 184, 189-190, 689 N.E.2d 833 (1998) (discussing
Restatement [Second] of Torts 5 876[b] [I9771 and claim of civil
conspiracy in context of rule 12[b][6] motion). Here, the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant not only wrongly advised Edward he had no duty to
Salvatore with regard to the purchase of Anthony's interest in the
partnership, but acted as Edward's lawyer in a transaction that conflicted
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. and then refused to give Salvatore the
information be requested after the sale had occurred. (Emphasis added).
Gacciola, 733 N.E. 2d at 139 (emphasis added).
To reiterate, in this case Reed Taylor's Complaint states claims against Clements
Brown for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor in breaching fiduciary duties
by acting to protect John Taylor's interests to the detriment of the interests of Clements
Brown's former purported clients, AIA Sesvices and AIA Insurance, thereby darnaging
Reed Taylor. Likewise, Reed Taylor's claims against Clements Brown with respect to
interference with his contractual relationships and conversion have the same factual basis.

I. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Breach Of Fiduciary Duties And
Aidinr~And Abetting Breach Of Fiduciary Duties.

The pleading requirements necessary to state a cause of action against a lawyer
for aiding and abet-ling breaches of fiduciary duties is the same as against any other
person or entity. See e.g., In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1007
(8th Cir. 2007); Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 35 1 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cacciola v.
Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). In addition, evidence that an attorney
has violated rules of ethics pertaining to dual representation is sufficient to support a
claim that an attorney violated common-law fiduciary duty of loyalty. Hendry v. Pelland,
73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A shareholder's allegations that a law firm's conflict of
interest representing two corporations is sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against the law firm. Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Senfi & Cohen LLC, 484 F. Supp.2d
337 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
Reed Taylor's claims against Clements Brown include aiding and abetting in John
Taylor and other individuals' breaches of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, along
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38 Idaho 664, 224 P. 435, 438 (1924); Wesfern Farm Service, Ine. v. OZsen, 151 Wn.2d
645, 90 P.3d 1653 (2004) (when a debtor transfers collateral subject to a perfected
security interest, the secured party may c o m e n c e an action against the purchaser for
conversion).
Here, Reed Taylor has security interest in the comissions of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor also has all of the shares of AIA Insurance pledged to him
and holds a security interest in those shares. Moreover, Reed Taylor also has a security
interest in the proceeds of all commissions and the distributions from AIA Services' other
subsidiaries, namely, the $1.2 Million Mortgage improperly pledged to CropUSA.
Glernents Brown has been unlawfully paid with funds derived fi-om assets securing Reed
Taylor's debt. Moreover, the assertion that John Taylor is entitled to have his fees paid
by the corporations has no application because the funds paying Clements Brown are not
the corporation's funds (it is noteworthy that proper approval has never been obtained).

2.

As A Secured Creditor, Reed Taylor Is Not Required To Own The
Commissions And $1.2 Million Mortgage As They Are Pledged To
Him As Collateral.

One who wrongfully withholds personal property from another who is entitled to
it under a security agreement may be liable for conversion. In re Bailey, 197 F.3d 997,
1000 (9th Cir. 1999); Case Corp. v. Gehrke, 91 P.3d 362, 365 (Ariz. App. 2004) ("A
secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral upon default, and so has
sufficient possessory interest to bring a conversion action.. .money can be the subject of
conversion"); Western Farm Service, Inc. v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d 645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004).
Reed Taylor has, since 1996, held a,security interest in all of the commissions of
AIA Services and AIA Insurance and the stockof AIA Insurance. See Complaint, p. 3 , 7
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10; pp. 19-20, fl47-54.

The $1.2 Million modgage was also obtained as proceeds from

the same commissions and was unl

ly titled and pledged with the assistmce of

Clements Brown. See Complaint, p. 15-16, 1( 35. VJhen AIA Services defaulted, Reed
Taylor was entitled to possession of the collateral, namely the $1.2 Million Morlgage and
all the comissions of AIA Services and AIA Insurance (which comprise virtually every
dollar of their revenue, save the minimal amount of rent received from tenants of the
building rented by AIA Insurance, which is also subject to Reed Taylor's security interest
in AIA Lnsurance's shares and his rightful control of the company).

However, the

property has not been relinquished to Reed Taylor as required, and hundreds of thousands
of dollars have been wrongfully transferred to Clements Brown and others. In other
words, those amounts have been "converted" and Reed Taylor is rightfully seeking return
of the funds from Clements Brown and others.

3.

Clements Brown Has Asserted Wrongful Dominion Over Reed
Taylor's Property.

Under the same authority cited above, Clements Brown has taken andlor accepted
funds from sources it knew were subject to a valid security interest in favor of Reed
Taylor. Clernents Brown mistakenly believes that ,the Idaho Code can strip away a valid
and perfected security interest to pay attorneys fees to the very attorneys who have been
assisting in perpetuating the fraud and corporate malfeasance over the years.

See

Clements Brown's Motion, p. 23. However, the authority cited by Clements Brown has
no application to Reed Taylor's valid and perfected security interests, which trurnp any
.
right John Taylor may have to the payment of his fees. Significantly, however, Clements
Brown has full knowledge that John ?'&lor has not complied with his obligations to
corporations, yet Clements Brown eagerly accepts the payment of funds from the
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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corporations, which constibates contrersion.
4.

Reed Taylor's Claimed Property Is Identifiable As A Specific Chattel.

As set forth above, Reed Taylor has a security interest in virtually eve+hing
owned by AIA Services and AIA Insurance and all of the funds of the companies, all of
which are clearly identifiable by and though bank statements, money transfers, and loan
proceeds (i.e., money laundered through the unlawful loan from CropUSA wherein John
Taylor pledged the $1.2 Million Mortgage (which is subject to Reed Taylor's security
interests)). All of the money paid to Clements Brown is traceable and all of the money is
property Reed Taylor is entitled to rightfully possess.

K. Reed Tavlor Has Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy And aid in^ And Abetting
Conspiracy.

1.

Clements Brown Has Engaged In Civil Conspiracy.

Idaho law is well settled on claims for civil conspiracy and the minimal pleading
requirements. Argonaut Insurance Company v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964
(1963) ("In the instant case it is alleged that injury resulted from acts done in pursuance
of the conspiracy" and the "order dismissing the complaint is reversed"); Lorang v. Hays,
69 Idaho 440, 449, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) ("a concerted series of action on the part of
wrongdoers, which culminates in producing the injury complained of. ..pursuant to a
conspiracy."); Kloppenburg v. Mays, 60 Idaho 19, 88 P.2d 513 (1939) (an agreement
becomes a conspiracy when its purpose is to do something that is unlawful or some
lawful thing in an unlawful manner).
Attorneys are also subject to liability for claims of civil conspiracy. See e.g.,
Traub v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382, 387 (Ga. App. 2003); Banco Popular North

118
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America v. Candi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.W. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for a

conspiracy). In one treatise, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are distinguished:
Civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are varieties of concerted-action
liability. The prime distinction between civil conspiracy and aiding and
abeaing is that a
wongful activity or to c o m i t a tortious act, while aiding and abetting
focuses on whether a defendant howingly gives 'substantial assistance' to
someone who perfoms wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant
agrees to join the wongful conduct.

See 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy Ij 3 (2008) (emphasis added).
Like aiding and abetting, Clements Brown attempts to confuse Reed Taylor's
conspiracy claim by citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions.
discussed above, Idaho law is well settled on conspiracy claims.

However, as
Reed Taylor's

Complaint alleges causes of action against Clements Brown for conspiracy, which are
both personal to Reed Taylor and which he is pursuing in place of the corporations for his
benefit. The agreement Clements Brown entered into involves the alleged "Joint Defense
Agreement," "Joint Retainer Agreement" and their purported direct and indirect improper
representation of other individuals for the purpose of interfering with Reed Taylor's
contractual rights and unlawfully protecting the interests of John Taylor, thereby
preventing claims from being asserted against Clements Brown.

Moreover, the

conspiracy specifically involves covering up and perpetuating fraud, conversion, and
breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, as set forth in Reed Taylor's Complaint.
See e.g., Complaint, p. 4,88 11-12; pp. 6-7,B 15; P. 10, 8 23; PP. 18-19 88 42-46.

Similarly, while practicing law is generally a lawful activity, practicing law
.. .
becomes illegal when done so in an illegal. manner, as set forth in Reed Taylor's
Complaint. Thus, although entering into a joint defense agreement is generally
* .
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pcmissible, the same joint deknse agreement can also be improperly used to illegally or
unladully practice law (and to the detriment of Clernents Brawn's former clients).
2.

Contrary To Clements Brown's Assertions, Reed Taylor Has
Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy.

Clements Brown challenges Reed Taylor's conspiracy claim on various theories
relating to an attorney being protected by merely giving advice to a client. See Clernents
Brown's Motion pp. 14-15. As with Clernents Brown's other arguments, the authority it
relies upon deals with traditional cases with facts and legal issues significantly
distinguishable. However, as discussed above, Clements Brown's acts do not merely
involve providing legal advice. Clements Brown was not authorized to represent AIA
Services or AIA Insurance or to ignore their interests to represent John Taylor, and all of
its acts are actionable. Notwithstanding this fact, Clements Brown has exceeded any
purported scope of representation and engaged in conspiring with John Taylor and others
to commit various torts and retain property in which Reed Taylor holds valid and
perfected security interests.

L. Reed Taylor Has Sufficientlv Pled Tortious Interference And Aiding And
Abetting Tortious Interference.

1. Reed Taylor Has Pled Tortious Interference With A Contract.
A prima facie case of the tort [of interfering with a contract] is established where
the plaintiff adduces proof of the following elements:
(a) Existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on the part of the
defendant, (c) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract, and
(d) injury to the plaintiff resulting fromthe breach.
Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1028, 772 P.2d 228 (1988). Reed Taylor concedes
that the above elements are required to make aprima facie case for tortious interference
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with a contract. They are not required to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6). Nevertheless, Reed Taylor has one again sufficiently pled the cause of action,
contrary to Clenlents Brown's assertions. As with all of Reed Taylor's causes of action,
he incorporates by reference each fact in the Complaint necessary to support each cause
of action. See Complaint, p. 1.
With respect to the first and second elements, Reed Taylor pleads the existence of
contracts. See e.g., Complaint, p. 3,

118-10; p. 4, 71 11-12; P.

17, 1 38; p. 18, 143.

Thus, the first and second elements are not only pled, but satisfied for purposes of the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. With respect to the third element, Reed Taylor has
also specifically pled intentionally interferences. See e.g., Complaint, p. 4 , 7 11; pp. 4-5,
12; p. 9 , 7 23; p. 15, 11 33-34; p. 17; 138; p. 18, 143. Finally, Reed Taylor has pled
the final element of damages. See e.g., Complaint, p. 15,134; p . l 0 , 1 2 3 ; p. 11-12, 125;
pp. 22-23. Thus, Reed Taylor has pled all four elements of tortious interference with a
contract (as to him and the corporations).
2.

Clements Brown Has Tortiously Interfered With Reed Taylor's
Contractual Rights By And Through Its Purported Representation
And Improper Assistance Of John Taylor And CropUSA.

Employees and agents are third-parties when acting outside of their scope of
authority. See e.g., Houser v. Cip of Rednzond, 91 Wn.2d 36, 586 P.2d 482, 484 (Wa.
1978). As the purported (and unauthorized) former agent for AIA Services and AIA
Insurance, Clements Brown bas tortiously interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual
rights by exceeding all scope of representation and without proper authorization. By
representing John Taylor, Clements Brown has intentionally interfered with Reed
Taylor's contractual rights. Moreover, Clements Brown has also intentionally interfered
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with Reed Taylor's contractual rights through its unauthorized representation of A1A
Sewices and AIA Insurance.

Finally, and not exhaustively, GZernellts Brown has

interfered with Reed Taylor's rights to be a board member of AIA Services, interfered
with his rights to possession of commission collateral, intentionally interred with hs vote
of the shares of AIA Insurance, and interfered with his rights involving the $1.2 Million
Mortgage, among various others.

M. Reed Tavlor Has Sufficientlv Pled Fraud And Aidinp And Abetting
Fraud.
Generally, the following nine elements in order to state a claim for fraud:
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality;
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement;
(7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury.
Mannos

V.

Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that

misrepresentations and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded
summary judgment in buyer's action for fraud).
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an
alternative cause of action to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud" does not
require a plaintiff to plead the nine elements of common law "fraud." See e.g., Smith v.
Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); McGhee v. McGhee, 82
Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760 (1960) (recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative
cause of action to fraud and that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine
elements of fraud "is not the case"); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 9 1 Idaho 55, 6 1, 4 15 P.2d 698
(196h)(a promise to build a house to certain standards constitutes "constructive fraud"
when the builder failed to do so).

.
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Moreover, a cause of action under 'konstmctive fraud'3s discussed in significant
detail in numerous treatises (wbich are frequently followed and cited by the Idaho
Supreme Court):
Constmctive fraud is a breach of duty which, irrespective of m ~ r a guilt,
l
the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate
confidence, or to injure public interests.
Constmctive fraud is fraud that arises by operation of law from conduct,
which if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage. It
is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt
of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to
deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public
interests. The legal duty may arise from a statute, a contract, or a trust.
To establish constructive fraud, it is necessary only to prove acts of fraud.
Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential
element. Thus, a party whose actions constitute constructive fraud might
still have acted in good faith.. .
37 C.J.S. Fraud $ 5 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis added).
Constructive fraud is defined as an act done or omitted that amounts to
positive fraud, or is construed as a fraud by the court because of its
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence,
even though the act is not done or omitted with an actual design to
perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Otherwise stated,
"constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a course of conduct
which, if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage,
irrespective of the existence or evidence of actual intent to defi-aud.
Constructive fraud, sometimes called legal fraud, is nevertheless fraud,
althou~hit rests upon presumption and rests less upon furtive intent than
does moral or actual fraud. It is presumed from the relation of the parties
to a transaction or from the circumstances under which it takes place.
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or
fiduciary relationship to another that induces justifiable reliance by the
other to his or her prejudice.
The conscience is not necessarily affected by it. Indeed, it has been said
that constructive fraud generally involves a mere mistake of fact. It
requires neither actual dishonesty nor intent to deceive, being a breach of
lexal or equitable duty that, irrespective of the moral guilt of the
wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive
others, to injure public interests, or to violate public or private confidence.
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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In its generic sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and
concealrnents involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence that results in damage to another.
Hence, the terms
"constmctive fraud" a d ""legal fraud"' both connote that in certain
circmstances one may be charged with the consequences of his words
and acts as though he has spoken or acted fraudulently, although, properly
speaking, his conduct does not merit this opprobrium.
If there is any distinction to be found between the terms "constructive"
and "legal" as applied to fraud, it probably amounts to this: Breach of a
fiduciary relationshiv or of a contract uberrimae fidei is usually called
" c o n s ~ c t i v efraud," whereas the term "legal fraud" is generally used to
characterize a misrepresentation made without knowledge of its falsity.
Constructive fraud may result from reckless and heedless representations,
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive.
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit

5

9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis

added). Similarly, attorneys are liable for the aiding and abetting of constructive fraud.
See Hearst v. Hearst, 50 A.D. 3d 959,857 N.Y.S. 596 (N.Y. 2008).
Clements Brown has assisted John Taylor and oihers in the commission of fraud,
including constructive fraud, which simply requires a duty and %rids being
inappropriately diverted or utilized.

Moreover, Clements Brown's acts constitute

constructive fraud and fraud upon AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor has
sufficiently pled these claims on behalf of himself and as directly asserted for the
corporations.
N. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Claims For Malpractice.
For all of the reasons identified in this Response, Reed Taylor has standing to
pursue any beneficiary claims and direct claims against Clements Brown for malpractice
claims owned by RIA Insurance and AIA ~ e r v i c e s . ~Moreover, certain malpractice

9

Reed Taylor concedes that his independent malpractice claims asserted against Clements Brown are
supported by the third-party beneficiary and related authority cited above. However, the undersigned was
also unable to frnd a single case in which a creditor was owed millions of dollars by a highly insolvent
corporation, a creditor had a security interest in funds being converted and improperly utilized by the
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claims are dependent upon whether Clernents Brown was ever authorized to represent
AIA Services or AIA Insurance thereby making the claims alternative in nature (i.e., if
Clernents Brown was never authorized to represent MA Insurance as alleged by Reed
Taylor, then its acts were all as joint-tortfeasors. 0x1 the other hand, if Clements B r o w
had an attomey-client relationship w<th AIA Insurance, then Reed Taylor would have
claims for malpractice and also pussue claims for malpractice owned by AIA Insurance.).
Reed Taylor concedes that any claims against Clements Brown for malpractice
arising from its purported representation of AIA Services would only be warranted by
way of the extreme facts in this case (facts not seen in other cases, i.e., insolvency and
rights of secured creditor, etc.). However, this is not true with AIA Insurance because of
Reed Taylor's special standing as a pledgee, director, officer and secured creditor of AlA
Insurance's shares and assets.

0. Reed Taylor Has Alleged Valid Claims Under The Unfair Trade
Practices Act.
Clements Brown moves to dismiss Reed Taylor's claim as if the facts supporting
the claims alleged by Reed Taylor did not exist. See Clements B r o w ' s Motion to
Dismiss, pp. 26-30. However, like Clements Brown's other arguments, Reed Taylor has
alleged valid claims and the facts to support such claims.
1. Reed Taylor Has Alleged A Valid Claim Against Clements Brown For
Unfair Trade Practices.
Courts do not afford attorneys blanket immunity from claims brought by opposing
parties under the unfair trade practices acts. 'See e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager,
288 Conn. 69, 95-96, 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008); Burns ex rel Office of Public
defendant law firm,and the other significant facts in this case. That being said, Reed Taylor is still entitled
to bring direct claims for malpractice against Clements Brown that are owned by the corporations in lieu of
derivative claims as he is the only person entitled to receive any damages from the numerous harms.
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Guardian v. Hale arzd Borr LLP, 445 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.Ct. Mass. 2006) (allegations by a
guardian for disabled minor against law firm and trust manager demonstrated
recklessness necessary to establish claim under unfair trade act); Sf. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co. v. Hlis & Ellis, 262 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Cumpos v. Broohbank, 120

F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D .Ct. N.M. 2000) (attorney's misleading conduct violated unfair
practices act); see also Burnap v. Linnarfz, 38 S.W.3d 612, 619-20.

In Chapman

Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008) citing Mozzochi v. Beck, 204
Conn. 490, 529 A.2d 171 (Conn. 1987) (other internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a judgment against a debtor's attorney
under the Unfair Trade Practices Act:
1Tlhis court's reksal to permit litigants to raise claims against o~posing
counsel under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act caimot be
construed, as the defendant suggests, as affording blanket immunity to
attorneys for tortious acts they commit against third parties while
representing clients. Rather, the evidence shows that the defendant
negotiated, and directed his client to execute, a note and mortgage relating
to property that the defendant knew the client did not own.. .
Here, Reed Taylor's cause of action survives as an exception to any general rule
that a contract is necessary. The facts in this case are far more extreme than any of the
cases cited above and are easily distinguished from any cases cited by Clements Brown.
Reed Taylor has sufficiently pled claims under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See
Complaint, pp. 20-21,y';i 55-56.
2. Reed Taylor Has Alleged A Valid Direct Claim For Unfair Trade
Practices Against Clements Brown.
Under the same legal authority and argument above and Idaho's Unfair Trade
Practices Act, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring claims directly against Clements Brown for
its violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act involving its purported representation of
.
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AIA Insurance and AIA Services, i.e., Reed Taylor should be pemi.tled to bring AIA
Services and AIA Insurance" claims directly against Clements Brown by way of being a
stock pledgeel secured creditor, creditor of an insolvent corporation, the only authorized
officer and director of AIA Insurance, and the only persodcreditor entitled to any
recovered damages. AII of the actions taken by Clements Brown have directly damaged
Reed Taylor in a distinct and special manner. None of Clements Brown's actions were
authorized. Moreover, Reed Taylor's direct claims will prevent duplicative litigation and
there are no other bona-fide parties entitled to the assets or claims of the companie~.'~

P. Althou~hReed Taylor's Complaint States Valid Causes Of Action, He
Requests Leave To File An Amended Complaint To Clarify Facts And
Causes Of Action.
The twin purposes behind the court rule governing amendments to pleadings are
to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make
pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the
facts at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1197
(1999). If a complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, a rehsal to grant permission to amend would deprive a plaintiff of a
substantial right. Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 135, 326 P.2d 994 (1958).
As long as the proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the proposed claim. Christensen Family Trust v.
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 872, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) citing Duffin v. Idaho
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995) (emphasis
added). "Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in
'O In the unlikely event that Reed Taylor is able to recover sufficient h d s and assets to satisfy his
$9,000,000 debt, he will ensure that any other funds are frrst paid to Donna Taylor, the priority shareholder,
and deposit the remaining funds in the Court's registry for other innocent shareholders.
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M e r m c e of justice beween parties." "tillz v. Shintz, 82 Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 34&

Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint dleges s ~ c i e nfacts
t
to support all of his causes

of action a g h t Clements Brown, which are both kdependently o w e d by him and
being pursued directly a g h t Glernents Brown for h m against the corporations.
Neve&eless, Reed Taylor requests leave to file an amended complaint to clarify facts
and causes of action against Clements Brown, cure any alleged deficiencies, and add
addItiond causes of action and facts."

For the reasons set forth above, Clements Brown's Motion to Dismiss should be
denied in full.
DATED this

11
'
1

day of October, 2008.
C M B E L L , BISSELL & KZKBY PLLC

BY
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff

"

A motion to amend and supplement complaint will be Eled before the hearing and a draft version of the
proposed arnended complaint will be filed at that time. The amended complaint will clarify facts, clarify
and add causes of action, and include additional facts ascertaine~since the Complaint was filed.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of October, 2008, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the followiog:

IVElZY

John J. Jmis
H e p w o ~Lemmiz
,
& Janis, Chtd,
P.O. Box 2582
Babe, I
D 83701-2582

FAX T W S M I S S I O N
E
m (.pdf attachent)
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FILED
I,S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELIA & KlfMV PLLG
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-71 11

Attorneys for PIahtiNF Reed J. Taylor

N THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV08-01763
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL E. McNICWOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES I-V, &own
individuals;

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND mMORANDUM OF
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend
and Supplement his Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.

I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
This Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, the attached Exhibit
A, and the Court's file.

11, LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
"[A] garty may amend a pleading ordy by leave of the court.. .and leave shall be

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF,
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1 -,

f 39
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I

k e l y given when justice so requires.. ." I.K.C.P. I5(a). Similarly, a party may move to
supplement a "pleading seeing forth trmsac"r;ons or occmences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sough to be supplemented. .." I.R.C.P. 1S(d).
"Great liberty should be shown in allowing amenhents to pleadings iT1 mherance of
justice between parties." Snlifh v. %inn, 82 Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348 (1960).
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to m e n d his Complaint in the form
attached hereto as Eshibit A. The purpose of the amendment is to: (I) clarify and
expand the claims and causes of action; and (2) add derivative claims.
Justice requires that Reed Taylor be permitted to file his Amended Complaint.

DATED this /

79.z..day of October, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL &, Y/RBY PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J<day
o f October, 2008, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document with a Q a c h e n t to the
following:

--

m N D DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVEWICHT MAIL
FAX: TRANSMISSION
EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Lezarniz & Janis, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

MICHAEL S. BISSELL

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLG
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokme, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-71 11
Amnzeys for Reed Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF W Z PERCE

E E D J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf of himself and
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders
of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.;
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV08-01763

FIRST M E N D E D COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

v.
MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & MCNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; J A W
DOES I-V, unknown individuals;
Defendants.

I. FACTS

1.

Reed Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL,

BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all allegations and claims asserted below
..
.
are incorporated by reference into each cause of action, remedy andlor requested relief to

the extent necessary to support each such cause of action, remedy and/or requested
relief):
.', '
s

.I
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2.

Reed Taylor ("Xeed Taylor'?) is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Reed Taylor is bringing this action on behalf of himself individually and on
behalf of all shareholders and creditors of AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Seniices")
and AIA Insurance, Inc. ("'AIA Itlsusance"). Reed Taylor is an elderly person as defined
in I.C. $48-608.
3.

Clements, Brown &- McNichols, P.A. ("Glements Brown") is an ldaho

professional covoration in the business of practicing law.

Clements Brown is

vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants.

Clements Brown has

purportedly acted as counsel for AIA Services, AEA Insurance and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. ("'CropUSA").
4.

Defendant Michael E. McNichols is an individual residing in the state of

Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Clements
Brown.
5.

Jane Does I-V are unknown individuals who are andlor were aitorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants
(All of the Defendants are collectively referred to as "Clements Brown" or "its" or
"Defendants").

6.

Clements Brown is based in and transacted business through the practice

of law in Nez Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as
defendants in Nez Perce County, Idaho.

Clements Brown committed tortious acts,

exceeded the scope of any purported represtntation, andfor assisted in the commission of
tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho.

Clernents Brown's tortious acts andlor

assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

.

@
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7.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce Comty District Court. To the extent Lhat there are any
conflicts or discrepancies alleged in this Complaint, they are to be construed as
alternative relief, claims, remedies and damages being sought against Clements Brown
(i.e., if Clements Brown bad au&ority to represent AIA Services or AIA Insurance, then

it still commiaed certain torts and breached duties). However, no allegations in this
Complaint should be construed as any admission by Reed Taylor or any of the
corporations that Clements Brown ever had authority to represent AIA Services or AIA
Insurance.

8.

AIA Services is a closely held Idaho corporation. AIA Insurance is a

closely held Idaho corporation. The present and past relevant purported officers and
directors of AIA Insurance and AIA Services (R. John Taylor ("John Taylor"), Connie
Taylor, Jmnes Beck, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman) are interested parties by way of
their tortious acts and ownership of shares in CropUSA. Thus, a direct action for certain
claims is appropriate because, among other reasons set forth in this Complaint, any funds
recovered should not be placed in the hands of the foregoing parties.
9.

AIA Services has pledged all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance

that it owns to Reed Taylor pursuant to a $6 Million Promissory Note dated August 1,
1995, the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended and Restated
Security Agreement, the Restructure Redemption Agreement, and Series A Preferred
Shareholder Agreement (all of the foregbing, ancillary documents and related documents
are collectively referred to as the "Redemption Agreements").
*
10.

At all relevant times of the transactions and causes of action set forth in
*
b
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this Complaint, Reed Taylor was the sole pledgee of all of AIA Insuralce3 outstanding
shares and the only secured creditors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance entitled to the
commissions and related receivables received by the corporations and all proceeds related
thereto. As a stock pledgee and the sole stock pledgee of AIA Insurance's shares, Reed
Taylor is entitled to bring derivative and/or direct, claims as a shareholder since a pledgee
is entitled to all of the rights and protections of a shareholder, in addition to the individual
rights to protect collateral. As the sole pledgee of all shares of AIA Insurance, Reed
Taylor is entitled to recover and possess all funds, damages and/or property recovered
from all direct and derivative causes of action.
11.

As a creditor of the insolvent AIA Services owed over $8,500,000 and a

secured creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative
and/or direct claims against responsible parties in the place of; or on behalf of, AIA
Services. Reed Taylor is the only person entitled to the recovery of funds, damages, and
the like because of being (a) the only creditor with a security interest in AIA Insurance;
(b) the only creditor with a security interest in all past, present and future commissions
and related receivables of AIA Services and AIA Insurance; (c) the only creditor with a
security interest in all of the shares of AIA Services' subsidiaries and all dividends and
distributions related to such shares, including, without limitation the $1.2 Million
Mortgage received from the estate of The Universe; (d) a long standing creditor with
substantial contractual rights, which such rights and amounts owed to Reed Taylor were
specifically detailed in the financial statements of AIA Services since 1995, thereby
placing other creditors on notice of his superior claims; (e) the only person with priority
over all assets, funds and claims of AIA services by way of the Subordination Agreement
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with Donna Taylor; and (f) the creditor who is owed over $8,500,000.

12.

To the extent that any bona-fide creditor or shareholders come fornard

with any interests superior to Reed Taylor or to the extent that any dispute may arise
between Reed Taylor and other creditors, Reed Taylor will, without waiving any legal
rights or rernedies as a pledgee, creditor and secured creditor, either (a) pay the
creditsr(s) in his sole discretion; (b) seek a determination under the law of the priority or
rights to any payments or funds; (c) deposit the subject fimds andor property with the
Court for a detemination of priority or rightful possession pursuant to an interpleader
action; or (d) take such other reasonable actions as necessary under the law.
13.

Although Clements Brown, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,

Connie Taylor and James Beck are inappropriately and fraudulently asserting that Reed
Taylor has no rights because his redemption was allegedly illegal (which Reed Taylor
denies and the applicable law does not support) in an attempt to avoid the causes of
action, claims, remedies and damages being pursued against them for misappropriating
the assets, funds, services and opportunities of AIA Service and/or AIA Insurance, Reed
Taylor will move the Court to deposit all h d s and property recovered from Clements
Brown until the illegality issue has either been withdrawn, voluntarily dismissed, or a
determination has been made by the Court in T q l o r v. AIA Services, et al. The evidence
will show that the redemption was not illegal and that Clements Brown and the other
parties (including John Taylor and JoLee Duclos' alleged intervention) are simply
atkmpting to find any way to delay and/or thwart Reed Taylor's valid rights and causes
of action, and fraudulently avoid all of their unlawfbl acts and years of misappropriation
of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's assets, funds, sekices and/or opportunities.

'

.
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14.

AIA ServicesXnancial condition far exceeds the 'bone of insolvency" as

Reed Taylor is owed over $9,000,000 and the present fair-market value of AIA Servicesa
assets are $6,000,000, less than the amount owed Reed Taylor. But for the unlawful
actions of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos,
Bryan Freeman and other parties to protect their own interests, AIA Services should be in
bankruptcy under close scrutiny of a trustee. Clements Brown has Eull knowledge of
intimate details of the inappropriate andfor unlawful trransfer of millions of dollars of AIA
Services andlor AIA Insurance's assets, funds and services to CropUSA, John 'Taylor and
other parties.
15.

On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor served a derivative

demand letter upon the purported board of directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance
to take various actions, including specified actions against GIements Brown, John Taylor,
Michael Cashman, James Beck and all responsible parties for various tortious acts and
the recovery of misappropriated assets, finds, services andlor compensation.

Reed

Taylor has also made other written demands upon the purported boards of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance to take action, and no actions have been taken. Reed Taylor has also
made substantial non-frivolous claims against the responsible parties in Taylor v. AIA
Services, et al., but no actions have been taken as a result of the claims or allegations.

However, the purported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to act and
have failed to conduct the corporations in a responsible manner consistent with the law.
16.

The purported relevant past and present board members and officers of

AIA Insurance and AIA Services have failed to conduct shareholder meetings, failed to
properly disclose facts and transactions to the shareholders, and have continued to do so
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even after Complaints were filed and with the full knowledge of Clement~B r o w . The
past and present responsible board members and officers have never advised the
shareholders or creditors of the misappropriation of corporate assets, funds, oppomnities,
services and claims which should be pursued.
17.

Because of the fact that the relevant past and present purported board

members of AIA Sewices and AIA Insurance have a vested interest in not pursing claims
against themselves or the aEomeys that have u n l a a l y assisted them and have utterly
and completely failed to do so, Reed Taylor believes that he and Donna Taylor will be

the only parties to pursue the valid claims because the claims will never be pursued by
the paxties currently purported to manage AIA Services and AIA Insurance. This action

is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the state of Idaho which it would
otherwise not have.
18.

Although Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AIA

Insurance and that the actions of AIA Services' board of directors is not authorized, Reed
Taylor is pursuing claims under this Complaint as though the directors were not
authorized to act and, to the extent that the boards were authorized, then the actions were
unlawful, inappropriate and exceeded the scope of any agency act on behalf of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance.
19.

Clements Brown's acts, omissions, and torts alleged in t h s Complaint

exceed any purported attorney-client relationship and are not protected by any litigation
privilege or immunities. Clements Brown's purported past legal representation was never
authorized by the proper boards of AIA services or AIA Insurance nor was Clements
Brown's representation of only John Taylor. Any purported waivers Clements Brown

.
C

*'
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has obtained were not received by authorized andior disinterested represenbtives of AIA
Services and AIA insurance, and were not autlrorized.

20.

To the extent that Clernents Brown obtained any waivers or consents, its

p q o r t e d legal representation exceeded the scope of m y representation that was in the
best interests of AIA Services or AIA Insurance. By taking direction from John Taylor,
Comic Taylor ancflor James Beck, CIements B r o w h e w that any purported
representation was not, and could not, be in the best interests of AIA Services or AIA
Insurance thereby exceeding any scope of purported representation.
21.

AIA Services and AIA Insurance's purported agents, boards and/or

officers, in which Clements Brown allegedly relied upon, exceeded the scope of all
proper acts as agents, board members and ofificers of AIA Services and AIA Insurance,
which further resulted in Clements Brown's acts exceeding the scope of any authorized
legal andor attorney-client representation. All of the actions of Clements Brown, John
Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor and James Beck were outside of
the scope of their authorized acts and duties.
22.

Reed Taylor's Complaint is comprised of three types of claims: (a) those

claims and damages personal and individual to Reed Taylor; (b) those claims and
damages that are personal to Reed Taylor and AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but
which are being brought by Reed Taylor directly against Clements Brown; and (c) those
claims that are owned only by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but which are being
prosecuted by Reed Taylor derivatively on behalf of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
23.

In addition, Reed Taylor will also pursue claims that are derivatively

being prosecuted on behalf of AIA Insurance directly on behalf of AIA Insurance should

'' .,
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he gain control of the company in the near future. To the extent that f h d s andlor
property is recovered that exceed the amomts owed to Reed Taylor, he will deposit such
h d s and/or properly with the Court for the distsibution to innocent shareholders of AIA
Services.

24.

Clements B r o w bas never been authorized to represent AIA Insurance or

AIA Services in Taylor v. RIA Services, et al. CIements Brown has not represented the
interests of AIA Insurance or AIA Services, but instead has represented the interests of
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan
Freeman, CropUSA and other interested parties.

25.

As the only authorized officer and board member of AIA Insurance, Reed

Taylor, has not and will not authorize or consent to Clements Brown as being attorneys
for AIA Insurance or representing the company in any fashon or consent to the
representation of John Taylor. As a person who is required to be a member of the board
of AIA Services, Reed Taylor has not and will not authorize Clements Brown to
represent AIA Services nor has he or will he authorize or consent to Clements Brown's
representation of John Taylor. Thus, Clements Brown had no scope of representation
when it purportedly represented AIA Insurance and AIA Services because it is unlawfully
representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

26.

Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, the only

shareholder of AIA Insurance by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, the only
officer and director of AIA Insurance, and by far the largest and only secured creditor of
AIA Services (Reed Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 and AIA Services is insolvent).
AIA Services and AIA Insurance's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over

*

;
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Reed Taylor is entitled to bring cert-ain claims directly against Clements Brown for
cedain damages.
27.

At all material times, Reed Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 by AIA

Services through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995.

Reed Taylor is presently

owed over $8,500,000 by AIA Services. At all material times, Clements Brown had full
knowledge of AIA Services' debt and contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor.
28.

AIA Sewices defaulted on the terns of the $6,000,000 promissory note

when it failed to pay the promissory note upon maturity on August 1, 2005. Although a
formal demand was mecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on
August 1, 2005, demand for payment was properly served upon AIA Services by Reed
Taylor on December 12,2006. AIA Services was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to
be insolvent from said date.
29.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AIA Services,

Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of the stock of AIA
Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Insurance and AIA
Services. Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1,
1996, Reed Taylor had the contractual right upon default of A H Services to vote the
stock of AIA Insurance, and take operational control of AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor's
right to vote the stock of AIA Insurance was also perfected through AIA Services'

.

-

irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed Taylor that was coupled with an interest as
required by 1.C 5 30-1-722.
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30.

On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AlA Insurance and

al-tempted to take control of if: pursuant to his contract-ual rights as provided under the
law, the contract documents, and LC.

5

30-1-722. However, the interested purported

directors and officers of AIA Insurance (including John Taylor) by and through Clements
Brown intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Redemption Agreements and
refused to acknowledge Reed Taylor's valid vote of the stock of AIA Insurance and
rehsed to sunrender control as required.

31.

Clernents Brown further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting

interested parties (including John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining
order and preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, when Clements Brown knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and f h d s
of AIA Insurance were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded (i.e., restraining
and/or enjoining Reed Taylor would permit assets and funds to continue to be
misappropriated).

32.

Reed Taylor has a pending civil action against AIA Services, AIA

Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, and others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance,
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez
Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208 ("Taylor v. AIA Services, et al."), and therein Reed
Taylor obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AIA Services' default of the
$6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment andlor his prior vote
of the stock, Reed Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance but for

-
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the actions of John Taylor, which Clements Brown, with -Full knowledge of Reed raylor's
rights, fitcilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AIA Services, AIA Tnsusance
and Reed Taylor.
33.

With Clernents B r o w ' s full knowledge, Reed Taylor's claims assefled in

Taylor v. A& Services, et al, included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, conspiracy,
fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by John Taylor and others (including
CropUSA), including but not limited to claims that John Taylor had wrongEully
transferred over $1,500,000 of AIA Insurance's cash to CropUSA, for no consideration
and had transferred approximately $700,000 of the assets of AIA Insurance to CropUSA
for no consideration. John Taylor was at all times material also an interested director,
officer and shareholder of CropUSA. Also included in the civil action were other claims
that John Taylor and others had engaged in self-dealing andlor fraudulent transactions
with AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed
Taylor, and for the personal benefit of John Taylor and other interested parties (including
CropUSA).
34.

In 2007, Clements Brown appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AIA

Services, et ul., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AIA Services, a
corporation, and AIA Insurance, a corporation, and also represented the interests of John
Taylor, an individual, and the interests of other interested parties (including Connie
Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman), thereby exceeding any possible scope of
purported representation. At all material times John Taylor was an interested purported
CEO and director of AIA Services and AlA Insurance and an interested majority
shareholder of AIA Services.

The civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil
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conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duty perpelsated by John Taylor and
others against AIA Services and AIA I n s w n c e , and such acts having damaged and
continuing to cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, Clements
Brown mdcrtook to represent the three named clients AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
CropUSA, which such entities had no true common interests and each having
ineconcilable conflicts of interest with the other.

35.

In May 2007, Reed Taylor's attorney advised Clements Brown that it was

not appropriate for Clements Brown to represent John Taylor, AIA Services and AIA
Insurance, andlor to take direction from John Taylor because of various conflicts of
interest and the fact that John Taylor was an interested party with substantial claims
against him.

Despite the warning and demands made by Reed Taylor's attorney,

Cilements Brown breached its fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to
AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and its duty of care.
36.

On March 28, 2007, Clements Brown finally recognized the violations of

ethics and conflicts of interest and withdrew from representing AIA Services and AIA
Insurance. Although Clements Brown should have withdrawn from representing John
Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance in Taylor v. AL4 Services Corporation, et al.,
Clements Brown committed a further violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct and their duty of care by terminating the representation of the corporations and
continuing to represent John Taylor, which was a breach of their duty of loyalty to the
corporations.

Clements Brown's actions constitute a violation of the "hot potato"

.
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doctrine because it never received proper, authorized and informed witlen consent from

the corporations and it knew that the corporations should be pursuing claims against John
Taylor and others.

37.

Clements Brown inappropriately elltered into and/or parlicipated in a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA Insurance,
lac., John Taylor and other named and m a m e d individuals in Taylor v. AIA Sewices, et

al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and diverging interests in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and duty of care, and to the detriment AIA Services, AJA Insurance
and Reed Taylor. In Taylor v. AIA Services, et. al., a Joint Defense Agreement was not
permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conversion and the
commission of other torts such as breaches of fiduciary duties through conspiracy and
aiding and abetting, along with other causes of actions. The Joint Defense Agreements
were entered into without obtaining informed consent from disinterested and authorized
representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agreements were also
independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to the Joint Defense
Agreements should be asserting claims against other parties to such agreements.
38.

The Joint Defense Agreement(s) facilitated andor substantially assisted by

Clements Brown has substantially assisted in others (including John Taylor, James Beck,
Connie Taylor, Michael Cashrnan and CropUSA) to perpetrate andor hide acts of fraud,
fraudulent conveyances, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, while
also assisting Clements Brown in inappropriately and unlawfblly obtaining payment of
fees and costs for its services and in violition of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
law, and Clements Brown's duty of care.

-
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39.

Clemenls Brown assisted AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, John

Taylor, and others in entering into various inappropriate agreements and transactions
whtch were in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the law and its duty of
care, were not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested
paeies, constituted fraud andor the inappropriate transfer of assets and h n d s belonging
to AIA Services andor AIA Insurance, were not ams-lengh h-ansactions, m d o r were
done so without requiring AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance to retain separate
independent counsel that were retained by separate independent uninterested and
authorized parties.
40.

As the former purported aMomeys for AIA Services, an entity, Clements

Brown owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of
care, and under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the
assets and businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services was insolvent, to its
creditors including Reed Taylor. As former purported attorneys for AIA Services, and in
light of the claims made against John Taylor and others by Reed Taylor, Clements Brown
owed a duty to its entity client not to assume representation of the interests of John
Taylor, individually andor through a Joint Defense Agreement, or with any other
interested parties.
41.

As the former purported attorneys for AIA Insurance, an entity, Clements

Brown owed duties as provided by the 1daho.Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of
care and the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of
the corporation's stock, Reed Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and
assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but
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whose rights were breached and rejected by interested unauthorized directors, officers
and others who were in control of the corporation including John Taylor.

As past

purported attorneys for AIA Insurance and in light of the claims made against John
Taylor and others by the Reed Taylor, Clements Brown owed a duty to its entity client
not to assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, individually and/or through
any Joint Defense Agreement, and/or of other interested parties (including CropUSA,
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).
42.

As attorneys representing John Taylor (including through a Joint Defense

Agreement), Clements Brown owed its duties first and foremost to its former purported
clients AIA Services and AIA Insurance as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, duty of care and/or the law. As attorneys for John Taylor by and through taking
directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against John Taylor by
the Reed Taylor, Clements Brown owed a duty to its purported corporate clients not to
assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, CropUSA or other interested
parties directly or indirectly through any Joint Defense Agreements. Clements Brown
failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate
and authorized parties or disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, Clements Brown's duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of
Formation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed Taylor.
43.

As the former purported attorneys for AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance

.

(individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) Clements Brown owed duties of
loyalty to the corporations and could not represent John Taylor in Taylor v. AIA Services,

1
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et af., or represent or assist John Taylor in Donna J. Taylor v. R. Juhiz T ~ y l o rbecause

Clernents Brown's loyalty belongs exclusively to AlA Services alidlor AIR Insurance.
Furthemore, Clernents Brown could in no way participate in any joint defense of
CropUSA or other interested parties (such as John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck,
and/or Michael C a s h a n ) as AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance should have been
asserling claims against CropUSA, each other, and other interested and uninterested
parties.
44.

Clements Brown represented, and continue to represent, the interests of

John Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full
knowledge that John Taylor is an interested party and purported director of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the
course of litigation involving Clements Brown's fomer clients, AIA Services and AIA
Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor.
45.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, Clements

Brown has coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles Brady"),
the law firm that has represented AIA Services and AIA Services before and throughout
litigation with Clements Brown in Taylor v. AIA Sentices, et al. During the course of the
civil action after March 28, 2007, John Taylor and others have further engaged in
inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving themselves, AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, and CropUSA, which transactions have occurred with Clements Brown's
knowledge and/or assistance, and to the detriment of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
Reed Taylor as creditor and stock pledged.
46.

Clernents Brown is liable to Reed Taylor for an amount to be proven at

$43
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trial because Clements Brown has encowaged, conspired with, provided substantial
assislance to, andor aided and abetted . l o b Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
C a s h a n , Bryan Freeman, JoLee Duclos, AIA Senrices, AIA Insurance, CropUSA,
andlor other interested pafiies in the commission acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties, and other unlawful acts.
The acts of fiaud, fraudulent conveyances, tortious interference, conversion, and breaches
of fiduciary duties include, but are not limited to: 1j While purporting to represent AIA
Insurance and AIA Services, Clements Brown assisted andor aided and abetted John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion ofReed Taylor's contractual rights
to control and operate AIA Insurance, w k c h has proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Clements
Brown inappropriately assisted andor aided and abetted John Taylor and other interested
parties to engage in tortious transactions involving John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, andor CropUSA, which such transactions have been to the detriment of AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, and Reed Taylor, and proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) While representing John Taylor, individually
or through a Joint Defense Agreement, Clements Brown has had full knowledge that its
client is an interested party and purported director of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
CropUSA, and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation involving
Clements Brown's former clients, AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and Clements
Brown has assisted andor aided and abetted John Taylor and others (including,
CropUSA) and has coordinated and participated with Hawley Troxell and Quarles &
Brady in John Taylor's engaging in tortious transactions involving himself, AIA
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Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA, which transactions have been to the debirnent of
AIA Services and AIA Insurance and proximately caused damages to Reed Taylor as a
creditor and stock pledgee.
47.

In connection with Clements B r o w ' s inappropriate representation andor

joint defense of John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA hsurance, CropUSA, and other
interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Michael C a s h a n )
Clements Brown accepted payments of aQomeys fees and costs believed to exceed
$100,000 in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and as
participating andlor assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting
of others in the commission of torts, including breaches of fiduciary duties and
conversion.

48.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed Taylor v. AIA Services, et al.,

Reed Taylor's attorney in that action advised Clements Brown on nurnerous occasions
that its conduct violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, was
inappropriate, and constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested
parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA), among other potential legal claims against
them. In early 2007, Clements Brown was advised that its inappropriate actions would
result in claims being filed against them by Reed Taylor.

Reed Taylor's counsel

reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite the
warnings from Reed Taylor's counsel, Clements Brown conduct persisted thereby further
damaging Reed Taylor. Clements Brown's disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only
be construed as intentional improper acts to assist John Taylor and other interested parties
to the detriment of Reed Taylor.

*".i
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49.

Clements Brown wrongfi-llly assisted John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating CropUSA with the funds, assets, employees, trade secrets and other
things of value inappropriately obtained from AIA Services andor AIA Insurance, and
by assisting John Taylor and o&er interested parties (including CropUSA and Michael
Cashman) in preventing claims EPom being asserted and prosecuted against them.
Glements B r o w wrongfully assisted andor failed to prevent interested parties (including
John Taylor) in trmsferring the long-term employees of AIA Insurance to CropUSA,
while at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., that the
corporations were being operated properly andor failing to advise the Court of the
inappropriate acts, misappropriation of assets, and inappropriate andor unlawful
transactions.

All the while Clements Brown was aware of andor assisted in the

inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director fees of $20,000
per year when AIA Services was insolvent.
50.

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that Clements Brown take action to

protect the assets and funds of AIA Services and AIA Insurance and recover funds and
assets from John Taylor, CropUSA and other interested and uninterested parties for the
benefit of the corporations and Reed Taylor, Clements Brown refused to act in
accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, its duty of care, and the law. Despite
Reed Taylor's demands that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be
considered andor protected because of the wrongful acts of John Taylor and other
interested parties, Clements Brown refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose
all pertinent facts to the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
ill

ri
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51.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submitled to the court in

Taylor v. RIA Services, ed al., Clements B r o m made argments that did not benefit AIA
Sewices, AIA Inswastee, or Reed Taylor, inappropriately made other arwments
preventing valid claims from being asserted against John Taylor, James Beck, C o ~ e
Taylor, Michael C a s h a n , and other interested and utinterested pmies, and failed to take
action against responsible pwies (including John Taylor, CropUSA, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, Michael C a s h a n , Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of
Michael C a s h a n , Clements Brown successhlly argued to the Court in lhylor v. AU

Services, et af., that Mr. C a s h a n should not be named as an individual when Clements
Brown knew that such actions were directly impacting the assets and firnds of its fomer
purported clients, AIA Insurance and AIA Services.
52.

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that disinterested directors andor parties

must direct the litigation on behalf of the corporations, Clernents Brown refused and
permitted and/or assisted John Taylor and other interested parties to direct the litigation
to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor. Despite Reed Taylor's demands
that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance's improper guarantee of a $15,000,000
line-of-credit for CropUSA, Clements Brown refused to act, failed to inform or fully
disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the existence of such inappropriate loan
guarantees or report the unlawful actions to the Court.
53.

Clements Brown's conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct, the law and its duty of care, which require Clements Brown to disgorge all
attorneys' fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. ALA Services, et al., and for any other
related and/or unrelated legal services. Despite Reed Taylor's demands to comply with

C
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the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care, Clements Brown rehsed to do so.

54.

Through the acts of Clements Brown, the value of AIA Insurance and the

assets of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance have plummeted in value, the corporations'
value and assets have been impaired, andlor the assets and funds have been transferred to
CropUSA. m o u g h the acts of Clements B r o w , ownership of CropUSA was vested and
has remained vested in interested parties (including John Taylor), while the major
creditor Reed Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed
Taylor's demands that action should also be taken for the interests of the innocent
minority shareholders and creditors, Clements Brown has refused to take action and
inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck and Michael Cashman).

55.

Despite Clements Brown having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, Clements Brown participated
in providing a settlement offer to Reed Taylor in Taylor v. AIA Services, et a/., which
included a provision that he release all claims against Clements Brown as a condition of
the seltlement.

The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of

Professional Conduct and Clements Brown's duty of care and its obligations to its former
purported clients, AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

56.

Clements Brown has assisted in the inappropriate acts of John Taylor and

other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, Reed
Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares of AIA
Services. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is required to be a member of the board of
directors of AIA Services. Like Reed Taylor, Clements Brown has assisted John Taylor
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and other interested parties in preventing Reed Taylor and Uomxa Taylor from being
members of the board of directors of AIA Services, which has

er far reaching

ramifications regarding the validity of any corporate act and results in additional damages
against Clements Brown.

57.

With full knowledge of AIA Services' obligations to ensure that Reed

Taylor and Donna Taylor are members of AIA Services' board until they were paid in
full, Clements Brown proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings
and take and/or recommend inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by
interested purported directors without Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor being present and
without providing them with their right to be present, which further results in all such
meetings and decisions being null and void, and Clements Brown being liable for the
associated damages for substantially participating in such actions.
58.

Clements Brown assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify

disinterested parties or the Court that AIA Services had inappropriately pledged its sole
remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 Mortgage (in which Reed Taylor held a
security interest), to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of over $100,000 for Clements
Brown's services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and
the law.

59.

Clements Brown omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court

in Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., to the detriment of Reed Taylor. In several instances,
Clements Brown persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the best interests of
the corporations or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of the Clements Brown's purported
clients, AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and Reed Taylor (including requesting little or
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no bond and cor~sentingto the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when Clements Brown
h e w that the corporations were not being operated properly or their assets safeguarded).

60.

Clements Brown has inappropriately assisted John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and bonze by AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services for the benefit of CropUSA, John
Taylor and other interested parties.

61.

Clements Brown had full knowledge of John Taylor's Executive Officer's

Agrcernent. Even ~ o u g Jh o h Taylor has breached the terns of his employment contract
with AIA Services by competing against AIA Services through CropUSA (and violating
the corporate opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AIA insurance, and other
inappropriate actions, Clements Brown has intentionally refused to act in the best
interests of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, their shareholders, and/or Reed Taylor, to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
62.

Clernents Brown assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to CropUSA to defraud AIA Services' creditor Reed Taylor
(including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation
to AIA Insurance, assistance in transferring shares of the Pacific Empire Radio
Corporation to John Taylor, and failing to collect the over $300,000 owed by John
Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested parties or other appropriate and
authorized parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care.
63.

In April 2007, Clernents Brown permitted andfor assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AIA Sefvices and AIA Insurance with full knowledge
that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor were being intentionally denied their right to be on

;
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the board of ATA Services and p ~ i c i p a t i n gin such meetings (Donna Taylor has
subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed Taylor). At the meeting held in April
2007, Clernents Brown permitted and/or assisted John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor
and James Beck to the purported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance knouring
that they were interested parties who AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance should be
pursuing claims against, that they inappropriately held shares in CropUSA, that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations'bylaws.

64.

Clements Brown inappropriately permitted and/or assisted two interested

parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to approve andlor consent to a Joint Defense
Agreement with Clements Brown and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate
joint legal representations of interested parties with conflicting ineconcilablc interests
and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct and its duty of care, to the detriment of AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and Reed Taylor.

65.

At all relevant times, Clements Brown has been fully aware of Reed

Taylor's rights to property in which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as
collateral.

66.

Clements Brown also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AIA Services (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant claims
against the interested parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA) and the significant
misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but provided legal services on behalf of the

';
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interested parties and unlawfully accepted payment from AIA Services and AIA
Insurance. In comection with the payrnent of attorneys7ees and costs to other named
pmies in Taj7lov v. AIA Services, et a€., Clements Brown failed to obtain the necessary
approvals from Reed Taylor or other disinterested and/or authorized parties to the
detriment of AIA Services, AfA Insurance andor Reed Taylor.

67.

Despite demands to the contrary, Clements Brown continued to take

instructions andfor directives from the mau&orized boards (or John Taylor) of AIA
Services and/or AIA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated and are
comprised of interested parties (including John Taylor) with significant claims that
should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty
of care, and/or the law.

11. CLEMENTS BROWN'S AIDING AND ABETTING AND CONSPIRACY
68.

Clements Brown is committing and has committed tortious acts in concert

with other parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA, I-Iawley Troxell, Quarles Brady, and others)
and/or pursuant to a common design or civil conspiracy with such other parties.

69.

Clements Brown knew that the conduct of other parties (including John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan
Freeman, Wawley Troxell, Quarles Brady and others) constituted breaches of duties
and/or gave substantial assistance andor encouragement to such other parties in
breaching said duties. Clements Brown knew that it was purportedly using the normally
lawful act of practicing law to commit and/or substantially assist others in committing
unlawhl acts.

-

a
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70.

Clements Brown gave substantial assistance to other parties (including

John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael C a s h a n , JoLee Duclos, CropUSA,
Bryan Freeman, Hawley Troxell, Qwrles Brady, and others) in cornmilting and/or
accomplishtag tortious conduct and/or acts (including, without limitation, breaches of
fiduciary duties, f-raud, constructive fiaud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, tortious
interference, and other claims), and Clements Brown's conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and/or Reed
Taylor.
71.

Clements Brown conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of other parties in

the commission of the torts andor caused of action alleged in this Complaint (including
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA,
Bryan Freeman, Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady, and others) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasor, and such conduct has damaged AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, and Reed Taylor.
72.

Ciements Brown's conduct constitutes the commission of civil conspiracy

in the commission of the torts andfor causes of action alleged in this Complaint,
including, without limitation, the conspiracy to jointly represent parties to commit torts as
further evidenced by Joint Defense Agreements.
73.

The paragraphs in this Section are incorporated by reference into each

cause of action below as necessary to support aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy
of the torts and/or causes of action set forth below andor contemplated in this Complaint.
///
///
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111. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS-CONVERSION
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance3 Causes of Actions)
74.

Reed Taylor has, and has had during certain relevant time, a valid and

perfected security interest in the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance and all proceeds relating to such security interests. Reed Taylor also
has a security interest in all of the stock of AIA Insurance and the stock of all of AIA
Services' other subsidiaries, including The Universe and all distributions and proceeds
relating to such security interests (i.e., the $1.2 Million Lewis-Clark Mortgage).
Clcments Brown had full knowledge of Reed Taylor's security interests in the foregoing
property and such other property reasonably contemplated by the Redemption
Agreements.
75.

By way of Reed Taylor's security interest in AIA Insurance's

commissions, his security interest in AIA Insurance's stock, and his asserted contractual
right to the possession and control of AIA Insurance on February 22, 2007, all of AIA
Insurance's revenues, assets, and income should be under the possession and control of
Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the $1.2 Million Mortgage, settlement
proceeds in the approximate amount of $800,000, all funds and assets transferred or
utilized in any way by CropUSA, and every dollar of revenue generated by AIA
Insurance from all sources since February 22,2007.
76.

Reed is entitled to possession and control of all of the property to which he

has a contractual right, including, without limitation, the property indicated above and all
other property contemplated in this Complaint through his security interest in the
commissions and related receivables and the proceeds related thereto, security interests in
the stock of all of AIA Services' subsidiaries and the distributions and proceeds related
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thereto, and though the security and related rights set forth in the Redemption
Agreements.

77.

All of Reed Taylor's security interests and possession rights can be traced

through various sources to identify all funds and assets that Clements Brown has
unladully taken or assisted others in taking. Clcments Brown has taken control of
property, which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession and control, including without
limitation, all h n d s received for the payment of attorneys'fees and costs in Taylor v. AIA

Sentices, et al. and attorneys' fees and costs paid for other purported services. Clements
Brown has exercised dominion and control over assets (including the $1.2 Million
Mortgage) andor funds (any k n d s received from AIA Services or AIA Insurance) in
which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's
possessory rights and security interests.
78.

Clements Brown has received substantial payments believed to exceed

$1 00,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such funds Clements Brown
had no lawfkl right to possess or retain, funds that Reed Taylor had the legal right to
possess, and such funds were received in violation of the law, Rules of Professional
Conduct Clcments Brown's duty of care. Clements Brown also accepted payment of
funds purportedly owed to it, which such funds and the $1.2 Million Mortgage (to the
extent that any funds were derived from the Mortgage) Reed Taylor was legally entitled
to possess. Clcments Brown has also accepted the payment of services for attorneys' fees
and costs rendered for John Taylor, which were paid by the money and/or assets
unlawfully derived from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, which such money and/or
assets Reed Taylor held valid security interests and/or were derived from proceeds from
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such security interests

79.

Clements Brown's conduct constitutes the willful interferelice with

property m d o r k n d s belonging to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance;
and/or which such property andor h d s should be under the possession andlor control of
AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor, as the person entitled to such money
and property as a creditor and pledgee. Clements Brown intentionally deprived Reed
Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance of possession of such property and/or funds.
Despite demands, Clements Brown has refused to return such property and/or knds, and
has untawfully retained the property and/or h d s .
80.

As a direct and/or proximate cause of Clements Brown's acts and/or

omissions (which constitute conversion), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
81.

Clements Brown has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with other

parties in the conversion of property that Reed Taylor is legally entitled to possess and/or
property to which AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance are entitled to possess (including,
without limitation, funds paid to Clements Brown, funds paid to John Taylor and other
interested parties, the pledging of the $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA, and the $1.5
Million unlawfully transferred to CropUSA). As a direct and/or proximate result of
Clements Brown's aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy relating to the conversion
of assets and/or funds that Reed Taylor, AIA Services, and/or AIA Insurance are legally
entitled to possess, Reed Taylor, AIA Insurance, and/or AIA Services have been
damaged in the amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
/I/
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IV. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS--TORTIOUS INTEWEmNGIE
(Reed Taylor, M A Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
82.

Reed Taylor is a party to the Redemption Agreements. Clements Brown

had full knowledge of the Redemption Agreements.

Clements Brown intentionally

interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements
causing breaches of the Redemption Agreements.

Clements Brown's intentional

interference, includes, but is not limited to, torliously interfering with Reed Taylor's
contractual rights to vote the shares of AIA Insurance, rights to possession of the
commission collateral, right to be a member of the board of AIA Services, right to be an
officer and director of AIA Insurance, right to possession and control of AIA Insurance,
other rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements, and rights set forth in the
Subordination Agreement with Donna Taylor. Also included in this cause of action are
tortious interfcrence claims based upon Clements Brown, John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance.
83.

Clements Brown has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interfcrence of Reed Taylor's contractual
rights. Clements Brown's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's
contractual rights.

84.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Clements Brown's acts and/or

omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to be
determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.

163

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3 1
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT

85.

A M Services is a party to John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement.

Clements Brown has full knowledge of the Executive Officer's Agreement, Clements
Brown has intentionally interfered with AIA Serviceskconl-ractual rights set forth in the
Executive Officer's Agreement causing breaches to the Executive OEcer's Agreement.
Clements Brown's intentional interference, includes, but is not limited to, torliously
interfering with AIA Services' contractual rights prevent John Taylor from transferring
AIA Insurance's employees to CroplJSA, rights to prevent John Taylor from competing
against AlA Sewices or AIA Insurance through CropUSA, and rights to control John
Taylor's compensation. All of these allegations have been repeatedly alleged by Reed
Taylor throughout the course of Taylor v. AfA Services, et al. Also included in this cause
of action are tortious interference claims based upon Clements Brown, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of
AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance.

86.

Clements Brown has also aided and abetted andlor conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael' Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA andlor other parties in the tortious interference of AIA Services' contractual
rights. Clements Brown's acts andlor omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
andor civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of AIA Services'
contractual rights.
87.

As a direct andlor proximate result of Clements Brown's acts andor

omissions, AIA Services has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to
be determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
V. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS-FRAUD AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
(Reed Taylor, M A Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
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88.

Clements Brown owed special duties to Reed Taylor, AIA Services andlor

AIA Insurance as described thoughout Chis Complaint.
89.

Clements B r o m owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor

of AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outslanding shares of AIA Insurance, a
stock pledgee in which Clements Brown h e w had l a f i l l y voted the shares of AIA
Insurance, the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance, the holder of a
security interest in all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance, the holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AIA Services'
other subsidiaries and all distributions related to the shares (i.c., the $1.2 Million
Mortgage and $800,000 settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA
Services, and the only party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance.
90.

Clements Brown owed and owes duties to AIA Services and AIA

Insurance to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow
interested parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) from taking actions that are
not in the best interests of the corporations, including, without limitation, unauthorized
and/or conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of
assets and h d s to interested parties to the detriment of AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance, to advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John
Taylor and other interested parties, and to not issue opinion letters to auditors and/or
other parties to assist in the commission of tortious conduct.

Clements Brown has

breached its duties and acted unlawfully (and all improper and/or unlawful acts set forth
and/or contemplated in this Complaint), and its conduct constitutes constructive fraud for
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which AIA Services and/or AIA insurance are entitled to recover damages in the amount
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

91.

Clements B r o w has also aided and abeMed and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael C a s h a n , Jol,ee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the con~rnissionof fraud and/or constmctive fraud and
to othemrise defraud Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. As a direct
and/or proximate result of GIements Brown's acts, Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance have been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on
summary judgment.

VI. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-MALPRACTICE
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
92.

Clements Brown owed Reed Taylor a special attorney-client relationship

for all of the reasons set forth in this Complaint (including, without limitation, the
allegations contained in Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). From
time to time, Clements Brown has also possessed h d s and/or property which it should
have protected and safeguarded for Reed Taylor, but failed to do so. All of the foregoing
results in the existence of duties on the part of Clements Brown owed to Reed Taylor, or
at the minimum, a special duty to ensure assets and funds are protected for the benefit of
Reed Taylor in the event that he takes control and possession of AIA Insurance pursuant
to his contractual rights (which such event could have happened at any time during
Clements Brown's purported representation of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance).
Also included in these special duties is to not obtain a restraining order or injunction
knowing that the funds, assets and services of AIA Insurance were being misappropriated
and/or u n l a f i l l y transferred.
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93.

Clements Brokm" past pwported clients were trustees andor fiduciaries

perfoming similar hnctions for a nun-clien4, Reed Taylor. Clements B r o w knew that
its appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance to take action to prevent andor rectify the breaches of f i d u c i v
duties owed by AIA Services andor AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor when such breaches
were crimes andlor fraud ancSfor CLements B r o w assisted and/or are assisting in the
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Clements Brown's
actions and Clements Brown's obligations to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance would
not be significantly impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect
sums owed by others and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others
(including, without limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and GropUSA).
94.

Clements Brown breached its duties (including, without limitation, the

duty of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct and/or proximate
result of Clements Brown's failure to perform the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was
damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
95.

Clements Brown owed AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance an attomey-

client relationship for purportedly representing AIA Service and/or AIA Insurance and
duties pertaining to the corporations being former clients, which results in the existence
of duties on the part of Clements Brown owed to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
96.

Clements Brown owed AIA Services, AIA Insurance andlor Reed Taylor a

duty of care to provide, including,.but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, ethical,
unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with
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the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the corporations (referred to
herein and above as "'duty of care"). Clements Brown breached its duty of care as a result
of its acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the corporations and Reed Taylor, to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.

97.

Clernents B r o w breached its fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services, AIA

Insurance, andlor Reed Taylor, including, Uri~outlimitation, the duties of care and
loyalty.

98.

Clements Brown's acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

Clements Brown's fiduciary duties, and such conduct have damaged the corporations and
Reed Taylor, in an m o u n t to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

99.

Clernents Brown breached the duty of the standard of care owed by it to

AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. As a direct and/or proximate result of Clements
Brown's failure to perform the duties owed to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance in
connection with the legal services purportedly provided by Clements Brown, AIA
Services and/or AIA Insurance were damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on
summary judgment.

VII. FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-VIOLATIONS OF THE I.C.P.A.
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services andfor AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
100.

Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance are all persons as defined

by I.C. $ 48-602. Clements Brown's purported practice of law constitutes services as
defined by I.C. $ 48-602. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance have either
purchased services directly from ~ l e m e n t sBrown, are known beneficiaries of services
provided by Clements Brown, andlor its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar
through which AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor has contracted for

;

.
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services through hade and commerce.
101.

By way of the anomeys of Clements Brown's obligations to the Court and

as members of the Idaho State Bar, they owe duties to their puqorled clients,
beneficiaries of their services, and the adverse parties in litigation to comply with the
Rules of Professional Conduct and the laws, Clements Brown has served only the
interests of J o b Taylor, Connie Taylor, Michael C a s h a n , James Beck, JoLee Duclos,
CropUSA and other interested parties-who

Clements Brown has not honestly

represented to the Court and Clements Brown" bbeeficiary andfor adversary that
Clements Brown was not complying with its obligations under the Rules of Professional
Conduct or the law, to the detriment of Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
Clements Brown's unlawful and inappropriate acts have a direct impact on consumers
and the integrity of the legal system, and further constitute unfair methods and practices
and violations of I.C.
102.

5 48-601, et seq.

Clements Brown has falsely represented that it had approval from the

Idaho State Bar and approval from authorized constituents to represent AIA Services
andor AIA Insurance, when in fact it did not have such authority in violation of I.C.

5

48-603(5). Clements Brown has falsely represented that its services have been provided
to a particular standard when in fact its services have not met the appropriate standards
(including the standard of care) in violation of I.C.

5 48-603(7).

Clements Brown has

falsely disparaged the services of Reed Taylor's counsel in violation of I.C.

5 48-603(8).

Clements Brown has falsely represented that services were not needed (i.e., not making
claims against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, CropUSA
and others, when it knew such claims were warranted) in violation of I.C.

I

lC$j

5 48-603(16).
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Glernents Brown has ellgaged in acts and/or practices that have been misleading to Reed
Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance in violation of I.C.

5 48-603(17).

Based upon

all of the allegations in this Complaint, Clernents Brown has also violated other
applicable provisions of I.G. jj 48-603 and/or I.C. $48-601, et seg.
103.

Reed Taylor has puschased services and has lost property and/or money

and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of Clernents Brown declared
unla*l

by I.C. jj 48-601, et ~ e q .
104.

AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance has purchased services and have lost

property and/or money and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of
Clernents Brown declared unlawful by 1.C. jj 48-601, et seg. AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance is requesting that all contracts for purported services provided by Clements
Brown be declared void and that all funds and/or assets paid under such contracts be
returned to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
105.

Clements Brown knew or should have known that its conduct was

perpetrated directly and/or indirectly against Reed Taylor in violation of I.C. $ 48-608,
including, without limitation, for being an elderly person who has lost more than 25% of
his monthly income by way of Clements Brown's unlawf%l acts.
106.

Clements Brown's acts constitute violations of the Idaho Consumer

Protection Act, specifically, I.C. $ 48-601, et seq. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance are entitled to damages, treble damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees
and costs and/or such other requested relief as a result of Clements Brown's violations
and as available under I.C. $ 48-601, et seq.

Clements Brown's violations or the

unlawful acts of attorneys (including attorneys as adversaries) are not any of the
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exceptions to I.C.

5 48-601, et seg. as set forth in I.C. $48-605,

VIII. SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-BWACIL OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance's Causes of Action)
107.

Clements Brown ovved Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor

of AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, a
stock pledgee in which Clernents Brown knew had l a f i l l y voted the shares of ATA
Insurance, the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance, the holder of a
security interest in all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance, the holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AIA Services'
other subsidiaries and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million
Mortgage and $800,000 settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA
Services, and the only party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance. Based upon all of the foregoing and Clemcnts Brown's possession of b d s
and assets of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance from time to time, Clernents Brown
owed a special fiduciary duty to safeguard the assets and k n d s of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance.
108.

Clements Brown breached its fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor. As a

direct and/or proximate result of Clements Brown's breached fiduciary duties, Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary
judgment.
109.

Clements Brown, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman owed and/or owe fiduciary duties to A M Services and/or AIA
Insurance and to Reed Taylor as the only significant secured creditor of the insolvent
AIA Services and as the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance (and the
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person who voted the shares). Clements Brown bas substantially assisted other parties in
breaching the Bylaws of AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. John Taylor owed andior
owes fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor by way of being Reed Taylor's brother. The
fiduciary duties owed and breached include, but arc not limited to, the duty of loyalty,
duty of care and duty to deal in good faith,
110.

Clements Brown had full knowledge of all of the fiduciary duties owed to

Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. The fiduciary duties owed to Reed
Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance include (but are not limited to), the
obligation to safeguard AIA Services and AIA Insurance's assets and business
relationships and to recover k n d s and assets unlawfUlly transferred from AIA Services or
AIA Insurance.

111.

Clernents Brown, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services
andor AIA Insurance; and Clements Brown knew that the foregoing parties' conduct
constituted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services andor AIA
Insurance.

These breached fiduciary duties are ongoing and Clements Brown has

substantially assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing parties in the commission of
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance. Clements Brown also continues to substantially assist andior encourage the
foregoing parties in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services
andor AIA Insurance.
112.

Clements Brown's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA

Services and/or AIA Insurance in an amount to be' proven at trial or on summary
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judgment by aiding and abetting andor substantially assisting others (including John
Taylor and CropUSA) through a civil conspiracy in the commission o f breaches of
fiduciary duties owed lo Reed Taylor, AIA Services a d o r AIA Insurance.
XX. SEmNTIX CAUSES OF ACTION-EXCESSIVE

COMPENSATIONNVASTE
(Reed Taylor, M A Services andlor AZA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
113.

Clements Brown has known that AIA Services is insolvent and AIA

Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateral. Clements Brown has known that AIA
Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary ofthe i~lsolventAIA Services. Clements Brown
bas known that RIA Insurance's business is in the final years of existence and that its
commissions are dwindling as new health policies have not been issued for years.

114.

Clements Brown has atded and abetted andor conspired with John Taylor,

Connie Taylor, James Beck, and others to pay excessive compensation for salaries and
fees for purportedly being officers andor directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.
Clements Brown has aided and abetted andor conspired with John Taylor, Connie
Taylor, James Beck, Michael Casbman and others to waste the remaining assets of AIA
Services andor AIA Insurance. All the while Clements Brown has known of Reed
Taylor's rights and AIA Services' insolvency. Clements Brown had full knowledge that
John Taylor and other directors and officers' compensation was required to be set by the
lawful board of directors of AIA Services andor AIA Insurance, but substantially
assisted John Taylor and others in obtaining inappropriate compensation.
115.

Clements Brown's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA

Services andor AIA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including, without
limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck) through a civil conspiracy in the
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payment of excessive compensation.

X. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all

claims and dasnages so triable.

XI. P M Y E R FOR RELIEF
UrHE;mFOW, Reed Taylor prays for the following relief:
1.

For a judgment against Glements Brown, jointly and severally, for

$6,000,000 in damages ($2,000,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000 in treble
damages), the exact amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary
judgment, plus an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;

2.

For a judgment against Clements Brown, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $4,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C.

5 48-

608(2);
3.

For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to Clements Brown by AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance;
4.

For judgment against Clements Brown, jointly and severally, for

additional damages as provided under I.C. 5 48-608;
5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed Taylor pursuant to I.C.

5

48-601, et seg. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary
injunction to restrain Clements Brown from undertaking further representation;
6.

For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to

Idaho Law, including, without limitation,.I.C. 5 48-608, I.C.

5 12-120 and/or I.C. 5

12-

121; and
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7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED rhls -day of October, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF NEiZ PERCE )

I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this First
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this First Amended Complaint, and believe
that the facts in this First Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my
knowledge and belief.

Reed J. Taylor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of October, 2008.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
My commission expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I H E E B Y CERTIFY that on the
day of October, 2008, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of Reed Taylor's First Amended Complaint to the
following:
I 4 A W DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MALL
FAX TRANSMISSION
-- EMAIL (.pdf a a a c h e n t )

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 8370 1-2582

MICHAEL S. BISSELL
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Jolm 3. lar-lis [lSB No. 35991
F1EPqiORTH. LEZAMIZ & .JANIS
537 W ~ a ~ x ~ Street,
d c k Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idal-ro 83701-2582
Telephone: (208) 343-7510
Fa3i No. (208) 342-2927

A'ctotneys for Defendsults Michael E, McNicllols
and Glen~ents,Brown & McNichols, P A.

IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF TI-IE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAIiO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
. k 6 * i *

RZED J TAYLOR, an individual;

1
) Case No. CV 08-0 1763
1

Plaintiff,
vs
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICI-IOLS,
P A., an Idaho professional corporation;
JANE DOES I-V, unlu-rown individuals;
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT

1
)
)

1
)
)

INTRODUCTION
While Courts normally favor liberal grants of motions for leave to anlend pleadings,
this case is the exception. This Couit has already received the briefs and heard oral aigument on the
Rule lZ(bj(6) Motion to Dismiss the first Complaint in this case, as well as the coillpanioii case

brought by the Plaintiff against the Hawley Trosell law firm. These Motions were based

011

pure

legal issues of standing, privilege, and the laclc of any legal duty the Defeildants could possibly have
toward the Plaintiff' that could suppoi-t 8ny legally cognizable cause of action. The proposed
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Ametrded Coinplaint suffers from tlie very sanle legal deficiencies and fails to state a ciaill1 upon
tvhicir relief can be granted as a matter of law. The Defe~ldantsthus respect&~liyrequest that the
Plaintiffs Motion be denied

LEGAL S T A N D A m
It is readily acknowledged that the Iddio appellate courts have rxled that inotions for
leave to amend pleadings are to be treated liberally See, e g , Wiclcsti oil? v Nor.ti1 Idaho College,

11 1 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986) The language of the Rule itself speaks to this with the now
familiar standard that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires " I X C P

1S(n)

Neveitl~eless,the Ida110 appellate courts have been equally adamant in instructing that inotions for
leave should

be granted if a proposed claim(s) in tl-ie new Coiuplai~ltfails to state a valid, legally

cogirizable claim.

I11

the words of the Idaho Supreme Court:

In determining whether an ailended complaint should be allowed,
where leave of court is iequired undei Rule 15(a), tile court may
coilsides whether tl-ie new claims ploposed to be inserted illto the
action by the anended complaint state a valid claim. If tlie amended
pleading does not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing p a l 9 would
be prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim, or if the opposing
party bas an available defense such as a statute of limilations, it is not
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the rnotion to file the
<amendedcomplaint

Blncfc Cn17jro11
Xacqzte!bnll v. Idaho First N n t i o ~ ~Bnt~k,
n f 1 1 9 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.Zd 900 (1991)\
Consistent wit11 this, the ldafio appellate cour-tshave repeatedly upheld or affirmed a district court's
decision denying a motion for leave to amend a complaint. See, t) g , Bi~seltv Stale, I 1 1 Idaho 865,

727 P.2d 1293 (Ct. App. 1986); PfTeils v. Zi~7ifedStnte.s
Ljfi

fEil7.s.Co

, I 19 Idallo 160, 804 P.2d 333

(Ct. ilpp. 1991); Blnclc Crrt7)ion Rncqrtefbnll, .stcpr.cr, I 19 Ida110 at 177-78; Sfnfe v Dnicel Clzeln

The same result should apply here.

LAW AND ARGUMENT
Much of the proposed Amended Gonlplaint reads a lot like the first Complaint. In
fact, many of the palagraphs are word for word identical

As far as the differences in the two
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pleadings, the chsutges in the Alnended Complaint are essentially two-fold in natu~e:{ I ) 011the socalled "'direct" clailns agaii~stthe attonley Defendants the Plaintif3 adds sonie specific factual
allegations and attempts to clean up some implicitly acknowledged pleading deficieilcies in his first
Complaint; and (2) To add new claims of a "derivative" nature not in the actual name of the AIA
corporate entities, but by Reed Taylor on ''behalf of the creditoxs andlor sl~areholders"of the AIA
companies
Each of these types of claims being made by the Plaintiff in the proposed Ailiended
Goinpiaint will be addressed separately and in twn.
A.

The "Direct" Claims.
These ale the claiins the Plaintiff brings on his own individual behalf directly against

the attorneys who iepresented the Defendants in the still ongoing underlying case. On tllese claims.
there is no need to address whatever specific changes in the factual allegations are being made in the
Ainended Complaint fiorn the first one. The points and arguments made by the Defendants in their
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Disilliss the Elst Cornplaint apply with equal force and effect to the
Amended Cornplaint, since all such points and arguments are based on who these parties are in
relation to each o t h e ~ .There is simply nothing about ally changes in these factual allegations that
can change anything about this.
011

these direct claims, the attorney Defendants are being sued "directly" by the

Plaintiff who sued the attorneys' clientsfdefendants in the underlying case. In other words, the
Plaintiff is suing attorneys for his lawsuit adversaries, a11 because the attorneys advocated positions
on behalf' of their clientsfdefendal~tsin the underlyiilg case which arelwere adverse to positions
advanced by the Plaintift just as lawyers are supposed to d o Worse, tlle Plaintiff is malting such
independent or direct claims against the attorneys while the uilderlying lawsuit is still pending,
meaning long before there has been a Pull and final determination of the merits of all the claiins and
defenses being made in that case.
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No amount of wordsmithing cat1 claange w l ~ othese parties are, and what legal duties
they do or do not owe to each other as litigatio~iadversaies. Fur this reason, and rather tllan repeat
atguil~entsalready briefed and argued to this Court at some lengh, for pulpose of these "&rect7'
claims the Defeildant would just adopt and incorporate by reference all of the briefs and argurnerits
macle by defense counsel iai both co~npailioncases on the dual Notions to Disniiss the first
Complaint.

B.

T h e "Derivative" Claims,

The fact that the Plaintifrs Anleilded Coinplaint now purports to iliake "dc~ivative"
claims acting on behalf of the AIA corporate entities does represent a legally substantiiic change
fiom the claims made in the fixst Con~plaint.It does not, liourever, chai~gethe bottom-line outcoirte
The Plaintiff is hardly in a posirioil to legiti~natelyclaiin the right to make such claims in a
"deerivative" capacity against attorneys who represeilted the coinpanies and/or its directors in a
separate lawsuit bso~tghtby the saiile Plaintiff.

I

TJje snltte n~gz,me171son flte itiotiot~to Liisrniss nppIjt io der'ivnlive ciniilrs.

To begin with, the points and arguillents on the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
to Dis~liissapply to these so-called derivative claims as well Again, no ;unount ofcleative or novel
pleading can ~ h a n g ewho these parties are ill relation to each other. The Plaintiff heie is also the
Plaintiff in tlle under lying case against tlle AIA entities, .Jolu~Taylor, elc. Tlle Defendant atto~neys
in this case (and the coinpanion case) are litigation counsel in the underlying case representing the
Defendants on the claims brought by that Plaintiff. While theie is presently a stay in the undeilying
case pending the outcoille of a disqualification motion, this underlying case is otherwise still pending
and not yet fully and finally resolved. The issues raised by the PlaintifFs claims in that case are, in
fact, being hotly contested,
By now trying to classi6 himself as having "derivative" standing for nlaking claims
in this case, the Plaintiff is in essence trying to place himself in the shoes of his lawsuit ad~iersaries,
pretend that he Is able to act on their behalf, all for the purpose of being able to sue their lawyeis for
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represet~ting

interests Stated another w q , the Plaintiff here viould in essence be concoctiilg

a legal tiieory by wl-iich an attorney's duties extend not to their awn clients but to the adverqary party
who sued their clients

This obviously makes no legal sense, and illustrates why courts have

universally iecogilized a Iitigatiall privilege extending to litigakion counsel. The legal premise
underlyi~lgsuch a privilege is of course based on the recogrtitio~~
that the law does not irupose a legal
duty being owed by litigation counsel to his clients' adversavy in a lawsuit These principles apply

regaidless of a plaintiff suing his Iawsuit adversaries' attorney on a "direct" basis

01

a self-

ploclail-ried'%derivative7'basis Either way, the leasons to apply a litigation p~ivilegeare the same

In addition, the Plaintiff's new claims based upon his self-appointed dei ivative stattls
would also require him to rneet the siatutory criteria for such status undei Idaho's Corporate Code
Simply prrt, he ~clrlnotdo this either
Idaho Code $ 30-1 -740 defines a "derivative proceeding" to mean "a civil suit in the
light of a domestic, corporation

"

This statutorjr definition, and the sections of the Code thak

follow "confirm the basic principle that a de~ivativcsuit is an aclion on behalf of the corporation "
I~inhoCode

5 3C-I- 710,Qgicinl Colt~rnel?tsThe veiy next section of the Code is entitled

"Standing," arid sqrtareIy addresses who has the right to coitlineilce or pursue such de~ivative
p~oceedings.It provides:
Standing.- A sharel~older may not cosnn~ence or maintain a
derivative proceed~ngunless the shareholder:
(1) Was a shareholdel of the corpoiation at the time of the act or
omission coillplained of or becanle a sl~areholdertluough tlmsfer by
operation of law from one who as a shareholder at that time; and
(2) Fairly and adequateIy represents tile interests of the corporation
in e~lforcingthe right of the corporation

Idaho Go& $ 30- I-7.CI

Thus, if there is going to be some consideration of whether the Plaintiff

does or does not qualify as having proper stai~dingto make derivative claims, the statutory criteria
is two-fold, and tile Plaintiff fails'to ineet either criteiion.
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The first statiltosy requireme~atfor a plaiiltiff :o bc able to cort~mencea derl~ative
p ~ o c c e d i ~is~ that
g the plaintift a~tvaflybe a shareholder of the co~poratiott,wflose interests tlte
plai13tiff purports to lepresent Tllis is mandatory. Here, the PlalntiK is si~nplytlot a sl~areholde~
In fact. hi: has not been a sl~a~ehalder
of the AIA con-tpanies for we11 over ten yeais at this point
The case caption for the Plaintiflts proposed First Amended Co~llplaintindicates he
is bringing Illis lawsuit against litigation coullsei

"oil

behalf of the .

s1~areho1ders7'of t l ~ eAIA

corporate elltitles I-Iowevet., it IS not sufficient under Idaho law ta just ciairn you are bringing your
lawsuit 'on behalf of" sl~arehoideisof a colporatioi? Rather, the '"Standing" statute requires lliat 61ie
plaiiltiff be a sllareholder of the corpo~atio~l
he or she claims to repiesciit

In the body of the Plaintiffs proposed First Alne~adedComplaint, he claims ti!? iig;lt
to bring a deiivative suit by virtue of being a credit01 of AIA Services, and a stoclc pledgee of AIA

Insutance. Tn other words, the Plaintiffs proposed Amended Comp?aint does 1101even alfege that
tlac Plaintif? is an actual shareholder of either company In any event, claiming to be a crcditvl of
one companj: and a stock pledgee of the other in no way amounts to the Plaintiff being an act~ial
sharel~olderof eitl~erofthe AIA cofpo~ateentities. The comments to the "Standing" statute of Idaho
Code 5 30-1 ~ 7 4 1make this point about as clear as it can be il-rade:
Section 741 requires tl-re plaintiff to be a sha~eholderand therefore
does not pelinit creditois or holders of optians, warrants, or
co~lversionrights to coillrnei-rcea derivative proceediiag
icinho Code

30-I-74 I , Official Cornme1717 3
111various filings and submissio~lswith this Court, the Plaintiff has made repeated

claiills to having a certain status, which the rulings of tl-iis Court in the underlying lawsuit have made
crystal clear the Plaiiltiff does not actually Iaave. For example, the Plaintiff claims in ltis proposed
First Amended Coi~lplaint- as lae has claimed repeatedly in various other submissions - that: he "is
the only authorized director and officer of AIA Insurance." See, Pl~j)7rt'fj'spt
oposedl;i~:rrAme)jln%d
Collzpl~inf
nrp 7, ?j 18 In sucll allegations, the Plaintiff is 11otjust assertiilg that lte llas illade clailns
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that he should be found to be entitled to this stafus. Instead, he claims that he actuaIly is

in t1.e

present tense-- tile only szch autfiorized director and officer. While the Plaintiff is loathe 111 adnzit
even the existence of a controversy over this point, it is simply undeniable that be does not enjoj that
legal status at this point. On the contrary, he has been cxplessly enjoined by this Court for the last
year and a half from a c t i ~ ~org attempti~lgto act as a director or officer of AIA Iirsurance In the
words of this Court's sdiing on Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Ii~junctiol~
dated Marc11 8,2007:
"PIaintifF Reed Taylor shall not . . act or asempt to act as a director or officer of AJA Insurance,
Inc." Yet, here he is i~ this case alleging he & the only autl-rorized director and officer, despite a
clear and una~nbiguou.:order ctf this Cou1-t telling liim he is not, and should not attempt to act as
such
Similarly, the Plaintiff has repeatedly alleged that he is the sole shareholder because

of his star.2; as a stock pledgee of ALP, Ii~suraneeandlor a cieditor of AIA Services and the ord: one
who can lawfully run the corporation With this self-appointed status, the Plaintiff theri goes on to
inalce vaiious aecusaticns against defense counsel such as they acted outside the scope of proper
replesetl~..itionall because they wcre not hired by the PlaintifY>the same person making ?he veiy
clairlls defense counsel hired to defendazt against. Again, this ignores that which everyone involved
lulows to be the undeniable trtith tbat stlcll issues are still being litigated in the underlying cnse, and
that there has been no full and final deternlinafion of these issues, It is a matter of recold, for
example, that the Piaiiitlff trkd to get this Court to reverse its Order granting the initial prelilninaly
injuilctinn in the underlying case by filing his own nlotion for prelinlinary injunction, and that such
effoit was denied hl its ruling on this Motion, this Court made it very cleal where the Plaintiff
currently starlds on this claim that he is the only shareholder who nlay lawfully iun the coi-poration
In the words of this Court:
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction is sinlply a back-door
atteiilpt by Plaintiff to persuade the Court to rule on the illerits of
Plaintiff's
lawsuit without allowing tlle parties the opportunity for
trial on the merits. The Court provided the parties with its analysis
of tlae nature of the issues in the lawsuit, informing the parties in clear
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and una-r.tbiguouslanguage that the issues are co~z-tplcxlegal issues
tl-tat require trial on the iflerits after suWijcienl oppor&nity to engage
in discovery and case prepamdon. Inorder to slant Plail-ttifFs Motion

Giving due regard to the concerns of the Plaintiff, the Court is not
willing to set aside due process and decide such co~nplexmatters
witiiout aEording all tile parties the ability to defend against
Plaintiff's claims.
See Opi17ion ur7cl Oi der- 017 Plnij?liSJShloiio1~for P~.elimil:ut-JJ
J~?jzmctioi;,
filed irdinl-ch 22,1007 in

SJZ
Per-ce Cotn~~y,
Civil Case Aro 06-028.55
The truth is the Plaintiff is cinitt7itzg he should be dcterinined to be the sole
s~~arelzolder
with the authoiity to run the cornparmy, but that issue is still veiy izluch up in the air in
the underlying case. Tl-tePlaintiff is not an actual shareholder at this point in time, arid tl~usdoes not
117ee.tthe first criteiia for havirzg standing to bring a derivative case u ~ ~ dIdaho
e r Code 5 30-1 -741

The second statutory requirement for Plaintiff to have stantling to bring a derivative
Pioceeding is a sl-tareholdercannot bring such a derivative claim "unless the sl~arel~oldel. . . fairly
and adequately represents the i i ~ t e ~ e sof
t sthe corporation in enforcing the light of the coiporation."

fcloiio Code fj 30-J-7$1(2) This particular Plaintiff in the present case canr-tot possibly meet this
criteria given all the circumsta~cespresented,
The i-t~ostglaring circunlstance is tliat tltis Plaintiff is already the direct lawsuit
adversary of the corporations i n a case currently pending before this same Court. He is, in fact, suing
the AIA coi-porate entity for many inore millions of dollars than everyone agrees the corporate
entities have, and is thus loolcing to bankmpt tIie corporations by virtue of the underlying lawsuit
Eorp~rrposesofthis type ofderivative clalln being brought against his lawsuit adversaries' attorneys,
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this pa_l-i:~cui;u
Plailztiff cotrld vely well serve as the definition of so~neonewl-to cou1d not possibly
"fairly and adequately represent the ittierests of'tlze corporation." It a'tlsolutely defies logic and
coillrnon sense that a plaintif%could sue a corporation and its diiectors, making numerous claims
agairlst them, while at the same time allowing that same Plaintiff to claim to represent the interests
of tile corporatio~lfor pllrposes of suing the corporation's and the djrectors' own lawyc~sw11o are
serving as the litigation counsel of such coiporations and officers against tile claims of the same
Plaintiff
Here again, the Plaintiff apparently wants to co~llpletelyignore the fact that he is
enjoined by this same Cotlit from attempting to act as a director or oWicer of the corporations, and
also enjoined "from . interfez ing wit11 the rnanagemellt ofthe businesses lmown as AIA Insurance,
Inc and AIA Services Corporation " Sge, Clpil?ior~or2 lbfolio~for Piaeliittitl-ar-y/ ? ~ ~ Z I I I C
ill INez
~OII

Perce Cozri-zr)),Civil Case No 07-00208, JifedMnt-ch 8, 2007, af y 6 That injunction Order by this
Court represents the current status of the underlying lawsuit, at least insofar as the Plaintiffs legal
abilities to act as an office1 or director or to manage the running of the companies. He is legally
precliided &om so acting under the express orders of this C o u ~ t .Yet, here he is filing a separate
lawsuit against attorneys for directois of the corporation and the co~porateentities tl~emselves,and
clairning to act on behalf of the corporations. This lawsuit, in other words, is at least inconsistent
with the Ordeis of this same Court in the underlying case, and in any event serves to illustrate the
basic point being made here that this Plaintiff could hardly be in a position to fairly and adequately
represent the inte1.est.s of the AIA corporate entities
This Court's original Order gianting the defense prelil11inar-y ii~junctioninaintained
the status quo and authoi.ized t l ~ ecunent management of the companies to continue running the AIA
corporate entities at the very least until sucl~time as the issues in that underlying case were fully and
finally r.esolved.. That represents the current status as well, since the issues in the underlying case are
far from being fully and finally resolved. As such, the Plaintiff is in direct conflict of interesk wit11
the corporation and there is simply no reasonable way for a plaintiff who sues the corporation and its
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dilectors directly, can t11e1l turn aro~lndand claim to reptesellt the corporation for prlrposes of suing
the lawyers w11o reptesetlt the defendant company and its di~ectorsin that same underlying la~vsuit

If anytliing, this Planltiff under the circumstances presented is the cluintessential opposite of a person
who can "fairly and adequately represent the interests of tlle corparatian" for purposes of making
derivative clai~nsagainst his adveisaries' allorneys The same is true of PIaintiff s counsel, who is
the same counsel representing the Plaintiff in the underlying case, brougl~tdirectly against the
corporation and its dil-ectors. IXow can such an ago~neyrepresent the direct adversary of the
colpo~ationand its directors, and then turn around and claim to essei~tiallyiepresent the corporation
anld its directors at the same time for purposes of suing tl~eiraEorileys7 'What the plaintiff aild his
COL~IIS
a1~e~tiying

to do I-iere would amount to one party and their attoilley clainling to represent both

sides of a serious legal dispute in two lawsuits going on at the same time It would amount to a direct
conflict of interest between current clients. In any event, the botlonl line is that this particular
Plaintiff could not possibly qualify as rneeting the statutory criteria to have standing to bring a
dei ivative claim, because he cannot fairly and adequately represent tlle ii-tte~estsof the corporation.
rhus, in addition to the point that the Defenda~ltsare entitled to a litigation piivilege
against both the direct and the derivative clairns being made by the Plaintiff in the proposed First
Amended Complaint, the PlaiiltiKcanrlot meet the statutory criteria for having standing to bring a
derivative c1aiil-i

CONCLUSION
In sum, the Defendants 1 espectfully request the Plaintiffs blotion fbr Leave to Amend
the Complaint in this ~tlatterbe denied, and that the Court dismiss the elairxs being made in this case
on the grounds that this Plaintiff rannot inalce legally valid clainls against litigation counsel for his
lawsuit advelsaries as a matter of law, as pre~iouslyargtred
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Dated this

&

w
-

duy of November, 2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident airtorney of tlte State of Idafto, with offices at 537 W
Bamiock Street, Suite 200, P . 0 Box 2582,B o i s Iduho
~ ~ 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
ofNovember, 2005, he caused to be served
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this &day
a trxe and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the inethod indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
MichaeI S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby PLLC
7 South Wowad Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201

[ 1 U S . Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax)
&] E-mail

w]
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FILED

IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE SECOND mDZGIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDARO, IN AND FOR TBE COUNTY OF NEZ, PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, an individual,

)
)

CASE NO. CV08-01763

)
)
)
)
)

OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation;
JANE DOES I-V, unknown individuals;

1
)

1

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion
to Amend Complaint. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held on October 16, 2008 and a
hearing on the Motion to Amend Complaint was held on December 4, 2008. Plaintiff Reed
Taylor was represented by attorney Michael S. Bissell. Defendants Michael E. McNichols and
the law firm of Clements, Brown & McNichols were represented by attorney John J. Janis. The
Court, having read the motion and briefs of the parties, having considered the record in the
matter, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby
renders its decision.

*.

Taylor v Mchhchols
O p ~ n ~ o&nOrder on Mot~onto Dlsmiss

..

*..

188

FACTUAL AND PROCEDUML BACKGROUNQ
The above-entitled matter is rooted in the underlying case of Taylor v, AlA, et. al., Nez
Perce Counv Case No. CV87-00208. The issues in the underlying case are complex and its
procedural history lengthy, though the matter has yet to go to trial. Reed Taylor's complaint in
the underlying case, m e n d e d five times, asserts eleven claims including one for default of a $6
million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporate defendants as part of a buy-out
or retirement package. In order to understand the claims being asserted in the instant matter,
certain events in the underlying case must be reviewed.
On January 29, 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AIA Services Corporation, AIA
Insurmce, Inc., John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. AIA Insurance,
Inc. is a business entity under the umbrella of AIA Services Corporation. At the time of the
filing of the lawsuit, John Taylor xias the managing director of the corporations and a board
member along with Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. Connie Taylor, the former wife of John
Taylor, held a community property interest in the corporations. Following the filing of the
lawsuit, attorney Michael McNichols was retained to represent AIA Services, AIA Insurance and
John Taylor; attorney David Gittens was retained to represent Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos;
attorney Jon Hally was retained to represent Connie Taylor.
On February 27, 2007, upon motion by the Defendants, the C o w granted a temporary
restraining order against Reed Taylor after he attempted to exercise management authority over
the corporate Defendants. A hearing date was then set on the Defendants' accompanying motion
for a preliminary injunction. On March 8,2007, as a result of actions taken by Reed Taylor
before and immediately following the filing of his lawsuit, the Court entered a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Reed Taylor from acting or attempting to act as manager andfor a board

'
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member of AIA Insurance Inc and/or from harassing and/or interfering with the mmagement of
AIA hsurance, Inc. and AIA Senices Corporation.' The Court's Order remains in effect.
On March 28, 2007, attorney McNichols filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for AIA
Services and AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor did not object and, at a hearing on April 12,2007, the
Court granted the motion to wifidraw. On May 7,2007, a notice of appearance on behalf of
AIA Services and AIA Insurance was filed by attorneys Gary Babbitt and John Ashby of the law
firm Hawley, Troxell Ennis &: Hmley, LLP. The firm continues to represent the corporations.
The last matLer in the underlying case that is of relevance to the instant case is a ruling by
the Court on motion for partial suvnmary judgment filed by Reed Taylor. After significant
briefing and oral arguments on the motion, the Court found the corporate Defendants were in
default on a $6 million promissory note issued to Reed Taylor by the corporations. However, the
Court made no determination relative to other terms in the extensive buy-out agreement between
AIA Insurance Corporation and Reed Taylor, such as the effect on voting shares and receivables
upon default of the promissory note. Those issues were not before the Court in the context of the
motion for partial summary judgment and, therefore, have yet to be determined.
After twenty-one months of motions and hearings in the underlying case, after trial dates
had been set and reset, and with a number of motions still pending before the Court, Reed Taylor
filed the above-entitled action against attorney McNichols and the law firm of Clements, Brown
& McNichols, who currently remain as counsel for John Taylor in the underlying case. In his

action, filed August 8, 2008, Reed Taylor asserts the following claims against attorney
McNichols and his law firm: (1) aiding and abetting or assisting others in the commission of
tortious acts in the underlying case; (2) conversion and misappropriation of AIA corporate

1

March 8, 2008 Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at page 6.
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assets: (3) violations of Idabo's Consurner Protection Act, 1.C. $48-601 et sey.; and, (4)
professional negligence and/or breach of fiduciary dutles. On September 29,2008, Dekndant
McNichols, tlvough counsel, filed a inotion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) along with
briefing. Reed Taylor filed briefing in opposi"con and on October 16,2008, the Court heard oral
arguments of counsel.
One day prior to the Court's heasing on DefendantsWution to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a
motion to amend his complaint, agaehing his proposed amended pleading. By order of the
Court, hearing on the Motion to Amend was held on December 4,2008 and the Court will
address the matter herein.

STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), a court is to review all
facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party and ask whether a claim for relief has been
stated. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 141,911 P.2d 133, 137 (1996). In the instant matter, the
arguments made by the parties incorporated events and actions that have occurred in the
underlying case of Taylor v. AIA, et al. Therefore, in making its analysis in the instant matter
and pursuant to I.R.E. 20 1, the Court will take judicial notice of the underlying case in toto.

ANALYSIS
{A) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

.

The issues raised in the instant rhatter appear at first blush to be complex and at times
convoluted. However, despite lengthy briefs and pleadings, the issues are not as daunting as they
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first appear.2 As stated by Reed Taylor in his opposition brief, the gravmen of his Complaint is
that aMorney McNichols and tlie law firm of Clements, Brown & McNichols aided and abetted
.John Taylor and others in commitling torts against Reed Taylor and acted to deprive Reed Tayior
of money and property to which he is entitled.3
Each of the claims asserted by Plaintiff relies upon his conten_l;ionthat the Defendmt law
firm and attorney were retained to represent the AIA corporations by John Taylor andior others,
that John Taylor andlor others had no authority to retain legal representation for the corporations,

and that Defendants knew they were retained without proper corporate authority. This factual
assertion by Plaintiff is critical to his claims and causes each of Plaintiff's clalms to fail as a
matter of law.
In the underlying case, the events of the litigation can be divided into three distinct time
frames based on procedural events in the case. The first time kame runs from the filing of Reed
Taylor's lawsuit against the AIA corporations, John Taylor and others until the Court's Order
entering a preliminary injunction in the case. The second time frame begins with the entry of the
preliminary injunction until the Court's Opinion and Order finding AIA in default on the $6
million promissory note (but deferring any finding on other terms of the buy-out agreement until
trial). The third time frame begins with the Court's finding of default on the promissory note and
continues to the present.
In the instant case, attorney McNichols was retained to represent AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and John Taylor after Reed Taylor filed suit against the corporations and its board
members in Nez Perce County Case No. CV07-00208. At the time of the filing of the lawsuit,
John Taylor was the managing director of the corporations and had been for many years. Reed
2

Plaintiff's Complaint is twenty-three pages in length. Defendants' brief in support of the motion to dismiss is
thirty-six pages in length. Plaintiffs brief in opposition is fifty-seven pages in length.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at page 19.
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Taylor contends the agreement at issue in the underlying case includes terms that render him the
sole shaeboldcr of the corporations upon default of the promissory note, and, because he
believed the promissory note was In default, be was the only person with authority to retain
counsel for the corporations to defend against the action he brought. However, at the time
Defendants were retained to represent the corporations and John Taylor, the question of whether
the promissory note was in default bad not been determined and remained pending before the
Court. Until such a determination was made, the authority to make decisions regarding legal
counsel for the coqorations rested with the corporate board of directors, which included John
raylor. Therefore, at the time attorney McNichols was retained to represent the corporations,
authority to enter into a contract for legal services rested with the corporate board of directors.
Reed Taylor, on the other hand, had no authority during this time period to make decisions for
the corporations. It would be a strange situation indeed for a civil plaintiff to be empowered to
select counsel for the defendant or, by logical extension, decide the defendant should have no
counsel at all.
After he was retained to represent John Taylor and the corporations, attorney McNichols
filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor. The motion was filed after
Reed Taylor attempted to have locks changed at the corporate offices in an effort to take over
management of the corporations. The litigation action of attorney McNichols was clearly
warranted where likelihood of great harm to the corporation existed from Reed Taylor's conduct
and no determination on the question of default andfor the effects of any default had been made
by the Court. As retained counsel for the corporations and John Taylor, attorney McNichols was
obligated to pursue all efforts necessary to prevent harm to the corporations and defend his
clients against the numerous claims of Reed Taylor.
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On March 8, 2007, after motions for injunctions were filed by both parties in the
underlying suit, after len@y briefing was submitted and hearings held, the Court entered an
injunction ordering management of the corporations to remain status quo, i.e, for management of
the corporation to remain vested in the corporations7 board of directors. In addition, the
injunction prohibited Reed Taylor from interfering with corporate management until further
order of the Court. Following the Court's entry of the preliminary injunction, attorney
McNichols rnoved to withdraw as counsel for the corporations. The COW granted the motion
and new counsel was subsequently retained to represent the corporations.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff's primary assertion is that attorney McNichols was retained
to represent the AIA corporations by persons who had no authority to retain corporate counsel
and that attorney McNicbols lcnew he was retained without proper authorization. This fact fails

as a matter of law as the Court entered an Order early in the underlying action that established by
judicial order that the operations and management of the AIA corporations was to remain
unchanged until further order of the Court. The Court's Order remains in effect to date. Under
Idaho Code $ 30-1-302, corporations have the same power as individuals to make contracts and
incur liabilities as necessary to carry out its business affairs and John Taylor, as CEO of the
corporations and pursuant to the Court's Order, had the authority to retain counsel for the
corporations.
Plaintiff's claims also fail under the doctrine of litigation privilege. The Court found no
Idaho case law addressing the doctrine. Nevertheless, numerous other jurisdictions have
addressed the doctrine at length, providipg the Court with direction as to the applicability of the
privilege.
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The courts in West Virginia have addressed the litigation privilege on a number of
occasions. In Clark V. Druck?*zan, 624 S.E.2d 864,2 18 W.Va. 427 (W.Va.2005), the plaintiff, a
physician and former defendmt in a medical malpractice suit, asserted claims in negligence
against counsel for the plaintiff in the malpractice lawsuit. The Clark Court, looking first at the
duties of an altomey, found an inflexible requirement that anomeys diligently, faithfully and
legitimately perfom every act necessary to protect, conserve and advance the interests of their
clients. Clark v Druckman, 624 S.E.2d at 868. The Court then noted that its research revealed
no case law that would support Clark's assertion that an attorney owes a duty to an opposing
party, such that breach of the duty would subject an attorney to liability. Id. at 869. The Court
stated, "This Court- can find no justification for imposing a duty of care in favor of an opposing
party upon counsel. Imposition of such a duty can only work to the detriment of counsel's own
client and would adversely impact counsel's duty of zealous advocacy for his or her own client
and would create an impossible and unjustified conflict of interest." Id.
Court's that have had the opportunity to address the litigation privilege recognize the
adversarial system would be turned on its head if parties to a lawsuit were allowed to bring
claims for torts andor legal malpractice against opposing counsel for conduct done within the
scope of litigation. While attorneys must not knowingly counsel or assist a client in committing
a crime or fiaud4, Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to pursue matters on
behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the attorney and
require an attorney to take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a
client's cause or endeavor. I.R.P.C., Rule 1.3[1]
The doctrine of litigation privilege appears intended to create a safety zone for attorneys
so that they may zealously advocate for their client without fear of retribution. The Supreme
4

I.R.P.C., Rule 1.2[10]
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Court of Appeals of West Virginia aptly described the scope and purpose of the litigation
privilege in Clark v. D v z ~ c h a n624
, S.E.2d 864,218 W.Va. 427 (2005).
In her concuning opinion in Barefield v. DPIC Companies, h e . , 21 S W.Va. 544,
600 S.E.2d 256 (20041, Justice Davis discussed the policies underlying the
litigation privilege. Therein she stated:
[tlhe public policies associated with the litigation privilege include: (1)
promoting the candid, objective and undistorted disclosure of evidence;
(2) placing the burden of testing the evidence upon the litigants during
trial; (3) avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of
subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality of j u d p e n t s ; (5) limiting
collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting zealous advocacy; (7)
discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging settlement.
Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 102 HawaiLi149, 73 P.3d
687,693 (2003).

Barefield, 215 W.Va. at 560,600 S.E.2d at 272 (Davis, J., concurring). In light of
these policies, we see no reason to distinguish between communications made
during the litigation process and conduct occurring during the litigation process.
As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court:
absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course
of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a
defamatory statement or other tortious behavior such as the alleged
misconduct at issue, so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.
The rationale behind the immunity afforded to defamatory statements is
equally applicable to other misconduct occurring during the course of a
judicial proceeding. Just as participants in litigation must be fiee to engage
in unhindered communication, so too must those participants be free to use
their best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of
having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.

Levin, Middlebrooks, Mhbie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., v. United States
Fire Insurance Company, 639 So.2d 606,608 (Fla. 1994). See also Jacksort v.
BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1274 (1 lth Cir.2004) (quoting
Levin ).
In Collins, we recognized that absolute privileges, such as the litigation privilege,
should only be permitted in limited circumstances. Collins, 2 11 W.Va. at 46 1, 566
S.E.2d at 598. Thus, we do not believe that a litigation privilege should apply to
bar liability of an attorney in all circumstances. In MehafJ, Rider, Windholz &
Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d. 230, 235 (Colo. 19951, the
Colorado Supreme court noted that "an attorney is not liable to a non-client absent
a finding of fraud or malicious conduct by the attorney." See also Baglini v.
Lauletta, 338 N.J.Super. 282, 768 A.2d 825, 833-34 (2001) ("The one tort
Taylor v. McNichols
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excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege is malicious prosecution, or
malicious use of process.'". We believe such exceptions to an absolute litigation
privilege arising fiom conduct occwing during the litigation process are
reasonable accommodations which preserve an attorney's duty of zealous
advocacy while providing a deterrent to intentional conduct which is unrelated to
legitimate litigation tactics and which harms an opposing party. As recently noted
by a California court:
[a] Xi-aud claim against a lavvyer is no different from a fraud claim against
anyone else. If an attorney commits actual fraud in his dealings with a
third party, the fact he did so in the capacity of aktorney for a client does
not relieve him of liability. W i l e an altorney's professional duty of care
extends only to his o m client and intended beneficiaries of his legal work,
the limitations on liability for negligence do not apply to liability for
fraud.

Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis &- Pogue, 121 Cal.App.4th 282,291, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d
26, 3 1-2 (Cal.Ct.App.2004)(intemal citations and quotations omitted).
In order "[t]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution it is essential to prove:
(1) That the prosecution was malicious; (2) that it was without reasonable or
probable cause; and (3) that it terminated favorably to plaintiff." Syl. Pt. 1, Lyons
v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 75 W.Va. 739,84 S.E. 744 (19 15). The term
malicious is defined as "[s]ubstantially certain to cause injury" and "without just
cause or excuse."Black"s Law Dictionary 977 (8th Ed.2004). This definition
implies an improper or evil intent or motive or the intent to do harm. Where an
attorney files suit without reasonable or probable cause with the intent to harm a
defendant, we do not believe the litigation privilege should insulate him or her
from liability for malicious prosecution.
As noted above, we can find no reasonable justification for distinguishing conduct
from communications for the purposes of the litigation privilege. However, we
also recognize the need for limited exceptions from application of the absolute
litigation privilege for certain intentional actions. Accordingly, we now hold that
the litigation privilege is generally applicable to bar a civil litigant's claim for civil
darnages against an opposing party's attorney if the alleged act of the attorney
occurs in the course of the attorney's representation of an opposing party and is
conduct related to the civil action.

Clark v. Druchan, 624 S.E.2d at 870-871.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff has argued his is a unique situation because he has filed
suit against the AIA corporations and its board members, that the contractual terms at the core of
his underlying suit make him the sole shareholder of the AIA corporations and, therefore, there is
9
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motion and Alpert appealed. The trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was affirmed by the Texas
Coazrt: of Appeals. In reaching its decision, the Texas Court made the following statements:
Perhaps as an oEshoot of its privily jurisprudence, Texas case law has
discouraged lawsuits against an opposing counsel if the lawsuit is based on the
fact that counsel represented an opposing party in a judicial proceeding. Bradt v.
Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). An
attorney has a duty to zealously represent his clients within the bounds of the law.
Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 71-72 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994, writ
denied). In fulfilling this duty, an aQorncy has the right to interpose defenses and
pursue legal rights that be deems necessary and proper, without being subject to
liability or damages. Id. If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party
for statements made or actions taken in the course of representing his client, he
would be forced constantly to balance his own potential exposure against his
client's best interest. See id. Such a conflict hampers the resolution of disputes
through the court system and the altaimcnt of justice. Thus, to promote zealous
representation, courts have held that an attorney is "qualifiedly immune" from
civil liability, with respect to non-clients, for actions taken in connection with
representing a client in litigation. See, e.g., Bufler v. Lilly, 533 S.W.2d 130, 13134 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
This qualified immunity generally applies even if conduct is wrongful in the
context of the underlying lawsuit. Renfioe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285,
288 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) ("Under Texas law, attorneys
cannot be held liable for wronghl litigation conduct."). For example, a third party
has no independent right of recovery against an attorney for filing motions in a
lawsuit, even if frivolous or without merit, although such conduct is sanctionable
or contemptible as enforced by the statutory or inherent powers of the court. West,
892 S.W.2d at 72. Courts have refused to acknowledge an independent cause of
action in such instances "because making motions is conduct an attorney engages
in as part of the discharge of his duties in representing a party in a lawsuit." Id.
(holding no cause of action existed for making motion for contempt because
attorneys do not owe duty to be correct in legal arguments-"even if the ... motion
for contempt had been meritless, their conduct in so moving, coming as it did in
the discharge of their duties in representing a party in a lawsuit, would still not be
actionable."). Thus, an attorney's conduct, even if frivolous or without merit, is
not independently actionable if the conduct is part of the discharge of the lawyer's
duties in representing his or her client. Id. at 74; Chapman Children's Trust v.
Porter & Hedges, L. L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429,44 1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). The immunity focuses on the type of conduct, not on whether
the conduct was meritorious in the context of the underlying lawsuit. Renfroe, 947
S.W.2d at 288.
As the Texas Supreme Court observed in McCamish, a lawyer's protection from
liability arising out of his representation of a client is not without limits. See
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McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 793-94; see also i'bles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899,91213 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). For exm~ple,a cause of action could exist
against an attorney who k~owinglyc o m i t s a fraudulent act outside the scope of
his legal representation of the client. See Likover v. ,SunJlower Terrace ZI, Ltd.,
696 S.W.2d 468,472 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no writ). If a lawyer
participates in independently fraudulent activities, his action is "foreign to the
duties of an aBorney.'Yd. ((quoting Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134,
137 (1882)). A lawyer thus cannot shield his own willful and premeditated
fraudulent actions from liabiliw simply on the ground that he is an agent of his
client. See id.
Alperr v. Crain, Caton & James, P. C., 178 S.W.3d at 405-406.

In the instant case, Reed Taylor's claims against the Defendants are based solely on
conduct engaged in by attomey McNichols as part of his obligation to zealously represent his
clients in the litigation process brought about by Reed Taylor's lawsuit against attorney
McNichols's clients. Plaintiffs first cause of action asserts the Defendants, with full knowledge
of Reed 'Taylor's rights under the buy-out agreement, aided and abetted others in the tortious
interference of Reed Taylor's contractual rights. Plaintiff asserts that in seeking and obtaining a
preliminary injunction against him in the underlying case, attomey McNichols aided and abetted
in the interference of Plaintiffs contractual rights that are at issue in the underlying case.
The conduct alleged by Plaintiff was not unlawfixl, was done in the course of the
litigation process and in the course of representing his clients' rights until a determination on the
legal issues could be made through the judicial process. The conduct of the Defendants done in
the course of seeking a judicial determination on the numerous claims brought against the
Defendants' clients in the underlying case falls within the litigation privilege even though Reed
Taylor may eventually prevail in the underlying action. When a party makes a claim that a
promissory note is in default and that certain terms of an agreement are triggered by the default,
an attorney is obligated to zealously defend h s client against the claims. It is not enough that a
plaintiff believes he will prevail on his claims. The AIA corporations and the board of directors
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have a lakvkl right, indeed the obligation, to appropriately defend against the clairns and to be
beard regarding any defenses to the claims. In addition, any attorney hired to represent the
corporation and its directors has an inflexible obligation to zealously represent his clients in that
defense and is obligated to take whatever steps are necessary within the litigation to protect his
clients rights until a determination of the issues is made by a court.
The second cause of action asserted by Plaintiff is for one of conversion. In the
underlying case, the question of whether the terms of the buy-out agreement entitle Reed Taylor
to the comissions and related receivables of AIA Insurance as security for the promissory note
is an open one. In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that by accepting payment for legal
services, attorney McNichols and his firm have converted those assets of AIA in which Reed
Taylor has a security interest, knowing Reed Taylor has a security interest in the assets, and thus
have unlawiklly converted to Defendants assets belonging to Reed ~ a ~ l o r As
. ' the Court has
already stated, there is in place an Order that management of the corporations is to remain with
the board of directors until a determination of Reed's claims is made or until further order of the
Court. Secondly, the corporations and the board of directors have a right to defend against the
clairns of Reed Taylor and to retain counsel to provide the necessary defense. The Defendants'
actions in defending their clients against the clairns fall squarely within the litigation privilege.
Reliance on the Court's Order placing authority to manage the corporations with the board of
directors, which includes contracting to pay for legal services, is justified and does not make the
Defendants liable for conversion.

Plaintiff argues that as a secured creditor, he has a right to make decisions regarding the operations of the
corporation. Plaintiff has provided the Court with no authority for his position. As a secured creditor, Plaintiff has a
right to seek a judgment allowing him to take control of the security, a claim he has asserted in the underlying action
and one that has yet to be determined.
Taylor v McNtchols
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Plaintifrs thrrd cause of action asserts Defendmts violated the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act, in particular I.C. jj 48-608(2), by engaging in acts, conduct, and representations
that were false, misleading and/or deceptive constiming unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or
practices. This allegation not only falls within the protections of the litigation privilege, as the
acts which Plaintiff alleges Defendmts engaged in were representations presented to the Court
within the scope of Defendants9 representation of the corporate clients, but the claim fails for
lack of privily, which is clearly required under the language of I.C. 5 48-608(1).~
Plaintiffs fourth cause of action alleges professional negligence andor breach of
Defendants' fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor and the AIA corporations. This claim fails for two
reasons: (1) litigation privilege and (2) lack of an at-l-orney-clientrelationship between Plaintiff
and the Defendants. In Elarrigfeld v. Nbncock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) and again in
Estate ofBecker v Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 96 P.3d 623 (2004), Idaho's Supreme Court
directly addressed the question of whether an attorney-client relationship is necessary before a
claim for malpractice may be asserted against an attomey. The Court held that, with the narrow
exception of the drafting of testamentary documents, there must be an attorney-client
relationship for a malpractice claim to be viable. In the instant matter, not only has Plaintiff not
asserted the existence of an attorney-client relationship with the Defendants, a key component of
his Complaint is that he has not been consulted or allowed to choose counsel for the
corporations.
Finally, there are two positions asserted by Plaintiff that the Court finds should be
addressed. The first is the assertion that attorney McNichols should have withdrawn from
representing, not only the corporations, but from representing John Taylor. Plaintiff argues

I.C. 5 48-608 reads in relevant part, "Any person who purchases or lease goods or services . . . ." Reed Taylor, by
his own admission, did not purchase the services of attorney ~ c ~ i c h zorl shis law firm.
*

Taylor v. McNichols
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.

atrtorney McNichols owed a duQ of loyalty to the corporations as clients and that potential
conflicts of interest between the corporations and John Taylor demands McNichols not represent
him. The relationships between the defendants in the underlyilag case have mmy overlays, soale
of which potentially create conflicts of interests between the defefendmtsand some of which
potentially create comnonality of interests between the defendants. One comonali.ty between
the defendants in the underlying case is that they are all defendmts. If there are conflicts of
interest that have been created by attorney McNichols initially acting as counsel for the
corporations and John Taylor, it is for the common clients to raise or to waive, not the opposing
party. Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct addresses conflicts of interest
between clients. Commentary 23 makes clear that there are circumstances in which it is not
improper for an attorney to represent codefendants even though conflicts of interest may
potentially exist. In the instant case, attorney McNichols represented all three clients for only a
brief period at the very beginning of the litigation, doing so at a very critical period in the case.
Elis immediate actions were clearly within that which is acceptable under the rules of
professional conduct established for attorneys representing codefendants in a litigation.
The second position asserted by Plaintiff is his argument that the codefendants have acted
wrongly in entering into a joint defense agreement. In the underlying case, many of Reed
Taylor's claims challenge interests that the corporations and the individual board members have
in common and that, therefore, require a common defense. It is only reasonable that a degree of
cooperation must exist between counsel for the corporations and counsel for the individual board
members, as the corporation is incapable of communicating with its counsel except through those
individuals who run the corporations. Contrary to the assertion by Plaintiff, entering into a joint
defense agreement does not prohibit the codefindants from asserting claims against each other if

.
Taylor v McNichols
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same reasons as addressed by the Court above, despite Plaintiffs bare allegation that the conduct
and actions of the Defendants exceeded the scope of their representation.
Plaintiff's aaempt to bring derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA
Services fail as a matter of law. Idaho Code 5 30-1-741 clearly and unambiguously provides
standing to bring derivative proceedings only to those who are shareholders at the time of the act
or omission complained of and only to those shareholders who fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the corporation. As noted by the ABA Official Comment at the end of I.C. 5 301-741, while some state's have eliminated the "contemporaneous" ownership rule, Idaho's
legislature chose to retain the requirement, as is evidenced by the language in the statute.
Plaintiff contends that, because other states have allowed creditors and stock pledges to bring
derivative claims, standing should not be limited to shareholders. The Court is not persuaded.
Idaho Code 5 30-1-741 is clear and unambiguous, making it clear Idaho's legislature has chosen
to limit derivative claims to shareholders only.

ORDER
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

day of December 2008

Dated this ;%

Taylor v. McNichois
01;inion & Order on Motion to Dismiss
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S h4OTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT was

J

FAXED

o ~ a ~ l epostage
d,
prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this g d a y of Decenlbcr 2008,
to:

Michael Bissell
7 So Howard St., Ste. 416
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John Janis
PO box 2582
Boise ID 83701-2582

PATTY O. WEEKS, CLERK
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 3. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICUL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, XN ANT) FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REEL) J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No. : CV08-0 1 763
Plaintiff,

v.

AFFmAWT OF MICHAEL S. BISSELL
IN SUPPORT OF PLAlBTIFF REED J.
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR

MICHAEL E. McNICI-IOLS, an individual;

STATE OF WASHPNGTON

1

) ss:

COUNTY OF S P O U N E

1

I, Michael S. Bissell, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, the

attorney for the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, and make this Affidavit based upon
my personal knowledge and belief based upon the inforination available to me.

2.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and con-ect copy of Reed Taylor's Motion

to Compel filed in Taylor v. AIA Sewices Corporation, et al. By way of the attached

Motion, Reed Taylor sought copies of tolling agreements and representation documents
submitted by certain defendants (who were represented by the Defendants in this action)

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL S. BISSELL . . . - I
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to their experts to testify in opposition to Reed Taylor's Motion to DisqualiQ counsel in

Taylor v. AIA Sewices Corporatiolz, czt a2. The documents requested in the Motion were
the same tolling ageements md evidence apparently relied upon by the Court in
dismissing Reed Taylor's Convplaint against the Defendants in this action.

3.

AMached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Court's Order

denying Reed Taylor's request to obtain copies of the documents referenced above. By
denying Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel (Exhibit A), the Court permitted the
Defendants to use the documents referenced in the Motion to Compel as a shield from
being disqudified, and as a sword for dismissing Reed Taylor's claims in this action.
4.

Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the itemization of fees

requested by the Defendants in this action. My office numbered each entry so as to
provide a basis to cite to the applicable entry for objection purposes.

5.

I have not pursed any claims in this action for any harassment, fi-ivolous or

unfounded purposes.

I stand by the claims asserted by Reed Taylor, as they were

asserted in good faith and supported by substantial law, as demonstrated by the
documents filed in this action. I have not, and would not, pursue any action for any client
/////
/I///
/I///
I////
///I/
/Ill1
/1/11
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knowing that the claims and facts asserted were not supported by the law or a good faith
arpment for the reversal modification or expansion of existing law.
DATED: This 20'" day of January, 2009.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me "Ibis 2othday of January, 2009-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

I HEmBV CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2009, I caused to be
served a true and correct copgrof the foregoing document to the following:
John J. Janis
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

NAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
O m W I C H T MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION
EMAIL (.pdf attachment)
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RODERICK C. BOND (Pro Hac Vlce)
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
F a : (208) 746-8421

MICHAEL S. BISSELL, TSB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KLRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7 1 1 1
Attonleys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN TI IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TILE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR T11E COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

I

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

Plaintiff,
v.

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
property comprised thereog BRYAN
W E M A N , a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof;

-- ----

*-

-*--

Defendants.

-

REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS PROVIDED TO
EXPERT WITNESSES OF AIA
SERVICES, AIA INSURANCE AND
JOHN TAYLOR AND PRELIMINARY
RESPONSE IN OPPOSrrION TO
MOTION FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW

1

&*,AA
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Plaintiff, Reed J. Taylor (""cerl

Tayfor"), submits this Motion to Compel the

Production of l~ocumentsProvided to Expert Witnesses of AIA Services, AL4 Insurance,
GropUSA, and John Taylor.

1. BRZEP STATEMENT OF FACTS
In opposition to Reed 'faylor's Motion to DisqudifL, AIA Services, AlA
Insttrmce and John Tay!c)r submiged the &davits

of expert witnesses Thomas D.

Morgan m d John A. Stlait. Gornie Taylor, James Beck m d Corrinc Beck filed a Joinder
incorporating by reference the expert witness affidavits. Sce Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Corrinc Beck's Joinder. The Affidavits of 'Ihornns Morgan and John Strail refer to
documents reviewed by each in sendering their expert opinions. Some of the docurncnts
reviewed by each are claimed to be subject to privilege.

A Iist of the privileged

documents reviewed by Morgan is set forth at pages 4-5 of his affidavit. A Iist of the
privileged documents reviewed by Strait is set forth at pages 8-9 of his affidavit.
Attached as Exhibit I to the SuppIementaf &%davit of Roderick Hond is a combined list

of the some of the privileged documents reviewed by each ("privileged documents").
It is essential to note that Morgan and Strait relied upon the privileged documents
in rendering their rcspcctive opinions. Specifically, on page 21 of his affidavit, Strait

emphasizes that his opinion is based upon privileged documents and candidly poinb out
Lhal Reed 'Taylor's expert witness, Peter Jmis, "simply doesn't have relevant

[privileged] information from which to opine."

See Straight Aff.

This strttement

perfectly kames the issue on this motion to compel: Whethe1 disclosure to a testifying
expert of privileged materials in connection with his testimony constitutes a m~tiverof the
attorney-client and work product privilege as to the material disclosed such that tile
opposing party is entitled to d~scovery?As discussed below, the answer is yes.

REED TAYLOR'S MUTIOM TO COMPEI,
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 2
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For this motion to compel, it is also to be materially noted that the privileged
documentx - before being disclosed to defendiults' experts - were the subject of Reed
Taylor" Requests for Prodwtion of Docurnenls. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond;
Supplemental AFfiitavil of Roderick Bond. The Defendants have refused to provide the
documents claiming priviIege. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond; Suppl~mentalAfidavit
of Roderick Bond.

The next business day after being served with the A-Efidavits of 'I%ornas Morgan
and 3 o h Strait, the attorney [or Reed 'I'aytor again requested of the defendants that the
documents provided to the expert witnesses. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond, Ex. E. The
attorneys for the defendailis were provided with written notice and an opportunity to
produce the documents. Id. The Defendants continue to refuse production nnd so stated

in an ernail dated October 14, 2008, fiom John Ashby to Roderick Bond, See Affidavit
of Roderick Bond, Ex. E. No other refponses were provided by any of the Defendants.

Reed Taylor now moves the court to enter an order compelling defendants to
produce the documents identified in Exhibit I to the SuppIemet~taIAfFidavit of Roderick

C. Bond.

A.

Reed Taylor Attempted To Resolve Tbis Matter Without Court Action,
However, The Defendants Have Refused To Produce Discoverable
Documents.
I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2) governs this motion to compel, and the rule provides as follows

in pertinent part:

(2) Motion. ... [rJf a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted
under Rule 34, fails to respond t h ~ inspection
t
will be permitted as requested or
fails to permit inspection as rcyuestcd, the discovering party may move for an
order compelling . , . inspection in accoidance wilh tile request. The nlotion must
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 3
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include a ~ e ~ c a t i that
o n the movant has in good faith conferred or a&cmptcdto
confer with the party itot mak-ing the rlisci~surt:in an eSEort to secure the
disclosure ~1iEhoutcourt action.

Here, Reed Taylor, through his counsel, has complied with I.X.C.P. 37(a)(2).
Reed 'Taylor ia good faith aftempted lo resolve this dispute withotit court action, but due

ta the defendann' refbsal to prc~ducerelevant documents this motion is required.

B.

The Defeadants' Dfsclosure To A Testi@ingExpert Of Privileged Documents
Constifutes A Waiver Of The Attorney-Client Privilege And Work Pmduct
Privilege, Which Requires The ProducGan Of All Such Documents Ta Reed
Taylor.
A party waives privilege when he or she discloses privileged documenh to a

testifying expert. witness. U S . Ffdelip d Guur. GO.v. Brcispelrct Oil Set-Y.S.Co., 2002

W 1.5652 (S.D.N.Y.), 53 Fed.R.Serv.3d CiO (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Pioneer Hi-Bred

fnl'eri?., lilt., 238 F.3d 1370 (gthCir. 2001); In itftcsselmnr?v. Phillips, 176 F.R.D. 194
(D.Md. 1997); In Doe v. Ltrzerpie County, 2008 WL. 25181 31 (ht1.D.Pa. 2008); CP Kelco
US. lrw. v. Pharmacin Corp., 213 F.R.D. 1% (D.De1. 2003); State ex lael. Tracy v.

Dandumnd, 30 S.W.3d 831 (Ma. 2000); Gall v. Jr2mison, 44 P.3d 233 (Colo. 2002).
~ J IUS.

Fideliiy h Cuar. Co. v. Br-aspetro Oil Servs. Go., 2002 WL 15652

(S.D.N.Y.), 53 Fed.R.Sely.3d 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the court ordered all documents
produced to the plaintiffs holding that disclosure of materials to a teslifyiilg expert in
connectio~twith his testimony effects a waiver to the same extent as any other discIosure.
The court stated:
it is well estabfished that volunt~ydisclosure of a document to a party outside the
privilege waives tl-re attorney-client privilege regarding that document. (Mtiltiple
citations otnitted). This is beestuse such disclosure undercuts the very senson for
the privilege2which is to protect the confidentiality of communications between
clients and their attorneys. (Multiple citations omitted).

REED TAY1,OR'S MO'MON TO COMPEI.
PRODUCTION 0
1
1
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U S . Fitielisy cfi Guur. Co., 2002 WL 15652

*

5, T l ~ ccourt, cited the Advisory

Committee's Notes to the 1993 Amendinents to Rtde 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and quoted:

'[Llitigants should no longer be able to argue that materials hrnisked to their
experts to be used in Forming their opinions-whetker or not ultimately relied on by
the expert-are privileged or otbenvise protected from disclosure."

In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Infern., Inc., 238 P.3d 1370 (gkh Gir. 2001),

the Eighth

Circuit Court of AppeaIs held that "hndamentd faimessY\requires any disclosure lo a
tes.tifj.ng expert of privileged or protected material in connection with his testimony
constitutes a waiver of the attomey-client and work product privilege to the same extcnt

as witl~any other disclosure. 'The court also referred to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Proced~lreand stated:
[Tjhe 1993 amenclments to Rufe 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make
clear that documents and infom~ution diselosed to a testifying expert in
connection with his testimony are discoverable by the opposing party, whether or
not the expert reIies on the documents and information in prepwing his report.
Rule 26(a)(2) requires that the testifying expert's report ."contain a complete
statement of all opiuions .to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the
data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; ...."
The accompmying Advisory Committee Note explicitly states that "[tJhe report is
to disclose the data and other information considered by the expert..., Given this
obfigalion of disclosure, litigants should no longer be able to argue that materials
ft~rnishedto their experts to be used in forming their opinions-wketller or not
ti.Itimiltely relied upon by the expert-are privileged or otherwise protected from
disclosure wher~ such persons are tcstifyillg or being deposed." (Citation
omitted). 'Tire revised ruic,~raceedx
arr the .li:tssut~~jio~t
il~iitfur~Jt~nt~i~l;tl
faitnesz
sc~uircsdiscfnst~reof all inFom~ntiaosxtp~liedti2 ir testifiittg cxnert in connection
with his tcsrinm~w.I n r f d , we are girite trrtabic to perceive whnt ill~ertlstst v ~ ~ u f d
b c serveti bttxet3nitlina c~1:15\mscI
to p r u v i d c - c ~ ~ r ~ r o o f u to
c t a tcstifvitl~
cxxsert: and then $0d e w discoven of such rnatedaf to the a~p-gm.

In re Pioneer Jfi-Bredlnlern.. Inc., 238 F.3d at 1375 (emphasis added).

REED TrlYI,0R7SSMOTION TO COMPEL
PRODUCTION OF' DOCUMENTS - 5
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In iWusselmm v Phil/@$, 176 F.R.D. t 94 (D.Md. 19971, the court held that whcn

an attorney &mishes work prodrict to an cxpert witness retained for purpose nf providing
opinion testimony, Chen the opposing party is entilled Lo discover such communication.

'I'hc coue also discussed the 1993 Amcndrnents to Rulc 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the status of case law:
26(n)(2)fB), a number of
Based largely on the Advisory Cornmigee's Note to K U ~ G
courts and commentators have accordingly concluded that if an attomey provides
work product to nn expert who considers it in farming opinions which he or she
will be testibing to at trial, this infomalion is do longer privileged and nlust be
disclosed
See, e.g., 8 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R,Miller, & Richard I..
krarc~is,Federal Prrrctice and Procedwe Ej 2016.2, at 250 (1993) ("At Ieast with
respect to experts who testify at trial, the disclostlre req~~irement
of Rule 26(a)(2),
adopted in 1993, was intended to predetermine further discussion and mandate
disclasure despite tale work product] privilege."). ..("Both the [I 993
Amendments to the Federal Rules] and the Advisory Colnmittee Notes indicate
that materials supplied to an expert are subject to discovery.").
rtlusselpnan, 176 F.R.D, 194 at 197-198. In Due v. Laizerne Counr;t; 2008 WL 2518 13 1

(M.D.Pa. 2008), the court held that work-product privilege protection is waived when

ail

attorney discloses privileged documents to an expert witness that considers, relies upon
and cites the documents in writing an expel* report. 'i'he priviIeged doeumcnts are
required to be produced to thc opposing pstrty.
In CP Kclco US. Inc. v. Phnmacia Curp.,'213 F.R.D. 176 (D.Dcl. 2003), the
district corirt also held that a puty is required to produce documet~tsprotected by the
artamey-client privilege when it provides the documents to an expert witness that offers.

is of
fundamental importartce. It woulcl be manifestf~unfair to alIow a partv to use the
~rivileec~ C sslricld
I
ir~fo~.n-iatiart
whiclt it had i l c l i t t e r a t c ~ ~ j ~to~use
~ s coffcnsi~'~
as Pharmacia did in this instance when it used Lhc allcnedly ~riviletreddocumet~ls
-to m its expert for testimony. ( See Fe8.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(a) and Advisory
Committee note.) I-Ience the truism that a ~rivileeccannot be mscd as both a
-shield
-- and a sword. See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758, 103 S.Ct.
1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1 983). The non-legal equivalent of that truism is equally
tu thc point: "You can't lime it bat11 wxvs." 'Iavinrr cltasei~&use {he infirmatim
in the context of an assertion of privilege, the inviolability of that sale

REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMEN'I'S - 6
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inhrmation from disclosure is, and remains, waived.

--cd to ticft.n&&

CP Kelco US. lac., 2 13 F.R.D. 176 at 179 (c~nphasisadded).
30 S . W.3d 831 (bfo. 2000), the court held
In State ex re/, Trucy v. Dann'ura~~cl,
that a party waives the aEomey-ciient privilege as to docments provided to an expert
witness who testifies and the opposing party is entitled to the production of all of the
materials provided to the expert.
Rule 56.01(b)(4) [Missouri denoinination of Rule 26(b)(4)] should be read to
require production of all of the materials provided to the expert. '1'0 hold
otherwise would allow the expert witness or the party reiaining thc expcrt witness
to select which doeurne~~ts
to produce after the expert has reviewed the documents
in preparation for the expert's testimony. ..It is approprtate, at deposition or trial,
to cross-exmine an expert witness as to kinformation provided to the experi that
may contradict or weaken the bases for his or her opinion regardless of whethex
the expert relied upon or considered the information.
Sraie ex re]. Tracy, 30 S . W.3d at 835,

In G ~ l v.
l Jumison, 44 P.3d 233 (Cola. 2002), the Colorado Supreme Court, en

bnnc, held that privileged materials lose their privileged status when disclosed to, and
considered by, a testifying expert.

In a scholarly and comprehensively considered

opinion, the court stated:
A 1993 amendment to Rule 2G of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a
parallel 1995 amendment to its Colorado counterpart mandate fbll disclosure of
ttse rnatcrials considered by an expert. witness, even if the nlateriafs include
attorney work product. The plain langt~age of' the amended Rule, thc
accornpunying advisory committee's note, policy considerations, and the weight
of authority compel the conclusion that privileged materials lose their privileged
status when disclosed to, and considered by, a testifying expert.

Gail, 44 13.3d at 234. 'l'he Goiorado Supreme Cotu-t also specifically addrcsscd and
rejected the disclosing party's argument that an in ca:amer-u inspection of the disclosed
doct~mentswas an available aiternative:

REED 1'AYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL
PRODUCTlON OF DOCUMEN'I'S - 7
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Strung public policy considerations strpport a constniction of Rule 26(a)(2)

resources.
A bright-line rule preserves judicial economy by obviating the need for a judge to
consider v1~11elbercot~nsel'scomunications to retained experts contain work
product.

Call, 44 P.3d al239 (emphsis added).
Lastly, beca~~si:
of its succinct and instructive natrtre, the guidance offered to
snorneys in Law and Practice of fnsurmce Coverage Litigation $ 24:39 (2008) is
mentioned.

Aiter stating th8.t there "'are three iinportant guidelines" for disclosing

documents to an expert witness, the first guideline is stated:
First, coullsel must consider whether the document to be provided is subject to
m y privilege because providing the dactunent to the cxpert will constitute a.

waiver of that privilege, Certainly, an expert should not be t~rovidedwtth any of
nriviteeed coi~~mttnicatiiai~s
Jkivs
tilt3 client, or work-nrotfucr, unlcare taking the extrcmefy unusual step ofwifiving such privileges.

~=l's

Law and Practice of Insurance Coverage Litigation $ 24:39 (2008) (cmphasis added).
IIere, the Johtl Taylor, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and 61.opUSA all submitted

expert reports by and through their attorneys. Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine
Deck filed n Joinder opposing disquaiification. They have a11 waived their attorney-ctient
priviicge and all doc~une~lts
must be produced that have been provided to or relied upon

by the experts, including, all notes and related documents.

REED TAYI,OR'S MO'I?ON TO COMPEL
PRODUC'TION OH DOCUMENTS - 8
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For the ressons articulated above, the Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion to
Compel Production of Docmenti; Provided to Expert Wilnesses John Swaight and

Thomas Morgan. The Defendants should be ordered to produce all documen& provided
to Thomas Morgm and John Shight and their notes, in particular, all documenfs listed ia

their Affidavits.
For the same reasons set forth above, the Motion for In Cmera Review should be
denied because the Defendants have waived any privilege.

DATED: This 15* day of October, 2008.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBYLLLC

Ned A, Cannon
hGcIrael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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, dlCT

NO. 9443

COURT

IN THE I)XSTRICT COURT OF
STATE OF IbAHO, IN

P. 1/3

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
OF WEZ PERCE

WED 3. TAYLOR, a singIe person,
CASE NO.CV07-00208

OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho

corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYL,OR and
CONNIX TAYLOR, individually and the
commdty property comprised thereof,
BRLAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an
Idaho corporation; and JAW3 BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individualIy and in the
community property comprised thereof;

COMPEL DOCUMENTS
PROVZDED TO DEFENDANTS'
EXPERTS RELATIVE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY

Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel filed October 15,2008.

On October 20,2008, the Court:heard PIainWs Motion to Compel along with Plaintiff's Motion
to Disqualify and Defendants' Motions to Submit Documents in Camera as the motions were dl

related. The Court took the motions under advisement. Shortly thereafter, the Court granted

Defendants' motjom to submit the documens sought by Plaintjff to the Court i~ c m m . Based

in p a t on the i~rcamera docm~nts,the Coua later entered its Opiflion and Order on Plaimips
Motion to Disqu&@ the Attorneys and Law Firms of Rawley Troxell Emis & Hawley LLP,
C l e m & Brown & McNichok, P.A., and Quales & Brady LIP. The Court now addresses

P l & ~ f f smotion to compd discloswe of the docments provided to the Court in camera.

Mer carehl review of the doculne&s sought by Pfain~Ef;the Court finds the dr~cuments
are .tvark product subject to attomeylclientprivilege md not discoverable, Therefore, Plainiifrs

Motion to Compel is hereby DENIED.

Dated this

7

day of January 2009.
,---I
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&#.i(ICT

rs-

b;~p3
NO. 9443
*,>.

COURT

C9*xP

P. 313

e copy o f the foregoing ORDER was:
d h m d delivered via cow barket, or

~4

V
mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewisto~Idaho, this _
Jmaq, 2009, to:
Roderick C.Bond
Smith and Camoh
508 Eighth St
Lewislon, US 8350 1

PO Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

Michael S . Bissell
7 S Howard St
Spokane, WA 99201

Smes GatzioIis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles and Brady LLP

David R. Risley
Randall, Hake & Cox

Michael E, McNichols
Clements, Brown cPr, McNichols
PO Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
David A. Gittins
PO Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403

Gary R . Babbitt
L) J o h Ashby

500 W Madison St., Ste 3700
Chicago IL 6066 1-2511

Charles Brown

PO Box 1225
Lewiston, ID $3501

.

-

Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
PO Box 1617
Boise, ID 837Qlaj17

To Plaintips Motion to Disqualify
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLG
At-torneys for Appellant Reed Taylor
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-71 11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-08-01763
Appellant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
MICHAEL, E. MCNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES 1-V, unknown individuals;
Respondents.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, MICHAEL E.
MCNICHOLS AND CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS AND
THE PARTIES' ATTORNEY JOHN J. JANNIS, HEPWORTH,
LEZAMIZ, & JANIS, CHTD., P.O. BOX 2582, BOISE, ID 83701;
AND

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant Reed J. Taylor appeals against the above-

named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

entered in the above entitled action on the Brdday of December, 2008, the Honorable
Jeff M. Brudie presiding.

2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

JudgmentslOrders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and
pursuant to Rules 4 and 1 l(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of issues on appeal,. which the Appellant intends

to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of which are issues of first impression);
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect
others:
a. Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation,
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action.
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the commission of
any of the foregoing causes of action?
c. Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the
attorney knew or should have known were funds in which the
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest?
d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation, have standing to
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation?
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e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have stallding to assert
direct causes of action against parties for claims o w e d by the
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the corporation?
f. Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded hisker scope of
representation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege?

g. Can an aeorney represent corporate clients with diverging interests
when the representation was approved by persons with
directorlofficer conflicts of interest?

b. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person from asserting
claims against an attorney, when the plaintiff does not have privity
of contract with the attorney, for violations of Idaho's Consumer
Protection Act?
i. In considering a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is it
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an
entirely different case in toto andlor to consider documents which
are not in the record for that case?
j.

Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged
corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for
malpractice against an attorney?

k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of
an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for
malpractice against an attorney?

1. Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to
dismiss under IRCP 12(b)(6) without requiring production of the
documents to the other party?
m. If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the
privileged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorneyclient privilege been waived and must the documents be produced
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel?
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n. If Idaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defense for an attorney, can
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney
asserls were under the scope of representation, when such scope of
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from
the corporation client, when the attorney knows or should have
k n o w that: (I) the representatives of the corporation have
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of
representation was not in the best interests of at least two
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attorney's
three different clients.

o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary duties, special
duties, and/or third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (1)
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the nonclient has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer
and director of the corporation client, the corporation client is
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds are
insuficient to pay; (4) that millions of dollars in assets and funds
may have been wrongfully transferred from the corporation client
by the very individuals directing the litigation ( 5 ) the parent
corporation of the pledged corporation is also being represented by
the attorney and the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by
the parent corporation client who is highly insolvent?
p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho's Constitution) to
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes
of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to a
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action attorneys
relating to any one or more the foregoing?
4.

There has not been an Order sealing all or any portion of this record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.
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6.

Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's

record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 1.A.R:
a. This Notice of Appeal;
b. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss;
c. Plaintifrs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;

d. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
e. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint (including
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint);
f. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend Complaint; and
g. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint.
7.

I certify that:
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter
because a transcript has not been requested.
b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested.
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid.
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid.

e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this 30'" day of January, 2009.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Appellate Reed Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I H E E B U CERTIFY that on the 3 0 day
~ of January, 2009, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy oEAppellant" Notice of Appeal to the following:
HAPXI DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION
EMAIL (.pcif a m c b e n t )

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6

John J. Janis
Hepwofih, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd.
P.0, Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

FILED

John .J. Janis [ISB No. 35991
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W B m o c k Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone: (208) 343-75 10
Fax: (208) 342-2927

2889mU ffi 3 39

I

Attorneys for Defendants Michael E. McNichoIs
and Clements, Brown & McNickols, P.A.
ZN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J . TAYLOR, an individual,

1
)

1
)
)
)

VS.

MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, an
individual; CLEMENTS, B R O W &
McNICHOLS, P.A., an Idaho professional
corporation; JANE DOES I-V, unknown
individuals,

Case No. CV 08-01 763

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL
CLEN'SMCORD

1
)
)
)

1
)

1

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT AND HIS COIJNSEL OF RECORD, THE COURT
REPORTER AND CLERK OF THE. ABOVE ENTITLED COURT;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that tlze Respondents in the above entitled proceeding

hereby request, pursuant to Rule I 9 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the following
materials in the clerk's record and reporter's transcript in addition to that required to be included by

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL. TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL CL.E.RI<'S RECORD - t

' 3 - v - 1 ' 0 aI"3
~
01 ~uensrndpamas aq 01 pa.rmbas sapled

1 1 uodn
~
pue Jmoa ~:,ys!a a q l j o 4 ~ a 1ayl
3 uodn pahlas

uaaq set! plo:,ar Ieuoyppe 103 tsanbal syrp JO Ado3 e leqi fgp.rar, laqlxq I

'p

Ino las ale ssarppe pue aweu asoyM 'paqnba~s~1dr13sue.11e LUOLIMwo,y .ia)~oda.r~mo:,ayl uo pahlas
uaaq seq ~ d l l r t s u es ,~l ~
a ~ l o d aIeuo!j!ppe
~

.IOJ

tsanba.1 s!riljo Xdo:, e Jeql Qya:, I

"S9LIO-80 A 3 'ON asQ AJuno3

axad zaN
ay

ID

u! '8002

ja 'jqqug ff X,fus n .rolXu~:rpaw 30 as%:,uoruedmo:,
' f ~~aqrua3aapalg

'lu!elduro3 puaurv 01 uogolr\l

S&JIU!t?Id pue SS!US~~[01 uoyop.~cslmpuajaa:uo laplo pue u o ~ u f d ~

-a

pue I 8 0 0 ~'62 xaq~uaidaspa19 '$u!s~dmo~)
ss!ws!a

OJ

uo!~oy\~,s$uepuajaa $0 voddns u! umpueJomalr;[

-y

.f

DATED this

fl

%A
day of Februay, 2009

HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The uildersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
B m o c k St., Ste. 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701-2582, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this ) 2 *day of ~ebruary,2009, he caused to be served
a true a~ldcorrect copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Michael S Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, WA 9920 I

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ 1 Hand Delivery
[ ] Oveinight Mail
[XJ Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 11
[XIE-mail Transmission

Linda Gariton
Court Reporter to .Judge Brudie
425 Warner
Lewiston, ID 83501

[XIU.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ]Overnight Mail
[XIFacsimile Transmission (208)746-1 474
[ ] E-mail Transmission

Clerk of the District Court
Nez Perce County Courthouse
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501

[

1 U.S. Mail

[XIHand Delivery
[ 3 Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission (208) 799-3058

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL. TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL CLE.RKIS RECORD - 3

MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL gt KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 41 6
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel; (509) 455-7100
Fax: (503) 455-71 11
Allomeys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV08-01763
PlaintiffIAppellant,
v.
MICHAEL E. McNICROLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS, B R O W & McNICHOLS,
P.A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES I-V, unknown individuals;

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS FOR
CLEW'S RECORD

DefendantsIRespondents.

--

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY

AND TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Appellant in the above entitled proceeding
hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 28(c), I.A.R., the inclusion of the following materials in
the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and identified
in the Notice of Appeal:

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS FOR CLERK'S RECORD - 1

"36

6'"

1.

Clerk's Record:
a.

2.

Afldilavl't ofMchael S. Bisselk in Szppori ofPlaintWs Reed L.
Taylor's hhtion to Disallow Defendants' Regttesf for Attorneys'
Fees and Costs (filed January 20,2009).

I certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served

upon the Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this

PA

day of February, 2009.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
By:
Attorneys for Plaintiff

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS FOR CLERK'S RECORD -2

9'27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/p

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of F c b m q , 2W9, I caused to he
sewed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the following:

HAND DIELWERY
U.S. MAIL
O E R N I G H T MAIL
FAX TMNSMISSION
EMAIL (.pdf aaacbent)

John J, Janis
Hepwofih, Janis & Brody, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS FOR CLERK'S RECORD - &
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